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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the life and work of General Bernard Schriever, 
principally with regard to his work introducing intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) into United States Air Force (USAF) service during the 1950s, and his 
related efforts to develop systems for manned and unmanned military spaceflight.  
It situates his life and work in the early Cold War of the 20th Century, and through 
exploitation of the Schriever Archive at the Library of Congress in Washington DC, 
and recently declassified US Government documents, principally those released by 
the National Reconnaissance Office, it seeks to explore his understanding of the 
strategic context of his work.   
It posits that to introduce a technically advanced system into military 
service, it is necessary to evaluate both technical and non-technical risks to 
progress, and to possess or achieve sufficient administrative control to reduce 
those risks and improve overall programme maturity in both domains.  By 
considering Schriever’s successful introduction of ICBMs into USAF service and 
his management of the early USAF reconnaissance satellite programmes, it 
demonstrates his understanding of all three facets of progress.  It then examines 
two areas where Schriever failed to achieve his stated goals, firstly in his attempts 
to develop a military manned spaceflight programme in parallel with the national 
programme being run by NASA and secondly in respect of his advocacy for space 
weaponization.  In each case, it shows that Schriever’s failures can be explained 
by insufficient progress along one or more of the identified lines of activity.   
Recently declassified US Government sources, and the Schriever archive in 
the Library of Congress, which includes unpublished book-length manuscripts by 
Schriever and co-authors, are used to corroborate his views.  The thesis concludes 
by critiquing the analytic model used and suggesting alternative sources that might 
shed further light on Schriever’s work.
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES 
The Schriever Archive at the Library of Congress.  This thesis draws on extensive 
exploration of the Schriever Archive at the Library of Congress in Washington DC.  
The provenance of the Archive is described in Chapter 3.  References follow 
normal scholarly convention with two variations specific to this thesis: 
 
When the Archive was curated, all content, regardless of classification, was 
allocated to a Container according to subject and/or date.  Classified 
content was then withdrawn and stored separately.  The author submitted 
numerous ‘Mandatory Declassification Review’ requests to the Library staff 
in an attempt to gain access to the classified content, with some success.  
When content was declassified, however, it was released to the author 
without indication of its original Box and Folder location.  Eventually, this 
content will be relocated to its original containers, but within this thesis, 
most such documents are, of necessity, noted as being in the ‘Schriever 
Archive, Recently Declassified Documents’ folder. 
 
The full citation to an item in the Archive requested by the Library would be: 
“Container number, Bernard A. Schriever Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.’.  To aid future scholars, all 
references in this thesis also indicate folders within the individual 
containers.  In the interests of brevity, after the first instance of an archival 
source, references are abbreviated to ‘Schriever Archive, Box ‘x’, Folder ‘y’.’ 
 
The Sheehan Archive at the Library of Congress.  Reference is also made in this 
thesis to the content of the ‘Sheehan’ Archive.  Mr Neil Sheehan wrote a biography 
of Schriever, published in 2009.1  He is also the source and donor of a large 
archive at the Library of Congress relating to his previous publications in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  On publication of his biography of Schriever, he donated his source 
material for that publication to the Library too.  Eventually, it will be incorporated 
into his existing collection at the Library, but it is currently (2015) awaiting 
processing.  Mr Sheehan and the Library granted the author access to the 
unprocessed acquisition relating to Schriever.  Currently, it comprises 21 
containers, as sorted by Mr Sheehan during his writing.  There is no finding guide 
for the acquisition, but the container names are descriptive.  There is some 
duplication in the collection – Sheehan would copy his interview transcripts, for 
example, and file them under multiple themes in various boxes if the interview had 
covered more than one relevant topic.  In this thesis, material from the Sheehan 
collection is referenced simply as being from the ‘Sheehan Archive, Box ‘x’.’, noting 
the container used by the author.  There can be no guarantee that these 
references will translate into any new storage scheme when the acquisition is 
processed, but they should then be locatable via the Sheehan Archive Finding 
Guide in the normal way. 
 
Republished Primary Material.  Two series of republished primary documentation 
have been used in this thesis.  The NASA publication ‘Exploring the Unknown’ 
(currently in 7 volumes) comprises a large amount of primary material from NASA 																																																								
1 Neil Sheehan, A fiery peace in a cold war : Bernard Schriever and the ultimate weapon (New York: 
Random House, 2009).  See also Chapter 3, p70 et seq within this thesis. 
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archival sources, reprinted verbatim with linking explanatory essays.2  The US Air 
Force Space Command publication ‘Orbital Futures’ (2 volumes) does similar, 
drawing on USAF sources.3  In each case, reference is made to the archival 
document as reprinted, with a note that it can be found in one or other of those 
publications.  References to the explanatory essays are treated as content of an 
edited volume and follow normal referencing conventions. 
 
Web-published Historical Volumes.  The author has been given and referred to 
copies of various source documents during the course of his research.  Some 
appear to be downloaded reprints, but the web-source of the downloads is not 
always clear.  References to these publications are made in the normal way for 
printed sources by title, author, publisher/place of publication and date.  The reader 
seeking to access titles referred to, but not otherwise locatable, is recommended to 
try searches at the US Defense Technical Information Center (www.dtic.mil), the 
NASA History web-page (www.history.nasa.gov) and the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) ‘reading room’ 
(http://www.nro.gov/foia/index.html).
																																																								
2 John M Logsdon (ed.), (1995-2008), (SP-4407) Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the 
History of the US Civil Space Program 7 vols.; (Washington DC: NASA History Office). 
3 David N Spires (ed.), (2004), Orbital Futures: Selected Documents in Air Force Space History 
(Essays and commentaries by David N Spires) 2 vols.; (Peterson AFB, CO: USAF Space Command). 
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CHAPTER 1 – TECHNICALLY ADVANCED SYSTEMS 
 
The relationship between technology and strategy is complex, and at times 
the descriptions of each suggest they are at cross-purposes.  Strategic thought 
seeks to identify timeless principles with wide applicability, while mastery of 
technology seems to require study of intricate and specific detail, which is only 
temporarily useful.  Even when the discussion is limited to military strategy and 
militarily useful technology, the tension remains.  But somehow the two are inter-
related; the concept of maritime strategy and the geopolitical view it enables, for 
example, is abstract without access to ships and some knowledge of marine 
engineering.   
The post World War 2 revolution in military technology which exploited 
nuclear weaponry, developments in electronics and computing power and the 
dawn of the space-age had profound implications for strategic thinkers, if only 
through what it made possible.  This thesis seeks to illustrate an aspect of this 
paradigm shift by considering the role of one man – General Bernard Adolf 
Schriever USAF – and the part he played in developing the capabilities of the 
United States of America in this respect.  His name may be recognised by some, 
and he gained a measure of public recognition during his life.  Nonetheless, it is the 
author’s contention that few recognise the nature of his contributions across the 
fields of missile and space technology, or understand why he acted as he did, and 
that filling this gap in the literature is a worthwhile endeavour.  Even fewer have 
pondered how he achieved the results he did, and this thesis also proposes a 
scheme for evaluating his methods. 
Without doubt, Schriever’s service career and personal talents propelled 
him to a position where he exerted great influence on the nature and capabilities of 
the United States Air Force (USAF) in the 1950s and 1960s.  In this period, he 
directed the development and introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) into the USAF inventory.  Starting at about the same time, he was also 
involved in managing the early attempts to harness space capability.  The 
engineering management techniques that Schriever used to direct the ICBM 
programme, and the associated organisational changes he promoted within the 
USAF have been the subject of study, but beyond this, little detailed analysis of his 
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life, work or motivations has been undertaken.  Given the respective impacts of the 
ICBM and the military space programme, this is a surprising omission. 
The crux of the lacuna is as follows: the availability of the ICBM had a 
profound impact on the conduct of the Cold War and consequently, on strategic 
thought then and since.  Schriever’s contribution to that project was significant and 
has been analysed in considerable depth.  Yet at the same time, Schriever was 
intimately involved in the birth of the military space programme.  At the time it 
began, it was not only the military space programme, but also a large portion of the 
national space programme of the United States.  Schriever had clear ideas about 
the utility of spaceflight as a domain for military activity – some were inherently 
practical and subsequently borne out by events, others much less so.  Yet analysis 
of his ideas about spaceflight, space capability and their impact on national security 
is notably thinner than that relating to ICBMs.  There are some passing 
acknowledgements of their importance; within the USAF, Schriever would be 
described informally as ‘the father of the ICBM’, and the reunion gatherings of his 
colleagues after his retirement were referred to as meetings of ‘missileers’.4  But 
the lasting tribute paid to him by the USAF when they renamed Falcon AFB, 
Colorado, as ‘Schriever AFB’ in 1998 is tied to spaceflight, not missiles.  The major 
resident unit on the base is the USAF’s 50th Space Wing (motto ‘Masters of 
Space’), which has a declared mission to ‘Command satellites to deliver decisive 
global effects’.5   Thus, he was implicitly being honoured in respect of true space 
capability rather than for ICBMs and strategic deterrence.  It seems reasonable to 
at least wonder why the analysis of his life dwells so much on the ICBM and to 
such a limited extent on his thinking on space power.  A major part of the answer 
may lie in access to relevant source material. 
During the course of his life, Schriever left behind significant clues as to 
what mattered to him and how he saw the world around him; he testified on several 
occasions to Congressional committees, he spoke in public at conferences, he 
wrote and inspired many short articles for the military and general press and 
supplied forewords to several books. It is only recently, however, that a large 
portion of his work has become accessible, principally through the conservation 
and curating of his personal archive at the Library of Congress in Washington DC 
and also as a product of official declassification activity conducted by the National 
Reconnaissance Office and other agencies.  Using these sources, this thesis seeks 																																																								
4 See, for example, Lt Col Keith Amburgey, 'Space and Missile Pioneers Meet: General Schriever's 
Old Timers Reunion', Association of Air Force Missileers Newsletter Vol 11 No 2  (June 2003). 
5 'Schriever AFB', <http://www.schriever.af.mil>, accessed 3 February 2013 . 
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to explain what Bernard Schriever thought was the potential of military spaceflight, 
both manned and unmanned, why he did so, and to what extent his reasoning was 
sound.   
An initial impetus for Schriever’s work was the realization among the 
victorious Allies after World War 2 of the technical progress achieved in several 
fields by Germany.  Key German personnel and examples of their work were 
brought to the west principally by the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Some of those personnel were subsequently offered resettlement in the United 
States under the ‘Paperclip’ programme, and contributed to continuation of their 
work.  Prominent among them were Wernher von Braun, Walter Dornberger and 
Hubertus Strughold.6  This thesis will examine their relationships, such as they 
were, with Schriever in later chapters.7   The United States also instituted an 
ambitious programme to assemble, adapt and test German V2 missiles at White 
Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.  The knowledge gleaned, and circulated, 
coupled with theoretical studies, principally those conducted by the RAND 
Corporation, highlighted great possibilities.  However, peacetime budgetary 
constraints and some unsolved technical problems served to limit early progress in 
capitalizing on this work.  At a later stage, the complex division of responsibility 
between the US Army, the US Air Force, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) and NASA for elements of the space programme further 
obscured whose work influenced who. 
Immediately after its formation in 1947, the USAF began pondering the 
utility of military spaceflight in various roles.  One role was simply the 
demonstration of the capability; while missiles and space-launchers are separate 
systems, possession of an orbital spaceflight capability convincingly demonstrated 
the potential also to develop an ICBM.  In the other direction, while possession of 
ICBMs did not guarantee a working space launch capability, they certainly 
demonstrated that such was potentially within reach of the demonstrating country.  
Demonstration of either capability was inextricably linked to issues of national 																																																								
6 There are several published histories of the Paperclip programme; most tend to view the programme 
widely, covering scientists of all persuasions and fields, and often dwelling on the moral quandaries of 
the officials involved, and the various efforts during the 1970s and 1980s to extradite or expel 
individuals as evidence of their alleged culpability in war crimes emerged.  None dwell exclusively on 
the rocket programme participants, but Eric Lichtblau, The Nazis Next Door: How America became a 
safe haven for Hitler's Men (Boston: Mariner Books, 2015) and Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy 
(London: Paladin, Grafton Books, 1988) provide significant details of the named individuals.  There is 
also coverage from the viewpoint of a participant in the biography of von Braun by Michael Neufeld.  
See Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun : Dreamer of space, engineer of war (New York: A.A. Knopf, 
2007). 
7 See Chapters 2, 5 and 6 (pp 32, 125 and 155) of this thesis. 
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prestige and technical competence.  The next roles exploited were independent of, 
but delivered in support of ICBMs: satellite reconnaissance to support targeting and 
inform deterrence strategies, surveillance for weather detection and forecasting in 
support of early reconnaissance systems, and missile launch detection for warning 
and response.  Satellite communications emerged at about the same time to 
support a variety of terrestrial missions.  But it also seemed plausible at the time 
that space itself would become an arena for combat and manoeuvre, and possibly 
for the direct attack of surface targets.  As will be shown, Schriever was involved 
with significant portions of the associated debates and had clear ideas of his own 
about their practicality. 
This thesis thus addresses the fundamental question “What did Bernard 
Schriever believe to be the utility of military spaceflight (manned and unmanned), 
how did he act to realize those beliefs, and to what extent were his views justified?”   
To do this, it notes that one common feature of all Schriever’s attempts to exploit 
space and missile breakthroughs were that they were innovative, technically 
challenging and complex.  To facilitate analysis of such programmes, it proposes a 
methodology positing that development is essential both against technical and 
‘systems’ goals.  The nature of systems goals, and the administrative 
underpinnings that are essential to such progress are outlined, drawing on 
contemporary military procurement methodologies.  This analytic scheme is then 
applied to Schriever’s attempts to exploit military spaceflight. 
In this chapter we will develop this analytic methodology to study the 
maturation of a technically innovative defence or security system.  This will then 
serve to analyse Schriever’s strategy for developing USAF space capabilities and 
to explain the successes and failures he experienced. 
A	Methodology	for	Assessing	Technically	Innovative	Systems		
During his post-World War 2 career, Schriever laboured to introduce 
various novel systems into USAF service.  Plainly some of his initiatives were 
objectively successful; he introduced the Atlas ICBM into service quickly, and at the 
same time he laid the foundations for the successor systems Titan and Minuteman, 
and a complimentary intermediate range system – Thor.  He also recognised the 
close links between successful ICBMs and their potential use as satellite 
launchers.  He had a sound awareness of the possible roles of military satellites 
and led the development of the first successful reconnaissance system – 
Discoverer.  In other areas, however, his results were less convincingly successful.  
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Although Schriever recognised the potential of communications and navigation 
satellites as aids to military operations, and participated in their development, they 
were less obviously USAF-related initiatives.  Finally, there were specific projects 
that he advocated for which never came to fruition.  Notable among these were his 
ideas about orbital bombardment systems and about military manned spaceflight. 
To truly analyse his work and draw meaningful conclusions, we must 
therefore have some analytic methodology, ideally, a single analysis that explains 
both the successes and failures consistently and accurately.  It is the author’s 
contention that the basis for such a system has emerged in recent times, couched 
as a recommended methodology to be adopted for the development of complex 
systems, and that it can be elaborated to support analysis of Schriever’s work.  It 
can be demonstrated that where Schriever followed its dictates, his projects 
prospered and where he did not, they stumbled and failed.  Whether Schriever had 
a conscious understanding of this methodology is moot – he does not appear to 
have spoken or written on the subject – but he does seem to have applied it 
intuitively.  We will now explain this proposed method and describe its component 
parts. 
Constructing	(and	modifying)	the	‘Pentathlon’	Framework		
The first step in the explanation is to distinguish between two different kinds 
of progress towards implementing a complex initiative, one relating to hardware, 
the other to ‘softer’ issues.  As described, the model is a development of Professor 
Keith Goffin’s ‘Pentathlon’ framework for innovation promotion.8  The development 
that inspired the author was carried out by Dr Mark Owen, an employee of MBDA 
Ltd, under the auspices of the ‘Materials and Components for Missiles, Innovation 
and Technology Partnership’, an Anglo-French defence partnership.9  Dr Owens’ 
(unpublished) work posits that a technologically advanced system must develop 
from an initial conceptual or experimental idea to a mature system capable of 
delivering some useful effect in a finite, usually strictly defined, time period; this 
might be the duration of a contract, an end-date for some system to be replaced, or 
a target date where a requirement can be defined.   
																																																								
8 For an overview of the Pentathlon framework, see Keith  Goffin and Rick Mitchell, Innovation 
management : strategy and implementation using the pentathlon framework (2nd edn.: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) Chapter 1. 
9 For details of the MCM ITP and its activities, see 'Welcome To MCM ITP', 
<http://www.mcmitp.com>, accessed 29 May 2014  
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Progress can be determined in two conceptually separate intellectual 
spaces: the first is ‘technology space’, where progress is measured by the 
technical performance of the system and its rate of improvement.  The second is 
‘systems space’ or ‘concept space’, where the intended use of the system, its 
tactical or strategic implications and other less tangible factors are assessed; the 
aspects being measured in each space will be defined shortly.  Owen’s model 
envisages relatively stringent conditions being met within the time constraints in 
both spaces, with improving performance being required in each, in parallel.   
Capability	Management	Frameworks		
The next step is to enumerate the different factors that might be measured 
in this way, and to consider how they could be allocated to each space. A potential 
template for this already exists; Capability Management Frameworks have been 
developed by several countries to ensure that in the introduction of a new 
capability, no critical aspect of development is ignored or neglected.  Three 
examples will serve to demonstrate the general principle: in the UK, Defence Lines 
of Development (DLODs) provide a taxonomy, in the USA, the Department of 
Defence ‘DOTMLPF’ framework is used,10 and in Australia, the scheme is known 
as ‘Fundamental Inputs to Capability’ (FICs).  All owe some debt to John 
Zachman’s Information Systems framework, though since that was developed 
strictly in the context of software development, the adaptations are extensive.11 
The UK DLOD scheme is promulgated as part of the MOD Acquisition 
Operating Framework (AOF).  It consists of 8 separate factors that must be taken 
into account when planning for the introduction of a new or enhanced capability 
within defence.  The factors are usually listed in the order corresponding to the 
acronym ‘TEPID OIL’, denoting Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information, 
Doctrine (and Concepts), Organisation, Infrastructure and Logistics.12  Each factor 
represents an area of activity that must be accounted for within capability 
management.  Three of the categories – Equipment, Infrastructure and Logistics – 
lean towards the technical aspects of the programme, but the others capture non-
equipment requirements, which cannot be neglected.  Some connections are 																																																								
10 Commonly pronounced ‘dot-mil-pee-eff’. 
11 For Zachman’s original formulation, see John A Zachman, 'A Framework for Information Systems 
Architecture', IBM Systems Journal, Vol 26 No 3  1987).  Zachman has updated the framework 
several times since publishing this article.   
12 The latest version of the AOF is accessible via UK MOD AOF Team, 'Guidance: Acquisition 
Operating Framework', (updated 17 March 2014) <https://www.gov.uk/acquisition-operating-
framework>, accessed 1 June 2014 .  The framework is unclassified and publicly accessible, though 
would-be readers must register their personal details and create an account to access it. 
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obvious; a new system will probably require training or re-training of operators, so 
there must be a plausible and affordable training solution developed in parallel with 
development of the hardware.  Infrastructure issues may be equally obvious – 
docks or harbours for ships, hangars and runways for aircraft, launch facilities for 
space systems.  But the other danger that the DLODs are designed to avoid is that 
more subtle dependencies, such as motivating personnel to operate the system or 
the need to incorporate the capability within doctrine, are overlooked.  It is worth 
stating what each is intended to encompass; the AOF provides a brief summary of 
them, included at Table 1 below. 
DLOD Explanation13 
Training  The provision of the means to practice, develop and validate, within 
constraints, the practical application of a common military doctrine to 
deliver a military capability. 
Equipment  The provision of military platforms, systems and weapons, (expendable 
and non-expendable, including updates to legacy systems) needed to 
outfit/equip an individual, group or organization. 
Personnel  The timely provision of sufficient, capable and motivated personnel to 
deliver Defence outputs, now and in the future. 
Information   The provision of a coherent development of data, information and 
knowledge requirements for capabilities and all processes designed to 
gather and handle data, information and knowledge. Data is defined as 
raw facts, without inherent meaning, used by humans and systems. 
Information is defined as data placed in context. Knowledge is 
Information applied to a particular situation. 
Doctrine & 
Concepts  
A Concept is an expression of the capabilities that are likely to be used 
to accomplish an activity in the future. Doctrine is an expression of the 
principles by which military forces guide their actions and is a codification 
of how activity is conducted today. It is authoritative, but requires 
judgment in application. 
Organization   Relates to the operational and non-operational organizational 
relationships of people. It typically includes military force structures, 
MOD civilian organizational structures and Defence contractors providing 
support. 
Infrastructure   The acquisition, development, management and disposal of all fixed, 
permanent buildings and structures, land, utilities and facility 
management services (both Hard and Soft facility management (FM)) in 
support of Defence capabilities. It includes estate development and 
structures that support military and civilian personnel. 
Logistics Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the operational 
movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, 
it relates to the aspects of military operations that deal with; the design 
and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, 
maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel; the transport of 
personnel; the acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and 
disposition of facilities; the acquisition or furnishing of services, medical 
and health service support. 
 
Table 1 – DLOD Summary. 																																																								
13 Extracted from the AOF as published in May 2014, reordered and edited slightly to conform to the 
TEPIDOIL acronym.   
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Having described the UK DLODs in some detail, we now turn to their US 
and Australian equivalents.  Descriptions here will be brief, simply to underscore 
that frameworks of this nature are used elsewhere, and are thus not a particularly 
British trait. 
The US DOTMLPF taxonomy is very similar in concept to DLODs, and 
appears to date from about 2001.14  It sits within the ‘DoD Architecture Framework’, 
a similar construct to the UK AOF.  The acronym decodes as: Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Education, Personnel, and Facilities.  
This reflects the US distinction between ‘training’ and ‘education’, separation of 
‘leadership’ as a distinct line of development (in the UK, it would probably be 
subsumed into ‘Organization’), a slightly more encompassing ‘Materiel’ to cover 
Infrastructure and Logistics areas and the fact that the framework is seen as an 
adjunct to the equipment itself, which is not, therefore, listed. 
The Australian ‘Fundamental Inputs to Capability’ are listed as Command 
and Management, Organization, Major Systems, Personnel, Supplies, Support, 
Facilities and Collective Training.15  Again, the similarities are obvious, reflecting 
only minor differences and national preferences.  There is thus a broad consensus 
on the factors thought important in management of capability development, at least 
in the context of the 1990s and 2000s.  But which factors sit in technology space, 
which in concept space, and are any others are needed? 
Populating	Technology	and	Systems	Space		
Technology space is relatively easy to populate; for a technically novel 
and/or complex system, the equipment, its design, development and performance 
will undoubtedly sit here.  The other technology-related areas from the DLOD 
‘menu’ would appear at least potentially to be logistics and infrastructure – logistics 
because of the likely challenges of maintaining a complex system, and 
infrastructure because of the demands of supporting and operating it.  In the case 
of satellites and missiles, infrastructure would, for example, include the provision of 
launch sites, range facilities for testing and the global communications and tracking 
sites required for on-orbit operation.   
																																																								
14 The DOTMLPF acronym features in the current US DoD Dictionary: Director, Joint Staff 
(promulgating authority), Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms,   (As amended 15 March 2014. Washington DC, 2010) 
15 Promulgated at: Chief, Capability Development Group, Defence Capability Development Manual 
(Canberra, ACT: Defence Publishing Service, 2006), 4. 
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Beyond these factors lies concept space, where the emphasis shifts to non-
mechanical or non-technical factors – personnel, training, information relevant to 
operations, and the doctrine and concepts underpinning use of the system.   
 
Two additional factors added are not traditionally included in national-level 
analysis – legality, and policy compliance.  In contemporary acquisition 
management, the tools and schemas outlined are designed to manage a 
programme on the pre-supposition that it complies with government policy and is 
underpinned by a robust legal regime.  There have been instances where policy 
shifts or emerging legal opinions have rendered defence systems non-compliant or 
potentially illegal, but at least in the West, and in recent times, where this has 
happened, the governments concerned have moved to withdraw and dispose of 
the offending systems.16  In Schriever’s time and in the USA, the single services 
enjoyed greater autonomy to propose and lobby for systems independent of each 
other and the administration than would be customary now, and the international 
legal regime surrounding nuclear weapons, space systems and arms control was 
much less mature than today.  Consequently, although both factors could possibly 
be accommodated in a slightly more expansive definition of ‘Doctrine and 
Concepts’, it will serve analysis better if they are examined separately where 
necessary.  
The next requirement for a useful model is to consider whether progress 
against any or all of these categories can be measured, or at least graded.  This is 
not a trivial distinction; measurement implies some agreed scoring system, 
implicitly leading to a numerical value, while grading simply implies a ranking.  
Thus ‘cold’, ‘warm’ and ‘hot’, or ‘small’, ‘big’ and ‘enormous’ are gradings, while 
‘212°’ or ‘1.73m’ are measurements.  Recent developments in capability 
management offer a measurement system for technology space, and a grading 
system for concept space is proposed here.  These have implications for any 
attempt to present an assessment model graphically. 
Codifying	Progress	-	Technology	Risk	Levels		
Systems of metrics for levels of risk – specifically technical risk – do exist, 
and are used regularly.  The system of Technology Risk Levels (TRLs) is a 																																																								
16 Examples of this happening include the prohibition of anti-personnel mines and other similar 
munitions, chemical weapons destruction agreements and implementation of various nuclear 
disarmament treaties. 
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relatively recent development, introduced initially by NASA in 1988 and widely 
adapted and developed since then.17  It was first proposed by 3 NASA researchers 
– S R Sadin, F P Povinelli and R Rosen – and initially comprised a seven-point 
scale. Later variations on this original scheme have proliferated, though the current 
consensus is broadly for a nine-point scale.  Sadin et al’s original classification is 
described below in Table 2.18 
 
TRL Description 
1 A phenomenon is observed, or an effect demonstrated, which might 
potentially have a useful application. 
2 An application of the phenomenon is proposed and validated 
3 Some analysis of the practical application is begun and/or experimentation 
to demonstrate or validate it is carried out. (This is often taken to mark the 
start of formal research and development). 
4 Laboratory demonstration of components of a practical system. 
5 Components or sub-assemblies are demonstrated either in the laboratory 
or in the ‘real’ environment (i.e. in space for a space-based system, albeit 
still perhaps not as a finished system). 
6 The finished system is validated in a laboratory or simulated environment 
7 The system (albeit probably a prototype) performs to expectations in a real 
environment 
 
Table 2.  Technology Risk Levels Explained. 
As noted above, later elaborations of the scheme have increased the usual 
scale from seven to nine points.  NASA itself, for example, now uses a nine-point 
scale, as do the European Space Agency and the US Department of Defense.19  
Since this thesis does not attempt to assign specific TRLs to individual systems 
retrospectively, there is no need to describe the nature of the refinements or the 
specific differences between scales.  All follow broadly comparable principles; they 																																																								
17 In the author’s professional experience, practitioners in the field are surprised to learn that 
formalisation of TRLs occurred so recently; there seems to be a perception that they have been in use 
for much longer.  Nevertheless, the citation immediately following is definitely the earliest formal 
attempt to define them. 
18 Stanley R Sadin, Frederick P Povinelli, and Robert Rosen, 'The NASA technology push towards 
future space mission systems (IAF 88-033)', 39th International Astronautical Congress (Bangalore, 
India, 1988).  The descriptions paraphrased in Table 1 are at p3. 
19 See John C Mankins, TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS: A White Paper (Advanced Concepts 
Office, Office of Space Access and Technology: NASA, 1995) for the latest NASA scale, 
'STRATEGIC READINESS LEVEL: The ESA Science Technology Development Route', (updated 13 
February 2012) <http://sci.esa.int/jump.cfm?oid=37710>, accessed 31 May 2014   for the ESA 
scheme and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)), Technology 
Readiness Assessment (TRA) Guidance (13 May 2011 edn. Washington DC: US Department of 
Defense, 2011) for the DoD scheme. 
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chart the progress of an idea from its earliest demonstration, perhaps at that stage 
with no envisaged useful purpose, through to a practical demonstration of its utility.    
Codifying	Progress	-	System	Risk	Levels		
While the metrics applied in technology space are relatively well formalised 
and accepted, the situation in ‘systems space’ is a little less clear.  ‘Systems 
Readiness Levels’ are defined in the literature, but there is not the same 
international consensus on meaning and applicability.  In the USA, the work of 
researchers at the Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, NJ in defining a 
‘Systems Readiness Level’ is noteworthy, though it is principally concerned with 
the challenges of integrating discrete components into an operational system.20  
Schriever faced challenges like this in his work, for example integrating warheads 
onto missiles and satellites onto launchers, but regarded those as being part of the 
overall technological effort.  ‘Systems risk’ needs a more broadly based analysis.  
In the UK, there is also a System Readiness Level process.  It attempts to 
address broader aspects of programme management.  As currently used, the 
process assigns an overall ‘Red/Amber/Green’ maturity to a programme, based on 
assessment against multiple equipment and non-equipment factors.  These are still 
biased towards technical and equipment issues, though they do acknowledge 
wider aspects of programme delivery.  The currently promulgated list comprises: 
training, safety and environmental factors, reliability and maintainability, human 
factors, software, information systems, airworthiness and maritime-specific factors 
if applicable, and an arbitrary number of project-specific factors identified by an 
individual project management team.  Within this list, a variety of performance 
criteria can be applied to measure progress.21   Factors such as these plainly help 
widen the scope of analysis, but they still lean heavily on technical progress.  What 
is needed is a broader and more consistent way of considering non-equipment or 
non-technical factors in analysing progress.  
It would be tempting to try to develop a multi-point scoring system for a 
‘System Readiness Level’ analogous to TRLs and reflecting these factors, but the 																																																								
20 For details of the Stevens Institute scale, see Brian Sauser et al., 'From TRL to SRL: The Concept 
of Systems Readiness Levels', Conference on Systems Engineering Research (Los Angeles, CA, 
2006).  Sauser’s paper also provides a brief historical review of other similar initiatives including a 
comparison between USA and UK practice. 
21 The complete ‘System Readiness Level’ taxonomy, which includes the suggested performance 
levels for different stages of a project  and various assessment tools, can be found at UK MOD, 'What 
are System Readiness Levels (SRLs) ?', 
<https://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/tactical/techman/content/srl_whatarethey.htm>, accessed 13 Mar 
15 2015. 
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subjective nature of any measurement applied to them militates against this.  It 
does seem possible, however, to apply a grading and Table 3 below attempts to 
codify this.  The existing DLOD framework is slightly expanded and combined with 
the ‘traffic light’ scoring of System Readiness levels, to yield an assessment matrix 
applicable to any technically advanced system.  The author’s indicative scoring 
descriptions are included.   
 
Line of 
Development 
Marginal (Red) Questionable 
(Amber) 
Mature (Green) 
Non-equipment Factors from DLODs – “Systems/Concept Space” 
Training Difficult,  
Un-validated,  
High failure rate, 
Expensive. 
Adequate. Successful,  
Validated, 
Self-sustaining. 
Personnel Unattractive, 
Over selective. 
Manageable. Popular,  
Over-subscribed role. 
Doctrine & 
Concepts 
No validated role or 
concept of employment 
(CONEMP). 
Recognition that 
system may address 
identified capability 
gap. 
Endorsed requirement,  
Clear CONEMP. 
Organisation No adequate structure 
for employment. 
Muddled,  
Contested,  
Ambiguous. 
Clear command 
structure. 
Information Requirement- 
ignorance, 
Poorly understood 
flows. 
Challenging 
requirement – bulk of 
data, excessive, 
complexity, information 
control at odds with 
system progress. 
Effective information-
management. 
Additional Non-Equipment Factors – “Systems/Concept Space” 
Legality Clearly challenges 
existing laws or norms. 
Tacit/local acceptance 
only or novel to the 
point of paradigm shift 
or establishment. 
Widely accepted or 
already tested at law 
Policy Contrary to established 
policy or opposing an 
incipient policy shift. 
Challenges established 
policy, presupposes 
policy shift. 
Supports or enables 
established or 
emerging government 
policy. 
 
Table 3 – ‘Traffic Light’ Non-Equipment Scoring Scheme (proposed). 
Administrative	Control		
So far, this thesis has proposed measures and gradings for individual 
elements of progress in a programme or project leading to the finished system.  But 
there is one further avenue along which progress must be made to deliver a 
technically advanced system, and that is the avenue, or ‘axis’ of administrative, or 
programme, control.  This axis yields at best minimal concrete benefit to the 
programme itself (this, in fact, will identify where it is being addressed), but is 
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nonetheless essential if progress is to be made.  It thus encompasses sufficient 
administrative or command authority for managers to ensure that progress is 
made, prioritization sufficient to ensure success in a competitive setting, responsive 
budgetary mechanisms with appropriate financial controls and oversight, and the 
management of relationships with other organisations crucial to delivery of the 
system in question.   
There is plainly a danger of a circular definition emerging here: ‘this 
category of things is important/essential because it comprises things held to be 
important or essential’, but on the other hand it reflects a clear reality.  A technically 
plausible system that addresses a clear need stands little chance of success if 
unfunded, or supported only by those with no responsibility for acquisition, or if it is 
reliant on assistance from those unwilling or unable to provide it.22  None of the 
remedies to these problems – funds, authority or assistance – will contribute 
directly to the finished system if addressed, but if they are absent, success is 
difficult or impossible.  Recalling our graph of converging technical and systems 
readiness at the start of this chapter, if risk reduction is what drives the lines closer 
to the central axis, administrative control is what enables this movement and allows 
progress with the passage of time.  Schriever gave great attention to this aspect of 
programme management, and achieved some of his most notable successes 
directly through the manipulation of factors in this area. 
From	the	Framework	to	a	Graph		
We now have all the components needed to measure and evaluate 
progress, and thus to construct the analytic model.  The working of the model can 
be presented as a graph, with progress represented on two vertical axes and time 
on the horizontal axis.  An example of such a graph is given below at Figure 1. 
																																																								
22 Lest this seem a fanciful analysis, it is worth noting it fits the experiences of Hermann Oberth, the 
German rocket engineer, during World War 1.  Serving on the Eastern Front as a medical orderly, he 
proposed a primitive ballistic missile as an operational improvement on conventional artillery to 
German Higher Command during 1917.  His plans were technically feasible, albeit it is unlikely that 
they were realistically within the capacity of German industry at the time, but the immediate cause of 
their failure was that Oberth had no recognised standing as a technician at the time, and the 
proposals were rejected out of hand by prevailing expert opinion.  See Helen B. Walters, Hermann 
Oberth : father of space travel (New York: Macmillan, 1962) Chapter 5. 
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Figure 1 – A Diagram of Owen’s Model. 
The diagram in Figure 1 is not a conventional graph, in that the portions 
above and below the x-axis are not positive and negative values of a single 
variable; rather they are two distinct quantities being plotted above and below the 
axis along a common passage of time to allow a comparison between them.  A line 
above the x-axis would show the outstanding risk of technical failure (as measured 
by a TRL) at a given point in time, the accompanying line below the x-axis shows 
the grading of the outstanding risk of system failure at the same time.  Values far 
from the axis either above or below (large absolute values) indicate high levels of 
risk, and values near the axis (small absolute values) indicate low risk or increased 
maturity.  At any instant in time, a project or system will have a given level of risk in 
both directions, and on the graph, the total risk inherent in the system could be 
shown as a vertical line between the two measurements or gradings.  A system will 
be required to achieve a designated level of both technical and system maturity 
after a set period of time, and this can be imagined as some sort of wall or barrier 
with an opening through which the project must pass at a given time. The original 
graph used showed the barrier as two brick walls, straddling the x-axis.  The gap 
through which the project is required to pass was referred to colloquially within the 
MCM IPT as the “valley of death”, and successful passage would denote the 
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system either entering productive service, or at least completing a given stage of its 
development to a level where it could begin the process again, perhaps integrated 
with some other sub-system.  Finally, span of administrative control is not charted 
directly, but can be inferred from progress along the horizontal (time) axis.    
Failure	Cases		
As well as this virtuous path, there are failure cases.  In the first instance, 
imagine a programme beset by technical issues, but where the systems need is 
urgent, well understood and integrated with the relevant policy or strategy.  
Progress has thus been made solely in systems-space, while technical risk 
reduction has stalled.  Whatever the reason for the technical failure – over-
optimism, fundamental issues not fully understood or poor performance on the part 
of technicians to cite but three examples – the situation was described within the 
MCM ITP as ‘concepting’ – pursuit of a conceptually elegant solution to the 
exclusion of concern for technical progress.  In conversation with team members, 
the situation was also described to the author as ‘wishful thinking’ or ‘daydreaming’, 
and it is this last (more descriptive) term that will be used within this thesis. 
The opposite failure case also occurs.  Here technical progress is being 
made, but against delivery of a product of questionable utility.  There are plausible 
reasons for such situations; an evolving strategic crisis that has rendered an 
ongoing programme obsolete, or perhaps emergence of a technical alternative of 
greater promise.  Whatever the cause, the term adopted within the MCM IPT for 
these situations was a ‘pet-project’.  The casual description of ‘something that was 
too much fun to give up’ cannot be taken too literally, but it captures the spirit of the 
underlying problem well.   
In later chapters, this thesis will show that Schriever had experience of both 
‘pet-projects’ and ‘daydreams’ as he explored the utility of military space systems, 
specifically in respect of military manned spaceflight and space weaponization.  
Regarding military manned spaceflight, Schriever saw a clear role for the military 
astronaut in space conducting military missions, but he also believed that such 
missions would have to be validated by a graduated series of experiments.  
Accordingly, he led the development of the USAF Manned Orbiting Laboratory 
project.  There are good reasons for believing that solutions to the technical 
challenges of such missions were within his grasp, but he struggled unsuccessfully 
to protect the experimental nature of its mission against competing operational 
demands.  Having allowed the programme to become subverted by these 
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demands, he was then unable to protect it against rapid changes in operational 
requirements.  He also struggled to develop it in a timely fashion and within budget.  
Thus, it represents a ‘pet-project’ – a technically plausible project, but ultimately 
one where the conceptual and doctrinal requirement could not be sustained.  In the 
case of space weaponization, Schriever had what he believed were sound reasons 
for promoting the concept, particularly relating to orbital bombardment systems; he 
also saw a clear need for such a capability.  But when it came to developing or 
introducing an orbital bombardment system, Schriever faced multiple problems; 
such a development would have been at cross-purposes with the US 
Government’s policy ambitions, and with the emerging consensus on treaty 
limitations of space activity.  More to the point, however, it would also have faced 
severe technical problems, relating to launch reliability, targeting and safe through-
life operation of the platforms.  Nonetheless, at least in Schriever’s mind, such a 
system was a ‘day-dream’; a conceptually sound system with technical challenges 
to be faced down.  Schriever never got the chance to evaluate the technical 
challenges in detail, since he failed to convince the administration of the need for 
such systems – arguably a failure of span of administrative control.  But taken 
overall, the importance of all three of our lines of activity are emphasised. 
Summary	–	Technical,	System	and	Administrative	Readiness		
This has been a rather winding path to arrive at the proposed methodology 
for evaluating the development of technically complex systems, and specifically 
those managed by Bernard Schriever.  The initial premise is that of Owen: 
progress is essential in respect of both technical risk reduction and systems risk 
reduction, usually within a defined time-period and towards defined goals. Formal 
measurement of technical risk is actually a fairly recent (1988) innovation, but the 
measurement scales in use have achieved rapid and relatively wide adoption.  
However, it is worth noting that this thesis will not attempt to apply one of the 
scales retrospectively in respect of Schriever’s work, firstly because to do so would 
require unachievable access to programme records and test results, in order to 
establish when a particular milestone was, or was not, reached.  As will be shown, 
Schriever was not a ‘hands-on’ engineer or innovator; rather he was a technically 
adept engineer-manager, who oversaw complex programmes that were 
implemented at his direction and under his control in a variety of government and 
non-government (industrial) settings.  The data that would be required for 
retrospective TRL analysis is not held within Schriever’s papers, and it is not clear 
whether the records required to apply such assessment after the fact even exist.  
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Secondly, even if retrospective measurement was possible, for any system that 
eventually entered service, it is axiomatic that an acceptable TRL was in fact 
reached.  This thesis will highlight where technical factors contributed to or caused 
programme failure, but in the main, it will simply demonstrate Schriever’s 
understanding of the technical challenges he faced, noting his determination to 
monitor progress and manage his project teams in order to deliver systems into 
service.  In this way, it can confidently assert where he was forcing risk levels down 
and steering his projects towards the ‘valley of death’, and where he failed to do so, 
even if it is not possible to assign exact numerical measures to progress at any 
given instant. 
Measurement of systems risk is a less exact science than that of measuring 
technical risk; there is less consensus on the factors to be measured, and implicitly 
more subjective judgements are involved.  Some measurements, such as training 
effectiveness, can also only be measured across an extended period.  
Nonetheless, they need attention throughout the acquisition process, and a 
pragmatic assessment seems possible.   There are limitations in the promulgated 
lists of systems risk or readiness factors, but the UK DLOD categorization, 
augmented by consideration of legality and national policy compliance, provides a 
proposed assessment tool.  Given the subjective nature of many of the 
judgements, and the extended period over which they would need to be applied, 
this thesis will resort to qualitative identification only of reasons for failure or 
success.  Once again, this will suffice to indicate the direction of progress even if its 
exact rate is unknown.  It will also be sufficient to indicate where Schriever fell 
victim to the lure of daydreaming or the attractions of pet-projects. 
Finally, there are factors that are essential to programme management 
without contributing directly to the end product; factors such as budgetary authority 
and span of administrative control.  Schriever was an experienced practitioner in 
this respect, identifying blockages to progress and taking effective steps to mitigate 
them.  In terms of Owen’s graph and model, they enable movement and progress 
within it rather than featuring directly on it. 
Having proposed this model, we now move to set the context where we will 
apply it.  In the next chapter, this thesis will outline Schriever’s life and the 
circumstances in which he worked.  This will serve to assert the significance of the 
work he undertook and of his part in it, without becoming trapped in detail of 
individual programmes.  In Chapter 3, this will lead to an outline of the studies 
already undertaken and the relevant literature relating to his work, in order to allow 
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identification of the gaps in the literature that it attempts to fill.  In Chapter 4, we will 
then look at two areas where Schriever achieved conspicuous success – the 
introduction of the ICBM into service and development of early reconnaissance 
satellites.  In Chapters 5 and 6, we will examine projects where Schriever achieved 
less; specifically, we will look at his ideas relating to space weaponization and to 
military manned spaceflight.  Taken together, this will show that where he achieved 
success, it was demonstrably through careful attention to each of our chosen 
directions of progress, and where he failed, at least one had been neglected.  This 
falls some way short of strict causation, but no claims of such are intended; it is 
exceedingly unlikely that there is a ‘magic formula’ which guarantees success in 
programme management if adhered to and failure if not.  Rather, it attempts to 
validate an analytic tool that can be applied retrospectively within its limitations.  It 
yields a framework for review and analysis to highlight reasons for success and 
failure, and as such, helps structure the analysis.  But first, we should situate 
Schriever’s life in its historical context. 
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CHAPTER 2 – BERNARD ADOLF SCHRIEVER 
 
The criteria for entitlement to military honours and interment at Arlington 
National Cemetery are simply stated, yet subtly graduated to indicate the status of 
the deceased.23   The principal beneficiaries are those who have served in the 
Armed Forces of the United States; some are interred having died on active 
service, others long after their retirement. There was therefore nothing inherently 
unusual about the funeral of a retired Air Force Officer that took place on Tuesday 
12th July 2005, though a close observer would have deduced from the ceremonial 
that a senior figure was being commemorated.  The honor guard of the United 
States Air Force (USAF) participated, according full military honours, and music 
was provided by the Air Force ceremonial band.24  The religious observances were 
led by a Roman Catholic Bishop of the Military Archdiocese, who had himself 
served as an Air Force Chaplain for over 30 years.  In themselves, these details 
would simply confirm that a senior retired officer had passed on; but among those 
that made this ceremony significantly more unusual was the presence not just of 
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and most of the 
Air Force’s cadre of four-star generals, but the additional presence as a mourner of 
the Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, attending in a private 
capacity.  Plainly, the deceased had been a man of some significance, and his 
passing had been deemed worthy of note, yet his origins would have given little 
indication of what lay in store for him later in life. 
The deceased on this occasion was Bernard Adolf Schriever.  He served in 
the Armed Forces of the United States for 33 of the 35 years between 1931 and 
1966, rising to high rank, and achieving a measure of public and professional 
recognition.  But although his name would be recognised by students of 20th 
Century American Air and Space Power History, his motivations and lines of 
reasoning remain more obscure.  Few relevant histories of the period omit his 																																																								
23 Department of the Army - Arlington National Cemetery, 'ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDE TO 
INFORMATION AND BURIAL AT ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY', (updated 17 May 12) 
<http://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/docs/FuneralInfo_AdminGuide2InfoBurial_ANC.pdf>, accessed 15 
Jul 12  
24Webmaster: Michael Robert Patterson, 'Bernard Adolph Schriever, General, United States Air 
Force', (updated 23 August 2006) <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/baschriever.htm>.  See also Neil 
Sheehan’s account of attendance at Schriever’s funeral contained in Sheehan, A Fiery Peace .  
Finally, some details here come from the Order of Service for the funeral (copy in the author’s 
possession). 
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name, but equally few attempt to explain why he acted as he did, except by 
describing the strategic imperatives affecting the USA at the time generally. 
  Recent exposure of his writing and thinking offer a new route into his work 
and thought, but in order to provide context, it is necessary to begin by describing 
his life, and particularly his Service career.  This chapter will therefore describe his 
circumstances, upbringing and interactions with significant contemporaries, 
particularly General Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold, who was effectively Schriever’s patron for 
the first half of his service.  The aim of this is to establish Schriever’s significance in 
the field as a character worthy of detailed study.   
First then, it must establish who Schriever was and what he did.  This need 
not be a comprehensive biography; Chapter 3 will describe existing and easily 
accessible sources for much of his life.  But the arguments expounded in later 
chapters will depend on specific details of his life, so the summary that follows 
provides the essentials of his life overall, and more specific details of his service 
career from 1931 to 1966. 
Coming	to	America		
Like several other notable Americans of the 20th Century, Bernard Adolf 
Schriever was an immigrant.25  In his case, his name correctly suggested his 
origins – he was born in Bremen, Germany in 1910, and came to live in the United 
States in 1917 after his father – a ship’s engineer on a German merchantman – 
was interned in New York in 1916.26  The Schriever parents both had family 
connections in the United States, and when Mrs Schriever and their two sons, 
Bernard (‘Benny’) the elder by some 2 years, and his younger brother Gerhard 
(‘Gerry’), managed to escape Europe and reach the USA to join her husband, it 
was natural that the family moved to New Braunfels, Texas, where they already 
had friends and acquaintances.27  Released from internment, ‘Papa’ Schriever 
found work trading on his qualifications as an engineer, but his death before the 
end of World War 1 in an industrial accident in San Antonio must have come as 
both a shock and a blow.  The nadir of both the Schriever boys’ childhood came 
when their mother was forced to place them in an orphanage on a temporary basis 																																																								
25 US Air Force, 'General Bernard Adolph Schriever (Official USAF Biography)', 
<http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7069>, accessed 21 July 2012  
26 Sheehan, A Fiery Peace  3.   Jacob Neufeld, 'Bernard A Schriever: Challenging the Unknown', in 
John L Frisbee (ed.), Makers of the United States Air Force (Washington DC: Air Force History and 
Museums Project, 1996), 281-82. 
27Sheehan, A Fiery Peace  4-5,US Air Force, 'General Bernard Adolph Schriever (Official USAF 
Biography)',   Of note, the growing anti-German sentiment in and around New York as the United 
States pondered entering the war would have favoured the move to Texas. 
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while she worked to support herself and establish a family home as a widow.  This 
hurdle was overcome when she found work as a housekeeper, and subsequently 
as the proprietor of a snack-bar on a golf course, but the need for financial security, 
and Bernard’s putative role as breadwinner for the Schrievers influenced his future 
career choices.28 
Bernard attended high school in San Antonio, and in 1927 entered the 
‘Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas’ – known today as Texas A&M 
University.  He graduated in 1931 with a BS degree in structural architecture.29  On 
graduating, he faced an unusual career choice; on one hand, while an 
undergraduate he had shown exceptional talent as a golfer, having won the San 
Antonio City and Texas state junior amateur championships in his graduating year.  
This led to him being offered a position as the golf professional at a local course on 
a respectable salary.30  On the other hand, he had attended a military college; the 
Agricultural and Mechanical College was in those days all-male, and all those who 
were medically fit were enrolled in the Reserve Officer Training Corps programme.  
Schriever had thus been in uniform for the duration of his undergraduate course.  
He was not obliged to proceed into the Army, but chose to do so, and was 
commissioned into the Army Reserve as a Second Lieutenant in the Artillery.31 
Despite entering the artillery, it is clear that Schriever felt little attraction for 
that branch of the service; rather it was a route into the Army overall, and 
subsequently a way to apply for transfer to the Army Air Corps.32  San Antonio was 
not just a military town; it was also the home at the time of US Army Aviation.  In 
the cuts to military facilities that had followed the end of World War 1, the Army Air 
Corps had reduced its training real-estate to two airfields – ‘Kelly Field’ and ‘Brooks 
Field’, both in the San Antonio Area.33  Schriever was too young on graduation to 																																																								
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30 Sheehan, A Fiery Peace  12  
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Sheehan, A Fiery Peace  13.  Sheehan attributes Schriever’s career choice to the influence of his 
mother, who did not consider golf a ‘respectable’ occupation.  In a conversation with the author in 
August 2011, Bernard’s brother Gerry cited the greater perceived job security that Bernard felt went 
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33 US National Parks Service, 'Kelly Field Historic District', 
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apply for entry into flying training, but on attaining the requisite 21 years of age, he 
applied to transfer to the Army Air Corps.  He was accepted and undertook flying 
training during 1932-33.  The typical ‘washout’ rate in flying training at the time was 
of the order of 50%, but Schriever survived (two of his classmates were killed in 
training), graduated, and moved to productive service at March Field in Riverside, 
California as a bomber pilot.  There he made an acquaintance that would have a 
significant influence on his future: Lieutenant Colonel (later General of the USAF) 
Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold. 
‘Hap’	Arnold	and	the	Air	Mail	Debacle		
Hap Arnold had been a career soldier since before World War 1, and had 
been one of the first US Army officers to learn to fly.34  During World War 1, he had 
risen to be Assistant Director of the Office of Military Aeronautics, with 
responsibility for overseeing the build-up of the US aircraft industry to support the 
military effort.35  While Schriever was growing up in Texas during the 1920s, Arnold 
had become embroiled in the controversies surrounding the conduct of Colonel 
‘Billy’ Mitchell and the latter’s court-martial for insubordination in 1925.  He survived 
with his own career if not intact, at least still underway, and by 1931 was 
Commanding Officer at March Field, where Schriever arrived in 1933 to join the 9th 
Bombardment Squadron.36  By this time, both Mrs Schriever and Gerry were 
dependent on Bernard’s support.  The Great Depression was underway, the 
business that Mrs Schriever had built up at the golf course in San Antonio had 
failed, and the collapse of a bank had robbed them of their savings.  Consequently, 
they followed Bernard to Riverside.  Here, a happy coincidence arose; Mrs Arnold, 
who was about the same age as Mrs Schriever, had spent 3 years in her youth 
living in Germany, and enjoyed conversing in German.  She made friends with Mrs 
Schriever, who became known socially on the base as a consequence.  Lt 
Schriever thus became much more closely acquainted with his commanding officer 
than might otherwise have been the case.   
Besides the social connection across the ranks, Arnold and Schriever were 
both technical visionaries.  Later in their respective careers, they were both 																																																								
Collection in the Library of Congress (Washington DC: Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
2011) 2-4 
34 US Air Force, 'General Henry H Arnold (Offical USAF Biography)', 
<http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=4551>, accessed 21 July 2012  
35 Sheehan, A Fiery Peace  17-18  There are echoes of Schriever’s later responsibilities in configuring 
US Industry to support the missile and space age with those held by Arnold in respect of conventional 
aviation. 
36 Arnold had narrowly escaped court-martial himself, for misuse of Government Property in that he 
was alleged to have used military printing facilities to lobby Congressmen on Mitchell’s behalf. 
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convinced of the close connection between the practical aspects of the 
employment of air and space power, and the state of technological progress.  
Arnold’s remark to Schriever in 1946 that:  
World War I was won by brawn,… World War II was won by logistics,… 
World War III will be won by brains,37 	
summarises the growing connection that both would make between the emerging 
capability of military aviation and its reliance on the ‘high technology’ of the day.   
In 1934, the state of that military technological capability was brutally 
exposed at March Field; the US Army Air Corps undertook to supply the trans-
continental airmail service, and in particular to bridge the gap across the Rocky 
Mountains.  President Roosevelt had suspended commercial contracts for air-mail 
placed by the US Postal Service on the suspicion of fraud, and prior to the 
suspension had asked the Chief of the US Army Air Corps, General Benjamin 
Fulois, whether the Air Corps would be able to substitute their services pending an 
honest re-letting of the contracts.  Fulois had replied in the affirmative, and 
consequently orders arrived at subordinate units to take station during the winter of 
1933-34.  Lt Col Arnold was appointed to a headquarters in Salt Lake City, and 
Schriever was one of the pilots thrown into the breach.  The ensuing carnage 
immediately cost the lives of two of Schriever’s classmates from training, along with 
others, as the inability of the Air Corps to match the performance of the commercial 
airlines in flying in poor weather and at night was laid bare.  Notwithstanding any 
contract irregularities, the commercial pilots had significantly greater proficiency, 
and were significantly better equipped, for such operations.  The importance of 
technical capability was unmistakably emphasised.38 
 Notwithstanding his dedication to the Corps and his performance in post, 
between 1935 and 1939, Schriever struggled to convert his Reserve Commission 
into a permanent appointment.39   He managed to extend his service in the Air 
Corps in the aftermath of the Air Mail debacle for eight months, but eventually 
returned to civilian life in 1935.  He re-entered service for a year to run a Civilian 
Conservation Corps camp in New Mexico, then gained a further reserve 
appointment in the Panama Canal Zone.  During his time there, he became 																																																								
37 This remark by Arnold to Schriever was widely quoted by the latter, including in an oral history 
interview within the NASA oral history program.  It is also quoted in Stephen B. Johnson, 'Bernard 
Schriever and the Scientific Vision', Air Power History, Vol 49 No 1  2002). 
38 Neufeld, 'Bernard A Schriever: Challenging the Unknown', in Frisbee (ed),Makers of the United 
States Air Force, 283. 
39 Sheehan, A Fiery Peace  22-27. 
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acquainted with the daughter of the Air Corps Commander for the Zone – Brigadier 
General George Brett – when he was appointed one of the General’s two aides.  
Schriever’s relationship with Dora Brett developed, but when they became 
engaged, Schriever had to accept that a Reserve Lieutenant’s position was too 
tenuous to support a wife.  He left active service with the Reserves, and took up 
employment with Northwest Airlines in Seattle as an airline co-pilot.  This lasted 
until the second half of 1938, when Hap Arnold, by now a Brigadier General, visited 
Seattle, partly to confer with the president of Boeing Aircraft there, but also, over a 
game of golf, to invite Schriever to apply for a regular commission in the Air Corps 
in the forthcoming competitive exam.  Sheehan cites Arnold’s wish to attract 
qualified airline pilots into the Air Corps, partly informed by the need to bolster its 
ability to operate at night and in bad weather, and coloured by the experience of 
the Air Mail fiasco: 
He explained that he wanted to create an all-weather air arm and therefore 
needed to get as many airline pilots who were Reservists as possible back 
into the Air Corps on a permanent basis, because they had the knowledge 
and experience for instrument flying.  Decades later, Schriever remained 
astonished at Arnold’s ability to look into the future.40 
 
Rejoining	the	military	and	World	War	2		
Schriever returned to duty as a bomber pilot, but soon transferred to test-
flying duty at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio.  This was not entirely unconnected with 
his father-in-law, Brigadier General Brett, now being head of the Materiel Division 
of the Air Corps, of which Wright Field formed part.  It provided him not only with an 
opportunity to broaden his flying experience as a test pilot, but also to enter the Air 
Corps Engineering School for its one-year course in general aeronautical 
engineering, which he did in July 1940.41  He did well in his studies, achieving an 
academic grading of ‘superior’, and consequently was selected to proceed on 
graduation from the Air Corps School to Stanford University to undertake a Masters 
degree in Aeronautical Engineering.  He entered Stanford in September 1941 and 
was studying there on 7th December 1941 when the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor brought the United States into World War 2.  Despite his expectation that 
he would be recalled to active duty immediately, he was ordered not to proceed 
until he had completed his studies; consequently, it was June 1942 before he left 
for Australia and wartime assignments, first with the 19th Bombardment Group and 																																																								
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then at the Headquarters of the Army Air Services, Southwest Pacific Area, the 
maintenance and engineering headquarters for the region.42  
For the duration of the Second World War, Schriever combined the role of 
combat pilot with that of maintenance officer, capitalizing on the training he had 
received at the Engineering School.  He flew combat missions regularly in B-17 
bombers with the 19th Bombardment Group, and then rose in rank and 
responsibility within Headquarters Far East Air Service Command.  At the end of 
the war, he was Commander of the Advanced Headquarters of the Far East Air 
Service Command on Okinawa.  He remained in service in the Pacific Theatre until 
after the Japanese surrender, returning to the United States in September 1945 as 
a full Colonel in the United States Army Air Forces.  He had flown 38 combat 
missions, gained a Distinguished Service Medal, a Legion of Merit award and a 
Purple Heart.43  His erstwhile patron had also advanced.  Hap Arnold was now a 
General and Chief of Army Air Forces, and Schriever’s first appointment following 
the war was to be at Headquarters, Army Air Forces in the Pentagon. 
The	Roots	of	Post-war	American	Innovation	and	the	birth	of	the	USAF		
To understand the significance of what follows in Schriever’s career, it is 
necessary to take a step back, and reconsider Arnold’s remark quoted above about 
brawn, logistics and brains.  The United States ended the war victorious, with its 
industrial capacity and access to natural resources largely intact, and uniquely, in 
possession of atomic weapons.  Yet for the astute analyst, there were still signs to 
give cause for concern.  Particularly in the Air Forces, the war had been technically 
conservative; most combat aircraft in service in significant numbers at the war’s 
end had been in service at its outbreak.44  This could be contrasted with both the 
Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe in Europe, where combat fleets had been 
comprehensively renewed during the war.  Partly, this was a consequence of the 
United States later entry into the war.  A type introduced in the United States in 
July 1941 (say) would still be considered ‘pre-war’.  Yet Arnold looked across the 
Atlantic and pondered that the jet engine had been invented in the United Kingdom, 																																																								
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and introduced into service both there and in Germany.  Both antagonists had 
made significant steps in introducing and exploiting radar (another British 
invention).  The only advantage that the United States had comprehensively 
exploited had been in atomic weapon design, and even that had been considered 
by Germany.  As for rocket and missile technology, Germany had built up a 
significant lead in the field, which the victorious allies were struggling to 
comprehend and exploit.  And all these advances had come in the face of large-
scale bombing, blockades, shortages of resources and active ground campaigns.  
Arnold himself had pondered this conundrum during 1944 and had taken the first 
steps towards addressing it.  
Arnold’s first exposure to the potential of rocket technology had come much 
earlier in his career, and it came about through a prolonged and recurring 
friendship.  Despite an academically inauspicious start to his military career at 
West Point, by the time he transferred from the infantry to aviation, Arnold had 
developed an interest in technical innovation, for example in the development of 
the ‘Flying Bug’, a very early attempt at developing a cruise missile.  Through this, 
he had come into contact with noted academics whose names will recur later in this 
account; most notable of these were Robert Millikan and Theodor von Karman.45  
Millikan was the inaugural Chairman of the Executive Council of the California 
Institute of Technology (Caltech).46  Having won the Nobel Prize for Physics in 
1923, he subsequently applied himself to investigating the properties of cosmic 
rays; the experiments he was conducting required apparatus to be flown to altitude.  
Millikan had collaborated with Arnold during 1917-18 in the development of the 
Flying Bug, and in 1931 he asked Arnold, as Commander of March Field, which lay 
about 40 miles from Caltech, for reciprocal assistance.  Historian Dik Daso 
suggests that Arnold had little comprehension of the nature of the physics being 
undertaken, but nevertheless he willingly co-operated, and the ensuing flights took 
March Field aircraft from Canada to Mexico.47  Through his continuing friendship 
with Millikan, Arnold also met Theodore von Karman, a Hungarian émigré 
academic who had arrived at Caltech in April 1930.48  By 1935, von Karman was 																																																								
45 For an account of Arnold’s involvement in the development of the Flying Bug towards the end of 
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director of the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory within Caltech, and by 1938, 
he was collaborating with (now) Brigadier General Arnold in developing rocket-
assisted take-off devices for the Army Air Force to aid the take-off of heavy 
bombers.49  Arnold had thus spotted at least one potential use for rocket 
technology at an early stage. 
During the Second World War, Arnold rose in rank and responsibility 
commanding the Army Air Forces, while von Karman continued to provide advice 
and analysis to the American military community.  In 1943, reports reached the 
USA via the United Kingdom of German interest in developing long-range missiles.  
Von Karman was asked to analyse these reports and provide comments on their 
feasibility.50  Arnold pursued other technological advances in American aviation too 
– the rocket-assisted take-off experiments of 1938, coupled with growing 
awareness of European successes on both sides of the conflict with jet-engined 
aircraft led to Arnold’s championing of the development of the Bell XP-59A – the 
first American jet-powered aircraft.51 
By 1944, Arnold was convinced of two things: that the war would soon be 
over, with America among the victorious allies, and that the development and 
exploitation of military aviation would depend on close cooperation with (civilian) 
scientists on topics of research interest.52  He discussed a way ahead on the latter 
challenge with von Karman in a famous conversation that took place in a car 
parked on the apron at La Guardia airport in New York early in August 1944.53  
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Implementing the proposed solution would bring Schriever back to the centre of the 
story. 
Arnold proposed to von Karman that he should lead an investigation into 
the technical steps required to secure American air-supremacy into the future.  This 
was to be a far-reaching study, with little regarded as off-limits: 
Arnold wanted the scientists assembled at the Pentagon to  “forget the past; 
regard the equipment now available only as the basis for the boldest 
predictions”…Forced for four years to think in incremental terms, General 
Arnold now sought the best people in the scientific community to spur air 
power technology far beyond present limitations54 
He had already canvassed Millikan as to von Karman’s suitability (and 
Millikan and Caltech’s willingness to lose his services for an indeterminate time).  
Von Karman’s only reservations were unwillingness to work at the Pentagon and to 
have to give and receive orders.  Arnold assured him this would not be necessary; 
he would be von Karman’s ‘boss’ and would issue the orders on his behalf where 
necessary.  This opened up the opportunity for Schriever to become involved in the 
follow-on to the program.  In the meantime, von Karman was appointed General 
Arnold’s Scientific Adviser on 23rd October 1944.  By December 1944, the 
organisation he was directing was officially titled the ‘AAF Scientific Advisory 
Group’.55  In its two-year existence, it produced an immediate interim report entitled 
‘Where We Stand’, and a twelve-volume substantive report (incorporating the 
content of ‘Where We Stand’, and including a first volume called ‘Science, the Key 
to Air Supremacy) entitled ‘Towards New Horizons’.56  By the time this report was 
being circulated among AAF leaders in late-1945, Arnold was further convinced of 
the need to institutionalize the process by which it had been produced.  ‘Towards 
New Horizons’ had included detailed surveys and recommendations for specific 
technical area, including high-speed aerodynamics, propulsion, missile design and 
guidance mechanisms and radio and radar systems, but in many ways the most 
far-reaching recommendations had been about the relationship between the 
scientific, industrial and military communities contained in von Karman’s original 
‘Science, the Key to Air Supremacy’ volume.57  In this, von Karman outlined the 
steps he saw as necessary to perpetuate the capability to generate reports such as 
his own.  His summary saw the following as essential: 																																																								
54 Gorn, Harnessing the genie  14 
55 Gorn, Harnessing the genie  19 
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It is imperative from this point of view that the Air Forces continue and 
expand their present direct relations. spiritual and contractual, with various 
universities, research laboratories, and individual scientists. None of the 
central organizations existing now and to be established should be the only 
source of information and the sole intermediary agency between science 
and the Air Forces. The Air Forces should have the freedom to call on 
institutions and individuals whose assistance they deem to be of the 
greatest benefit for their program.58 
 
Schriever thus arrived in Washington DC in December 1945 just in time to 
witness and participate in three initiatives championed by Arnold: the establishment 
of the Scientific Advisory Board (leading to Schriever’s associated responsibilities 
as ‘Scientific Liaison Officer’), building links with another Arnold project – Project 
RAND (soon to become the RAND Corporation) and involvement with the work of 
the Joint Research and Development Board.  In each case, however, Schriever’s 
precise duties and responsibilities are hard to define.  It seems plausible that in 
each case they never were formally stated.  Schriever himself commented later on 
this ambiguity: 
In December 1945, therefore, I was given a job called scientific liaison in a 
brand new office by that name in the Pentagon.  I was at first uncertain 
exactly what to do about scientific liaison.  Well, ‘liaison’ meant the Air 
Force working with the scientific community in this case, and that is what I 
set out to do.59 
 
Thus he embarked on what he later described in an Oral History interview 
conducted under the auspices of a joint programme by the National Air and Space 
Museum of the Smithsonian Institution and the RAND Corporation as: “the genesis 
of the creation of the Scientific Liaison Office for that rather general objective of 
establishing and maintaining that interaction with the scientific community”.60 
Meanwhile, realizing that, because of his failing health, his time as head of 
the Air Forces would probably be short, Arnold set out to institutionalise some of 
his wartime initiatives and implement the content of von Karman’s advice.  The 
institutional change he saw as most urgent involved making the Scientific Advisory 
Group a permanent feature of the Air Force landscape, but the charter of the 																																																								
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existing Group expired on 6 February 1946.  Complicating the otherwise 
straightforward step of re-constituting it as a standing body was Arnold’s 
resignation from the command of the Army Air Forces on 9 February 1946 on the 
grounds of ill-health.  A tussle ensued between General Curtis LeMay and General 
Carl Spaatz about reporting arrangements, eventually adjudicated by General 
Dwight D Eisenhower in favour of Arnold’s original vision.  The successor 
organisation – the Scientific Advisory Board – was constituted on 17 June 1946, 
though even after that it continued to face threats to its existence.61 
While building the fledgling relationships alluded to, Schriever also gained 
early exposure to another of Arnold’s initiatives to develop scientific capability: the 
formation of the RAND Corporation.  Arnold had exploited friendship with Edward 
Bowles, another academic contact, though this time from MIT rather than Caltech.  
Bowles had been a consultant to the Secretary of War, and this in turn had led to 
involvement of others, including Donald Douglas, President of Douglas Aircraft 
Company, Arthur Raymond, Chief Engineer at Douglas and Franklin Collbohm, 
Raymond's assistant. 
On October 1, 1945, Arnold, Bowles, Douglas, Raymond, and Collbohm 
met at Hamilton Field, California, to set up Project RAND under a special contract 
with the Douglas Aircraft Company.  Project RAND got under way in December 
1945.  On March 2, 1946, a letter contract was executed that put Project RAND 
under Frank Collbohm's direction.62  The first task laid on the Project RAND team 
by the Air Force was a study of the potential of earth-orbiting satellites, so by 
involvement with RAND’s work at an early stage, Schriever was gaining entry to a 
very early American consideration of the military potential of spaceflight.63  He was 
clear about the distinction between the work of RAND and the work of the Scientific 
Advisory Board: “The Scientific Advisory Board would use some of RAND’s 
analytical studies, but they never themselves went into that kind of detail.  Their 
interests were, I would say, at a level higher with respect to technologies, and even 
further out in the future than RAND”.64 																																																								
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Finally, Schriever had to reconcile these responsibilities with the activities of 
the Joint Research and Development Board.  This was an organisation in 
transition, on its way to being reconstituted during 1947-49 with the creation of the 
Department of Defense and the establishment of the United States Air Force as an 
independent service.  Schriever’s duties involved preparing briefing material for the 
members of the Board; he summarized: 
They set up that Joint Research and Development Board …so it was set up 
in ’46 and I was also the briefing officer to our representatives on the JRDB.  
So it was the Joint Research and Development Board, the Air Force 
Scientific Advisory Board and the RAND Corporation that I dealt with, 
interfaced with, as far as the air staff was concerned.  That’s how I became 
involved with the scientific community to the extent that I did…65 
One significant Schriever initiative from this period has been recorded; the 
introduction of Development Planning Objectives (DPOs).  These sought to match 
military requirements with R&D activity.  Working at the Air Force Historical Studies 
Office, Jacob Neufeld later described them thus:  
For the first time, operational matters were considered within the broad 
context of technological advancement.  DPOs were prepared for all major 
elements of air power: strategic, tactical and logistical elements; air mobility; 
space systems; air defense; intelligence; and reconnaissance.  Schriever 
became a strong proponent of the efficacy of “technology push”, an 
approach that allowed free rein to technological R&D as the means for 
solving complex operational needs.66 
 
Schriever continued in this vein until he was selected to attend the National 
War College (NWC) in 1949.  This was at the time a ‘young’ organisation, created 
in 1945 to prepare its graduates for the highest ranks in their service: “The College 
is concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources 
necessary to implement that strategy... Its graduates will exercise a great influence 
on the formulation of national and foreign policy in both peace and war...”.67  
Selection to attend thus marked Schriever as an officer with potential for high rank.  
The curriculum for the course was wide ranging, covering ‘International Affairs’ in 
the first semester, and shorter series of lectures on ‘Elements of National War 
Planning’, ‘Strategy Analysis’, ‘Strategic Concepts of Operations and Outline 																																																								
65 Schriever, 'RAND Oral History Interview',  9. 
66 Jacob Neufeld, 'Gen Bernard A Schriever: A Tribute', in Jacob Neufeld (ed.), A century of air power 
leadership : past, present, and future (College Station, TX: Air Force History and Museums Program, 
2003), 176-77. 
67 Quotation by Lieutenant General Leonard T Gerow, President of the Board that recommended 
creation of the NWC, cited in National War College of the National Defence University, 60th 
Anniversary Brochure (NDU Washington DC, 2005)  Downloaded from 
http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/AboutNWC/NWC_60th_Anniversary_Brochure.pdf on 3 August 2012. 
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Plans’, National Security issues in various guises, technology and logistics in the 
second.  Among the series on ‘Weapons Capabilities and Prospective 
Developments’ was one on ‘Guided Missiles’ – delivered by Dr Frederick Hovde, 
who was then the President of Purdue University, but who had been Chief of 
Rocket Ordnance Research for the National Defense Research Committee during 
World War 2.68  Schriever produced a term paper during his time at the College, 
thought its title offers little suggestion of an interest in technology and its 
applications (“The Economic Commission for Europe: Its Purpose, Organisation 
and Accomplishments”).  It is, however, unclear whether the students had any say 
in choosing their own topics. 
A significant development had taken place during Schriever’s time at NWC.  
In response to the Ridenour Committee’s report in 1949 (on work undertaken partly 
at the prompting of Dr von Karman, and partly at the direction of General Putt, who 
had been Schriever’s Commanding Officer during his time as Scientific Liaison 
Officer), the USAF had created a new command – Air Research and Development 
Command (ARDC) – in an attempt to separate research and development activity 
from the procurement and support of current combat equipment.69  ARDC would 
play a significant role in Schriever’s later career. 
The	‘Paperclip’	Cadre	and	the	V2	–	the	Foundations	of	the	US	Missile	Programme		
Since this period (broadly 1946-1950) marked the time when the ‘Paperclip’ 
émigrés referred to at the start of Chapter 1 were settling in the US, this is probably 
a good place to summarise Schriever’s relationship with them.  The first thing to 
note is that the Paperclip cadre was substantial and not exclusively concerned with 
rocketry and missiles.  At least 1500 individuals were potentially involved with the 
programme (along with their families, which took the total cadre size to well over 
3000), although a lower number were eventually assimilated into the USA.70  																																																								
68 Lecture Schedule for Academic Year 1949/50 for the National War College – NDU Archive; Purdue 
University Libraries, 'A Biography of Frederick L. Hovde', 
<http://www.lib.purdue.edu/spcol/?page=hovde>, accessed 4 August 2012  
69 The Ridenour Report was not the only report that had proposed the foundation of an R&D 
Command – there had been an earlier report by the Office of the Air Force Assistant for Atomic 
Energy in October 1947 which had made essentially similar recommendations, but which remained 
un-implemented.  Additionally, General Hoyt Vandenberg, the then Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
subjected the Ridenour Report’s findings to review by a further panel chaired by General Anderson of 
the Air University.  See MIchael H Gorn, Vulcan's forge : the making of an Air Force Command for 
weapons acquisition, (1950-1985) (University of Michigan Library Reprint edn. Andrews Air Force 
Base, Md.: Office of History, Headquarters, Air Force Systems Command, 1989) 12-14, and Major 
Arthur D Tubbs, 'Establishing Air Research and Development Command: Two Civilian Scientists 
Played Key Roles', (Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 1986  7. 
70 The US National Archive holds the personal files of over 1500 potential Paperclip émigrés , and 
admits that this is not a complete collection – notably, they do not hold the dossier for Wernher von 
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Nonetheless, the rocket scientists attracted most attention, and it is clear that as 
early as 1946 there were at least 100 of them working in the USA.71  The most 
prominent of them were undoubtedly Wernher von Braun and Walter Dornberger, 
both key figures in the development and production of the V2 missile.   
Work to develop what would become the V2 had occupied Wernher von 
Braun and Walter Dornberger from about 1930, until just before the German 
surrender in 1945.  Both men had been active in the ‘Verein für Raumschiffahrt’ 
(VfR), an amateur rocket development society founded in Germany in 1927 and 
absorbed into the Third Reich’s military expansion by 1934.72   Wernher von Braun 
(1912-1977) had joined the VfR in 1930, having previously been strongly 
influenced by the work of Hermann Oberth; von Braun was the principal designer of 
the V2 missile.  After World War 2, he emigrated to the USA and was assimilated 
under the ‘Paperclip’ programme prior to work firstly with the US Army and latterly 
with NASA where he played a key role in the Apollo moon-landing programme.  Dr 
Walter Dornberger (1895-1980) was initially a German artillery officer.  He served 
in World War 1 then qualified as an engineer.  He was the military patron of the VfR 
and was the director of the V1 and V2 programmes at Peenemunde during World 
War 2.  He too emigrated to the USA post-war, and worked briefly for the USAF 
(where he came into some conflict with von Braun’s work with the Army).  He later 
worked for the Bell Aircraft Company, prior to retirement and eventual return to 
Germany. 
Initially, the German rockets were referred to as being part of the ‘Aggregat’ 
series, commonly referred to as A-1, A-2 etc.  One of the last things attached to the 
programme was the ‘V2’ designation.73  This was imposed when operational use 
approached by Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry, standing for ‘Vergeltungswaffen’ or 
‘reprisal/vengeance weapon’, and indicating their perceived effect, rather than any 
development lineage across the ‘V-series’.74  Compared to the other rocket 																																																								
Braun.  For the National Archive finding guide, see http://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-
records/rg-330-defense-secretary/ (accessed 3 May 2016).  Total numbers credited to the programme 
vary with different authors – partly because in the earlier stages of the programme, the rate at which 
Germans were allowed entry was controlled carefully, and not all émigrés stayed permanently in the 
United States.  Eric Lichtblau mentions a figure of “…up to a thousand scientists…”.  Lichtblau, Nazis 
Next Door  24. 
71 Walter J Boyne, 'Project Paperclip', Air Force Magazine, Vol 90 No 6  June 2007) 
72 German development of rocket technology had not been proscribed by the Versailles Treaty, and 
was consequently attractive to the re-arming Reich as a potential means of developing long-range 
attack capability.   
73 The original convention of writers on the topic appears to be to hyphenate the ‘A’ designations, and 
not to hyphenate ‘V2’.  Particularly in the US, use of ‘V-2’ became common after the war.  This thesis 
adheres to the original convention, though use in the literature now appears to be mixed. 
74 To illustrate the diverse nature of the ‘V’ the ‘V1’ was a winged, pulse-jet powered bomb (in modern 
times it would be described as a cruise missile), developed by the Fieseler aircraft company, the V2 
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pioneers, the German team had the advantages of governmental support, good 
facilities and adequate funding, but despite this, they still struggled with technical 
problems throughout development, and indeed since they made more progress 
than any other team, they encountered more of them.  The A-1 to A-3 models were 
developed between 1933 and 1937, and represented at best technology 
demonstrators, rather than operational systems.  The only A-1, despite successful 
ground engine tests failed at launch, two A-2 models were successfully 
demonstrated to army officers in December 1934, and the A-3, a much larger 
design (about half the size of the eventual V2), was a severe disappointment to its 
designers, suffering several failures during December 1937.  The A-4 design had 
already been begun, but was temporarily halted while the A-5 emerged as a re-
designed A-3, still half-size, used to iron out design flaws.  After repeated 
successful A-5 tests, the A-4 was first flown in 1942, and the design became the 
V2, first used operationally in 1944.75  It is worth noting the achievements that the 
design team had accomplished at this stage. 
The V2 was a true ballistic missile; after launch, it accelerated along a pre-
determined path while the rocket motor ran, and at a designated instant, the fuel 
supply was cut off.  The rocket was then unguided, its point of impact determined 
solely by its position, speed and attitude at the instant the engine cut out.  The 
airframe could withstand the strains of powered flight and acceleration, a rapid 
climb into space (at a maximum altitude typically just above 50 miles) and the 
reverse process as it fell in free flight, stabilised aerodynamically but not guided, 
towards its target.  Total flight duration was typically about 5 minutes, and its peak 
speed was about Mach 4.0 – four times the speed of sound.  This was fast enough 
to pose problems of transonic and supersonic stability, complicated by the centre of 
gravity of the missile shifting dramatically as it consumed its fuel. Initially, the 
missile required both stability (i.e. the prevention of tumbling or tipping relative to 
the flight path) and guidance (i.e. direction along the required course to hit the 
target).  During powered flight, it was steered by a combination of aerodynamic 
control via moveable surfaces at the bottom of its fins, similar to those of an 
aircraft, and by varying the direction of the rocket exhaust by moving graphite 																																																								
was the ballistic missile described, and the V3 was a fixed, multiple-charge staged-firing cannon 
pointed at London from near Calais.  Development of both V1 and V2 systems took place at 
Peenemunde, partly on grounds of secrecy and partly because of access to test ranges and facilities, 
but in all other respects, they were separate systems. 
75 There are several accounts of the development of the A-series rockets, but one of the most concise 
is Walter Dornberger’s own, originally published in 1952.  See Walter Dornberger, V-2, trans. James 
Cleugh and Geoffrey Halliday (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1979).  Each of the ‘Aggregat’ 
rockets is cited individually in the index. 
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vanes positioned in the exhaust flow.  These latter surfaces were in fact relatively 
inefficient; since they were permanently in the exhaust stream, they restricted its 
flow, even when no steering command was required.76  Guidance was provided by 
a variety of systems, but at its heart, the V2 contained a rudimentary inertial 
guidance system.   
In its modern form, such a system consists of a physical platform held in a 
fixed orientation in space, independent of the vehicle in which it is mounted, 
stabilised by gyroscopes.  On the platform, accelerometers measure any 
accelerations imposed on it by the carrying vehicle in each of 3 dimensions, and by 
continuously summing those accelerations, and knowing the original start position 
of the system, they measure its present position.77  The V2 implemented several 
rudimentary forms of this system; one variant used three gyroscopes in an attempt 
to stabilise a platform in three dimensions.78  Most used a two-axis platform, 
supplemented by a compass system, and in some variants a radio navigation 
beam to aid initial steering.  In all cases, the essence of the system was to 
accelerate the missile along a pre-determined heading and a fixed attitude, a 
balance between vertical ascent and horizontal acceleration.  Launch sites were 
surveyed so that the required heading and distance to reach the target was known, 
and the missile either computed its speed by measuring acceleration until the 
required value was reached, or was tracked by radar from the ground and 
commanded to shut the engine down at the correct instant.  Because of its 
rudimentary design and tolerances in manufacture, accuracy was not very high; 
precise figures are hard to determine due to the operational circumstances 
surrounding most launches, but they were of the order of 3-5 miles over about 150 
miles of flight range.  An operational V2 carried about 1000 kilograms of high 
explosive.79  This was a substantial warhead, but accuracy in the 3-5 mile range 
was nowhere near enough to use single missiles against strategic targets.  Rather, 
the V2s were employed against area targets, principally cities such as London and 																																																								
76 One modification of a V2 that yielded immediate performance gains in post-war American flight 
tests was to remove the vanes from the exhaust, and substitute it with a moveable (‘gimballed’) 
engine which could tilt the entire thrust-line.  Although more complex than the vanes, and incurring a 
weight penalty, the performance improvement over the previous system was substantial. 
77 In its most modern form, an inertial navigation unit my dispense with the fixed platform and 
measure displacement by optical means, relying on interference between light beams travelling in 
opposite directions to each other, but the principle remains similar to the original gyroscopically 
stabilised platform. 
78 Practical three-axis inertial navigation systems rely on exquisite measurement of acceleration within 
very fine mechanical tolerances; it is fair to say that V2 systems did not approach the standards of 
accuracy that would be required e.g. to monitor the missile flight path and correct it continuously in 
three dimensions.  Nonetheless, it would be hard to describe them without stating that they embodied 
some of the characteristics of such systems. 
79 Norman Longmate, Hitler's Rockets: the story of the V2s (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1985) 103. 
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Antwerp.  Where they were used against precision targets (for example when 
aimed at the town of Remagen in Germany in 1945 in an attempt to limit use of the 
bridge over the Rhine there), they were of questionable effectiveness.80 
At the heart of the V2 lay its engine, probably its designer’s most significant 
technical achievement.  It used industrial alcohol as fuel and liquid oxygen as an 
oxidiser.  This choice of fuel was not the most powerful imaginable; The Russian 
rocket theoretician Tsiolkovsky had correctly identified liquid hydrogen as a more 
powerful alternative some 40 years earlier.  However alcohol was easily obtainable 
and transportable, was more dense (so occupied a smaller space within the missile 
for a given weight) and avoided the challenges of storing and pumping a liquid at a 
temperature of -250 degrees Celsius; the challenges posed by liquid oxygen at 
about -200 degrees Celsius were severe enough.  A significant breakthrough for 
the designers was their ability to pump large quantities of fuel and oxidiser to the 
combustion chamber; the pumps themselves drew on fire-engine pump technology 
(though they faced adaptation challenges to reach the performance required for 
use in the V2), but the mechanism of driving them on a common shaft, powered by 
decomposing hydrogen peroxide with a catalyst and using the resulting steam to 
drive a turbine was novel.  A greater problem had been achieving stable 
combustion within the engine – early engines had been plagued by unstable 
combustion leading to explosions or failures within the chamber.  This was 
overcome by extensive design and redesign of the fuel and oxidiser mixing 
arrangements, involving elaborate nozzles and careful component layout.  Finally, 
the combustion chamber was protected from extreme temperatures firstly by 
circulation of fuel around it as a coolant prior to injection into the chamber, and 
secondly by arranging for a small proportion of un-burnt fuel to form a thin film or 
boundary layer inside the combustion chamber.81 
Subsequent	V2	Refinements		
The V2 was thus a mature ballistic missile, but it is worth noting that 
although it represented the ‘state of the art’ in 1945, it left plenty of room for 																																																								
80 Historians debate whether nearby V2 impacts contributed to the collapse of the bridge, already 
significantly weakened by prior demolition attempts by retreating German forces.  Certainly V2 
impacts occurred in its vicinity on the day of its collapse, but none of the missiles hit it, and attribution 
must remain uncertain.  Hitler nonetheless sent personal congratulations to the battery commander 
responsible for the barrage on the following day.  For an account which concludes that V2s were not 
responsible, see Ken Hechler, The Bridge at Remagen (Presidio War Classic New York, NY: Presidio 
(Mass Market Edn), 1975) 198-201.  See also http://www.v2rocket.com/start/deployment/v2s-on-
remagen.html (accessed 17 July 2016) for further detail and references. 
81 A comprehensive description of the development of the A-4/V2 rocket motor can be found at J. D. 
Hunley, Preludes to U.S. space-launch vehicle technology : Goddard rockets to Minuteman III 
(Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2008) 102-12 
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Schriever and others to improve upon in the following decades.  By some 
measures, its development had stalled at precisely the ‘right’ stage for Schriever to 
capitalize on it subsequently.  On one hand it was too small, short range, 
inaccurate and inefficient for intercontinental use as a nuclear-tipped missile.  But 
on the other, and particularly after the American experience exploiting captured 
V2s post-war proved that improvements were possible, they had achieved their 
(limited) aims and it was impossible to argue that they were impractical.  Plainly, 
however, there were areas ripe for improvement. 
The first improvement required was to scale the missile up; a V2 was too 
small and too short range for intercontinental use.  Early ICBMs were substantially 
larger than the V2, both to allow carriage of a larger warhead and to increase fuel 
capacity to give intercontinental range.  This brought into focus the possibility of 
requiring a multi-stage rocket, as originally posited by Tsiolkovsky.  Both the Atlas 
ICBM and its Soviet counterpart ‘fudged’ this design issue by adopting a hybrid 
‘stage and a half’ design, where multiple rocket engines were ignited at launch, and 
some later discarded soon after launch, but subsequent missiles would employ true 
multi-stage principles.82  As well as the theoretical advantages outlined by 
Tsiolkovsky regarding discarding useless weight, multi-stage rockets also allowed 
the various stages to be optimised for operation in the atmosphere (for first stages) 
or in the vacuum of space (later stages).83  Initial fears about the difficulty of igniting 
a second or subsequent stage in-flight were addressed by the development of 
‘hypergolic’ fuels and oxidisers, which reacted spontaneously when mixed.  The 
principle could also be applied to first stages, in the interests of launch reliability for 
missiles on alert, though at a price regarding safety in a silo due to the toxicity and 
spontaneous explosiveness of the substances involved.84 
The next improvement was to guidance systems.  These needed to be 
matched to the yield of the warhead (greater yield requiring less accuracy to 
achieve effect on a given target).  Dornberger is clear in his memoir that inertial 																																																								
82 Chuck  Walker and Joel Powell, Atlas : the ultimate weapon : by those who built it (Burlington, Ont.: 
Apogee Books, 2005) 24-25 
83 This factor had a significant impact on the design of the rocket engine exhaust nozzle, since it 
determined whether the engine had to operate against atmospheric pressure outside the chamber, or 
whether it was exhausting into a vacuum. 
84 The worst silo accident in USAF service killed 53 workers in 1965 when a fire started in a silo in 
Searcey, Arkansas, although this instance did not directly involve missile fuel.  Other silo accidents 
involving hypergolic propellants did occur, however, including one in 1980 at Damascus, Arkansas 
involving a Titan II ICBM, which killed a member of the silo crew and ejected the (live) nuclear 
warhead from the silo.  The warhead safety features worked as advertised and no detonation or 
release of nuclear materials occurred.  For further details of Titan incidents and accidents, see David 
K. Stumpf, Titan II : a history of a Cold War missile program (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas 
Press, 2000) Chapter IX. 
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systems had been preferable to the radio beams used for some early V2 flights (at 
least partly because of their immunity to jamming and other countermeasures), and 
von Braun had also favoured them from the outset during V2 development.85  
When Schriever came to developing the Atlas ICBM, he was initially limited by the 
accuracy of inertial guidance available, and the first Atlas missiles used a hybrid 
system with gyroscopic information on the missile being combined with radar 
tracking data from the ground; later variants employed purely inertial systems.86   
A further problem to be addressed was re-entry; although the V2 coasted 
clear of most of the atmosphere at the top of its trajectory, and thus had to travel 
back through it to reach its target, it did so at a relatively modest speed for a 
missile.  Although fast enough to induce problems with transonic stability during re-
entry, and to impose significant stresses on the missile airframe, it still managed to 
avoid significant issues with frictional heating during its descent.87  To reach ranges 
typical for ICBMs, however, the missile must be accelerated to much greater 
speeds, and problems of frictional heating during re-entry became significant.  A 
variety of solutions were explored, broadly speaking along two lines of 
development.  One was to build a massive cover for the warhead, large enough to 
absorb the heat generated without damage to the payload.  The other utilised 
ablative coatings – materials capable of exposure to high-temperatures which 
would gradually burn away during re-entry, and which were made thick enough for 
the inner layers to survive.88  
There were, of course, other significant problems to overcome; for example, 
the V2 had employed mobile launchers capable of launching a missile from a rural 
location after it had been fuelled in the field.  At least initially, this was impractical 
for an ICBM due to its size.  The early use of cryogenic (ultra low-temperature) 
oxidisers such as liquid oxygen required that the missile be fuelled immediately 
before launch (otherwise the liquid oxygen would boil within its tank and either 
evaporate if it was not continuously topped up, or gradually chill the entire rocket if 
it was) limited operational employment.  Even assuming a fixed launch site, which 																																																								
85 See Dornberger, V-2  245 for his views on jamming, and Neufeld, Von Braun  103 for von Braun’s 
views on inertial guidance.  References within Neufeld on this topic refer to ‘’Krieselgerate” – the firm 
who manufactured the gyro platforms. 
86 Walker and Powell, Atlas  54. 
87 German engineers suspected that some of the in-flight failures experienced by operational V2s 
were due to frictional heating during descent igniting un-burnt fuel in the missile’s tanks, but this does 
not appear to have been proven conclusively, nor was it a limiting factor in the use of the V2.  J D 
Hunley, Preludes to US Space-Launch Vehicle Technology: Goddard Rockets to Minuteman III 
(Gainseville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2008) 80. 
88 Walker and Powell, Atlas  58.  Ernest G.  Schwiebert, A history of the U.S. Air Force ballistic 
missiles (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1964) 61-62. 
		 39	
could produce sufficient liquid oxygen, the civil engineering challenges of protecting 
‘on alert’ missiles either in silos or in surface revetments was substantial.89   
Schriever	and	the	Paperclip	Cadre		
Alongside von Braun and Dornberger was another member of the Paperclip 
cadre – not an engineer, but rather a medical doctor – called Hubertus Strughold, 
who would influence Schriever’s thought significantly.  Initially, Strughold had the 
greater influence on Schriever, principally because on arrival in the United States, 
von Braun and Dornberger were sequestered by the US Army, rather than the Air 
Force.  The Army initially confined them in Fort Bliss, Texas, and later moved them 
to Huntsville Arsenal in Alabama where they worked on the Army’s Redstone (short 
range) missile programme.90  Strughold, meanwhile, who had been located in 
Germany by a USAF doctor and aviation medicine specialist, Colonel (later Major 
General) Harry Armstrong, started work immediately at the USAF School of 
Aviation Medicine at Randolph Field, Texas.91  The author can find no direct 
evidence of interaction between Schriever on one hand and Armstrong or 
Strughold on the other in these early days, but given Schriever’s wide-ranging 
duties at the time, it seems likely he was aware of the work being undertaken at 
Randolph Field.  Schriever quickly identified the importance of aero-medical 
research to enable manned spaceflight, and there is later evidence of the 
continuing relationships between the Paperclip cadre collectively and Schriever.92  
As for von Braun and Dornberger, neither ever worked directly for or with 
Schriever, yet plainly their work influenced him.  Dornberger was detained by 
British forces at the end of World War 2 and was held in the UK for 2 years before 
travelling to the USA.  After working briefly for the USAF at Wright-Patterson AFB 																																																								
89 Dr John Lonnquest, whose PhD thesis deals extensively with Schriever, and which will be 
discussed in the next Chapter, later became the Historian of the US Army Corps of Engineers.  He 
has written the definitive history of the civil engineering and infrastructure aspects of the ICBM 
programme, which expands at length on this topic.  See John C. Lonnquest and David F. Winkler, To 
defend and deter : the legacy of the United States cold war missile program (USACERL special report 
97/01 Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, Legacy Resource Management Program, Cold War Project, 
1996) 
90 Bower, Paperclip  308-09.  Boyne, 'Project Paperclip',  (Air Force Magazine). 
91 Mark R. Campbell et al., 'Hubertus Strughold: The “Father of Space Medicine”', Aviation, Space, 
and Environmental Medicine, Vol 78 No 7  (July 2007 ).  Although written over 20 years after 
Strughold’s death in 1986, this article takes an uncritical view of him; he died a US citizen, in good 
standing with the USAF, but his posthumous reputation has been severely tarnished by the previously 
overlooked connection between much of his post-war work and experiments carried out on human 
subjects in concentration camps during World War 2.  The ‘Hubertus Strughold Award’ mentioned by 
Campbell is no longer awarded under that title.  Both Bower and Lichtblau devote chapters of their 
books to Strughold – see Bower, Paperclip  Chapter 11 and Lichtblau, Nazis Next Door  Chapter 6.  
Details of Armstrong’s rise to prominence as a USAF medical officer can be found in Annie Jacobsen, 
Operation Paperclip: the secret intelligence program that brought Nazi scientists to America (New 
York: Little, Brown & Co, 2014) 204-16. 
92 See Chapter 5, p125 of this thesis. 
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(while Schriever was working in the Pentagon) he was employed by Bell 
Aerospace.  He worked on the X-15 and X-20 Dyna-Soar programmes – the latter 
of particular interest to Schriever – before returning to Germany in retirement, via a 
brief sojourn in Mexico.93  Von Braun stayed in US Army service at Fort Bliss and 
later at Huntsville prior to transferring to NASA and playing a leading role in the 
Apollo programme.  His views on the potential utility of space weapons became 
prominent in the late 1950s, and in this context became more relevant to 
Schriever’s work.94  
Schriever	in	the	early-1950s	–	‘Development	Planning’		
On graduation from the NWC, Schriever resumed duties within the broad 
area of technology, research and development.  His new appointment was as 
Assistant for Development Planning on the Air Staff.  Here, his responsibility was to 
try to move weapons development planning forward to incorporate technologies not 
in service at that instant.  He described it thus: 
…the main purpose of that particular office was to try to factor in, as an 
extremely important element in the determination of initiating new weapon 
system developments, the technologies that would be available 
downstream…I mean five to ten years in the future, although that meant the 
technology was already being worked with in laboratories…to try to give a 
balance to the nearer term operational commands and the longer term 
technology…95 
 
Once again, Schriever’s precise duties remained loosely defined – he 
himself described them as “ad-hockery”.  He rose within the Development Planning 
Office from ‘Assistant for Evaluation’, to ‘Assistant for Development Planning’ to 
Office Director.96  He had the advantage of support for his activities from the then 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Nathan Twining, who knew Schriever from 
previous service.97  Schriever had control of a budget of $10 million to fund his 
activities, and one of the uses he put this to was having personnel seconded to his 																																																								
93 Roy Houchin describes Dornberger’s role in the X-20 in his monograph Roy F. Houchin, US 
hypersonic research and development : the rise and fall of Dyna-Soar, 1944-1963 (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) 7-9, 16.  Jacobsen also notes Dornberger’s employment history in her ‘guide to 
characters’ (op cit). 
94 See Chapter 6, p155 of this thesis. 
95 Schriever, 'RAND Oral History Interview',  20. 
96 These promotions owe at least something to the departure of Dr Ivan Getting, the founding 
Director, from public service to join the Raytheon Corporation.  Getting would interact with Schriever 
again in the 1960s via The Aerospace Corporation. 
97 Twining had undertaken his flying training at the same Texas bases as Schriever, but about 8 years 
earlier.  He had then among other things served as an engineering officer in Chicago during the Air 
Corps ‘Air Mail’ operations in 1934, and in the Pacific Theatre at Air Forces Headquarters during 
World War 2 until 1943.  
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office for fixed term projects.   He thus was able to seek assistance from various 
organisations such as the Air University at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and more 
notably from the RAND Corporation.98  Schriever’s days of ‘ad-hockery’ were 
coming to an end, however, as technological developments in atomic weapons 
were about to force a period of massive re-equipment on the United States armed 
forces. 
After the initial breakthrough in developing atomic weapons during World 
War 2, the United States had to contemplate other countries doing likewise.  The 
Soviet Union duly achieved effective nuclear parity in 1949.  At that point, both 
countries could only usefully deliver such weapons by air, as bombs dropped from 
aircraft.  Although vastly more powerful than conventional alternatives, the yield of 
early fission weapons was still sufficiently limited that they required relatively 
accurate delivery, which at that time could only be achieved by aiming them from 
an aircraft near the target, to assure its destruction.  The potential of missiles as a 
delivery system had obvious advantages from the standpoint of speed and reduced 
vulnerability, but the limits on the accuracy of missiles of sufficient range to serve 
as deterrent systems meant they were impractical.  Solving this conundrum would 
either require more accurate missiles or more powerful nuclear warheads.  In 1951-
52, successful American tests of thermonuclear devices, which relied on nuclear 
fusion rather than fission, and which offered much higher yields than fission 
devices, suggested that the latter breakthrough was more likely.  Determining 
whether this was in fact the case was referred to a special panel of the Scientific 
Advisory Board, under the direction of Professor John von Neumann.  Their report 
in 1953 confirmed the feasibility of a thermo-nuclear tipped ICBM, and the USAF, 
which had maintained a fitful interest in their development over the years since 
World War 2 re-assessed priorities and established an organisation specifically to 
deliver an operational version.99 
The	Western	Development	Division	and	the	Dawn	of	the	Space	Age		
Schriever thus became the first (and only) commander of the Western 
Development Division (WDD), a component of ARDC established in Inglewood, 
California on 1 July 1954.100  Schriever directed the WDD with the prime aim of 
																																																								
98 Schriever, 'RAND Oral History Interview',  21. 
99 Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM : a study in bureaucratic politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976) 170. 
100 The Western Development Division was re-named the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division in 1957 
(while still commanded by Schriever), and was eventually split into a ‘missile’ division and a ‘space 
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delivering an operational ICBM as quickly as possible.  The resulting weapon 
system was known as the ‘Atlas’; it achieved operational status in September 1959.  
To produce an operational system as quickly as possible, Schriever developed a 
variety of techniques of programme management, collectively known as 
‘concurrency’.  The natures of these techniques, the reasons for their success and 
the ways that Schriever employed them have been the subject of much study.  For 
now, it is sufficient to note that concurrency circumvented the limitations of 
sequential development, where one component of a complex system was 
developed essentially to completion before the next stage was commenced.  
During the five-year duration of Atlas development, Schriever coordinated the 
design, testing and production of the complete missile airframe and propulsion 
system, its integration with the warhead, the construction of infrastructure at the 
operational bases for the missile and the training of personnel to operate it.  Within 
his management activities, Schriever also undertook significant innovation in the 
introduction of management information systems and development of internal 
review and communications processes.  Finally, he had to cope with shifting 
budget priorities and changing perceptions of American preparedness compared to 
that of the Soviet Union, particularly following the launch of Sputnik 1, the first 
artificial Earth-orbiting satellite, by the Soviets in 1957.  Schriever accepted that in 
taking on the appointment at WDD he was perhaps limiting his career; the 
discussion he had with General Power, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in July 
1954 was commented on at some length by a close colleague, Colonel Vince 
Ford.101  Evidently, however, he felt any sacrifices were worth the inherent penalty. 
It was during this period that Schriever also became directly involved with 
exploring the utility of military space systems.  The US Army and Navy had both 
been considering their potential since 1945, and Schriever would have been aware 
of the content of the RAND Report of 1946 that had outlined their likely roles, and 
the subsequent work commissioned by the USAF.102  On 15 February 1956, one of 
the consequences of that work was that responsibility for the USAF satellite 
programme, previously vested in the Wright Air Development Center (WADC) at 
																																																								
systems’ division in 1961 within Air Force Systems Command, which Schriever had risen to command 
at that time. 
101 Evidence for this interview can be found in the Schriever/Ford manuscript, which will be described 
in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
102 The original RAND report was published as Project Rand, Preliminary design of an experimental 
world-circling spaceship (Santa Monica, CA: Project Rand, within the Douglas Aircraft Company 
Engineering Division, 1946)  There were numerous follow-on reports, commissioned by the USAF 
from the RAND Organisation in the intervening years. 
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Wright-Paterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio,103 was transferred to WDD.104  The principal 
focus of this work was the launch of a reconnaissance satellite as soon as 
possible.  Presented to the public as ‘Discoverer’, a series of scientific satellites to 
characterise the upper atmosphere and perform other aspects of basic research, 
the program could actually trace its origins to the DPO for reconnaissance that 
Schriever had promoted while working at the Pentagon.  Also in hand, and in fact 
orbited before a successful Discoverer mission was achieved, was Project SCORE, 
an early communications satellite.  Both programmes relied on technology 
developed by WDD for launch – the SCORE vehicle was in fact an ATLAS missile 
airframe launched into orbit in its entirety.  Thus Schriever played a key role in the 
earliest US military space systems.  When Discoverer at last achieved the most 
challenging part of its rather tortuous development, the safe recovery of a capsule 
ejected by the orbiting reconnaissance system, the payload exposed to public view 
was a US flag that had been successfully launched and recovered.  With some 
fanfare (as part of the public explanation of the mission), the flag was taken to the 
White House and presented to President Eisenhower.  The scene was 
photographed, but whether by accident or design, no extant photograph seems to 
show the whole grouping around the President; nonetheless, standing close behind 
the President when the flag was presented was Major General Schriever. 
Air	Force	System	Command		
In 1959, with Atlas entering service, and with two more missile systems 
initiated by Schriever – Titan and Minuteman – in development, he was promoted 
to the rank of Lieutenant General and given command of WDD’s parent 
organisation, AFBMD.  He guided it through a major reorganisation that he himself 
initiated, and was rewarded by his final promotion to the rank of (4-star) General to 
command one of its fruits, Air Force Systems Command (AFSC).  This gave him 
wider management responsibilities; after 8 years of almost exclusive involvement in 
space and missile systems, he took responsibility for the management of aircraft 
procurement for the USAF too.  Between 1961 and 1966, the bumpy paths of the 
C-5A transport aircraft and F-111 multi-role fast-jet aircraft into service fell under 
his remit.  At the same time, however, he retained his involvement in space and 
missile systems development.  The USAF had for some time been lobbying and 																																																								
103 The same location and essentially the same organisation as Schriever had served at in 1940. 
104 John T. Greenwood, Space and Missile Systems Organization : a chronology, 1954-1979 (AFSC 
historical publication Washington, D.C.: Air Force Chief of Staff, History Office, 1979) 34  Significantly, 
the WADC retained responsibility for the X-15 experimental rocket-powered aircraft, and would 
similarly control the development of the X-20 Dyna-Soar program. 
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manoeuvring for a coherent military manned spaceflight programme, and Schriever 
had been involved with it throughout.  Early proposals for an overtly military 
manned spaceflight programme, referred to variously as ‘Military Man in Space’ 
(MMIS), and ‘Man in Space Soonest’ (MISS) had come to naught, and the 
transformation of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) into the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and parallel creation of 
the Defence Advanced Research Program Agency (DARPA) had frustrated USAF 
ambitions in this area.  NASA still relied heavily on all the Services for its own 
programmes; Mercury capsules were launched atop (Army) Redstone and (Air 
Force) Atlas launchers, each derived from the equivalent missile.  Gemini capsules 
similarly relied on (Air Force) Titan-derived launchers; it was not until the Apollo 
program that NASA launched a manned capsule atop a non-missile derived 
launcher, the Saturn – and even that was developed by a team originating from the 
US Army missile programme.  The US Navy played a critical role in recovery of all 
NASA astronauts when they returned to ‘splash-down’ in the ocean, and the four 
Services supplied the bulk of the astronaut corps, most of which were former 
military test pilots. 
While Schriever was commanding AFSC, several further attempts at a 
military manned spaceflight programme were undertaken, though only the last of 
these involved him directly.  This was the attempt to develop an early ‘space 
station’ known as the ‘Manned Orbiting Laboratory’ (MOL); Schriever himself was 
the MOL project director in the last 2 years of his service career.105   
																																																								
105 Since these programmes provide a very clear insight into Schriever’s view of the importance of 
military manned spaceflight, their natures are described in more detail in Chapter 5, and specifically at 
pp 122-24. 
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Retirement		
In 1966, Schriever retired from the USAF.  He had commanded at 4-star 
rank, and the only logical further appointment for him would have been as Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, but with no combat experience in South-East Asia and no 
experience on jet-powered aircraft he would have been a surprise choice.  His 
retirement from Air Force service did not mark the end of his working life, however.  
Some of his ventures were commercial; he established a Washington-DC based 
consultancy firm with an Air Force colleague, General Fulton McKee, and served 
as an adviser to many corporate bodies.  Others were in the public sector; among 
them, he advised the Department of Transportation on the regulation of civil air 
transport, he served on (President Nixon’s) Presidential Advisory Council on 
Management Improvement in the early 1970s, was involved in President Reagan’s 
election campaign and subsequently his transition to the presidency, and under 
President Reagan served on various advisory bodies relating to the Strategic 
Defence Initiative, foreign intelligence and defence management and policy.106   
He also began to garner honours marking his career achievements; he was 
awarded an honorary doctorate by Utah State University in 1995.107  The United 
States Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs endowed a chair in Space Systems 
Engineering in his honour in 2005.  He was elected an honorary fellow of the 
American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics and a member of the National 
Academy of Engineering.  He received a ‘Lifetime Achievement’ award from the Air 
Force Association in 2003, and was honoured three times by the Air University at 
Maxwell AFB, Alabama within its ‘Gathering of Eagles’ programme.108  He was 
inducted into the National Aviation Hall of Fame in 1980.  The Headquarters of the 
USAF found its own unique way to honour Schriever; in 1998, Falcon AFB, 
Colorado was renamed Schriever AFB.  This was the first (and only as of 2012) 
time that a USAF base has been named for a living serviceman, and Schriever had 
the unique experience of attending its dedication ceremony. 109  Falcon AFB was at 																																																								
106 See Sheehan, A Fiery Peace  471 for a description of some of Schriever’s retirement activities.  
Further details can be deduced from the chronology and container titles in Kells et al., BAS Papers; 
Finding Aid , especially pages 3-4 and 20-34. 
107 The award by Utah State was probably in recognition of the relationship between the US military 
space community and the Space Dynamics Laboratory created at Utah State in the wake of US 
experiments with V2 missiles following World War 2.  Schriever had also been awarded an honorary 
degree by Rider University in New Jersey in 1958, while still serving in the USAF. 
108 In 1987, 1997 and 2001. 
109 Some cite the naming in 1927 of Wright Field (later Wright-Patterson AFB) in Ohio for the Wright 
Brothers, one of whom was still alive at the time of the naming, as a counter example, but neither 
brother had ever served in any branch of military service, and no attempts seems to have been made 
to link the dedication with the surviving brother. 
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the time a relatively ‘young’ base, having been established in 1983 and supporting 
only space-related units throughout its history.110  His final years passed in this 
general aura of recognition and gratitude from the USAF for his career endeavours.  
He maintained close links with his former colleagues; the body known as 
‘Schriever’s Old-Timers’ met regularly, with close support and encouragement from 
the senior leadership of the USAF.  Its last formal gathering appears to have been 
its 15th Anniversary reunion at Bolling AFB in Washington DC held 23-27 April 
2003.  Among those present to honour Schriever and his colleagues were the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commanders 
of Air Force Space Command and Materiel Command, and of US Strategic 
Command.111  His death, aged 94 in June 2005, led to the funeral honours noted at 
the start of this chapter. 
Schriever’s life spanned the 20th Century and the rise of air and space 
capability and power.  From respectable but modest origins in Germany, he made 
a new life in the United States.  His military career up to 1945, while honourable, 
would not have suggested the respect he eventually gained, though his technical 
qualifications might have been thought noteworthy.  Rather, his renown arose from 
its latter half.  In the next chapter, this thesis looks at how other scholars and 
writers have gauged his importance and why.  Suffice it for now to note that for the 
remainder of this study we will concentrate on his contribution to the development 
of space and missile capability within the USAF.  Plainly his part was significant, 
but to do him justice, we should establish why.
																																																								
110 See Randolph J. Saunders and Meredith Cooper, Master of the Sky to Master of Space:  A Brief 
History of the 50th Space Wing (Schriever AFB, Colorado: 50SW History Office, 2011) Appendix 7 for 
the history of the base and its renaming. 
111 Amburgey, 'Space and Missile Pioneers Meet: General Schriever's Old Timers Reunion',  
(Association of Air Force Missileers Newsletter ) 
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CHAPTER 3 – LITERATURE, SOURCES AND THEIR 
PROVENANCE 
 
Students of the history of the early US Space and Missiles programme 
cannot claim to be short of material to study; many of the key players realised the 
seminal nature of their work and took steps to record parts of it, institutional 
historians were established in key departments, and the longevity of many of the 
principals allowed relatively generous recording of their outlooks and memories.  
Yet there are challenges in this field of study, and whether for these reasons or 
otherwise, it is the author’s contention that there is a significant gap in the analysis 
of Schriever and his motivation.  This chapter firstly surveys the existing academic 
analysis and popular accounts of Schriever’s life and work.  The limitations of such 
sources will be highlighted, in order to indicate where further work might be 
profitable.  It is followed by an examination of the provenance of the Schriever 
Archive at the Library of Congress, in order to lay a foundation for the analysis of 
Schriever’s thoughts that it contains.  In particular, it examines the three book-
length manuscripts found there to establish their authorship and Schriever’s 
relationship with each. 
Categorisation of Existing Analysis 	
In his lifetime, Schriever’s work attracted interest for at least three reasons.  
The most obvious was the interest generated by the end product – delivery of an 
operational ICBM system.  The histories deriving from this period form a major part 
of the technical underpinnings of the copious literature on nuclear deterrence, as 
well as documenting the various engineering and scientific challenges and 
breakthroughs faced and achieved by missile developers.  A second strand of 
literature covers the management techniques employed by Schriever to marshal 
the resources placed at his disposal during his work developing ICBMs, and in 
particular his time at the head of the Western Development Division.  The context 
of this literature is the emergence of Systems Engineering as a distinct discipline 
within engineering, a process promoted by increasing complexity, particularly of 
military systems.  Within this analysis, Schriever’s proponency of ‘concurrency’ is 
thought notable, and is consequently the subject of much study.  Thirdly, there are 
straightforward biographies of Schriever, some written as matters of scholarly 
record, others with more popular aspirations.  As will be demonstrated, there are 
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still gaps in his life-story; filling some of the gaps in this area is one goal of this 
thesis.  
The	Histories	of	the	ICBM	Program		
The ICBM was developed in the United States within a severely 
compressed timeline, driven by competition between the United States and the 
USSR.112  Notwithstanding the original analysis of space systems and their utility 
undertaken in the immediate post-World War 2 period by the RAND Corporation 
and the related work undertaken on behalf of the US Navy, the driver for the 
development of systems such as Atlas and its immediate successors, was missile-
related, specifically the dominant wish to deliver thermo-nuclear warheads at inter-
continental ranges with acceptable levels of accuracy.  The connection between 
achievement of that capability and gaining access to space was, however, evident.  
Thus early literature both sought to explain to the American public what a missile 
capability would confer and to describe the systems being developed to achieve it.  
Each emerging system was presented to the general public through a variety of 
official statements and announcements, but each also led to the writing of books 
detailing the programmes, from both a policy/strategy perspective and also from 
the standpoint of technical history.113  Thus, for example, by 1960, the Atlas missile 
had been described in detail by John L Chapman, an American journalist and 
wartime member of the US AAC.114 
  Chapman’s book was written for a general audience, and thus eschews 
scholarly conventions of footnoting and referencing.  It was written, however, to get 
the story of the missile into the public domain as rapidly as possible – the Preface 
is dated ‘August 1959’, about the same time as the first detachment of Atlas 
missiles achieved operational status.115  Chapman acknowledges significant 
assistance from the Convair Corporation in the preparation of his work, and this in 
itself gives it some value; gaps in corporate records and archives form a significant 
lacuna in early spaceflight and missile history.  It also, however, must raise 
questions as to its impartiality and objectivity.  The core of his work is a journalist’s 																																																								
112 No attempt will be made within this thesis to describe the development of ICBM or space-flight 
capability in the USSR or any other nation.  Thus description of an event or sequence of events here 
should not be taken to imply primacy in the field; plainly, the USSR was the first nation to demonstrate 
achievement of earth orbit and of manned spaceflight, in 1957 and 1961 respectively. 
113 This thesis will look specifically at two works, one on the Atlas missile, the other on Thor.  There 
was also a popular history of the Minuteman missile, though Titan does not seem to have been 
described until much later in its service life. 
114John L. Chapman, Atlas : the story of a missile (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960).  The end-
matter notes Chapman’s service in the US AAC in a bomber squadron in India and China. 
115 Chapman, Atlas  xii, 144.  There are conflicting dates in the literature for the activation of the first 
Atlas missile detachment, but it is plain that Chapman’s book was published at about the same time. 
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linear narrative of the Atlas programme.  It begins with an explanatory section on 
the nature of an ICBM, its flight profile and the principles behind rocket propulsion.  
It then summarises the immediate post-war proposals for missile development 
arising out of captured German technology, the significance of the development of 
thermo-nuclear payloads and the various technical obstacles encountered and 
overcome along the way.  It concludes by discussing the utility of Atlas as a 
satellite launcher, describing its use in Project SCORE, the early communications 
satellite mentioned previously and its (then) forthcoming use as a launcher for the 
orbital flights within the NASA Mercury manned spaceflight programme.  Thus it 
served to underscore the connection in the USA between missile technology and 
spaceflight, though by 1959 the Soviet Union had already demonstrated the 
general principle beyond any conceivable doubt.  It acknowledges Schriever’s 
contribution to the development of Atlas, noting his early proponency of ballistic 
missiles, though also his previous realisation that until the thermo-nuclear 
breakthrough of 1952-3, air-breathing and rocket propelled cruise missiles offered 
a more promising line of development.116  It also notes his involvement in the 
decision to impose external management on the Atlas project.117  At the time of the 
book’s writing, Schriever was heavily engaged in the early ‘Discoverer’ missions, 
and he is not noted in the acknowledgements for contributing directly to the text; 
considerations of security would probably also have intruded in any such 
attempt.118  The principal source employed by Chapman appears to be Karel 
(‘Charlie’) Bossart of the Convair Corporation, though the credit extended to 
Colonel B L Boatman USAF, who was closely associated with Schriever, is also 
noteworthy.119   
In the following year (1961), an equivalent book describing the Thor missile 
gained endorsement by Schriever when he contributed the Foreword.120  Entitled 
‘The Mighty Thor: Missile in Readiness’, this too was written by a journalist – Julian 
Hartt.121  Schriever highlights what he saw as important in his brief foreword; Thor 
had been developed in an even more compressed timescale than Atlas, and like 
Atlas it had contributed significantly to early spaceflight, being the first launcher 
																																																								
116 Chapman, Atlas  59, 71 
117 Chapman, Atlas  74-5 
118 A total of 7 Discoverer launches took place between January and August 1959 
119 Chapman, Atlas  Acknowledgements, 185 
120 Julian Norris Hartt, The mighty Thor : missile in readiness (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
1961) 
121 Again written for a popular readership, this volume omits both references, and an index. 
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employed at the USAF launch facility at Vandenberg AFB, California, and the first 
to lift a US payload into a polar orbit.122  As he notes:  
The story of Thor is a story of ‘firsts’...[details of Vandenberg and polar 
orbit]…First long range missile in the Free World to record one hundred 
launchings.  The story of Thor is more- it is a story of space.  Thor has 
earned the title of ‘Workhorse of the Space Age’.123 
Hartt also makes early reference to Schriever’s use of concurrency in 
project management.124  This is not, however, a detailed analysis of the concept, 
and there are better accounts elsewhere. 
After these first popular volumes, academia sought to catch up.  The first 
thesis concentrating on the development of ICBMs was submitted by Claude Johns 
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1964.125  It opens with a 
conventional history of early ICBM development: the achievements of Germany 
during World War 2, the early service proposals for long range missiles in the 
immediate post-war period and the importance of the development of thermo-
nuclear warheads in allowing ICBM development to start in earnest.  It posits three 
principle architects of the early US ICBM programme – John von Neumann, via the 
work of the Scientific Advisory Board panel described in Chapter 2, Trevor 
Gardner, who was the Secretary of the Air Force’s Special Assistant for Research 
and Development when Atlas development began in earnest and was later 
appointed Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, and lastly Bernard Schriever.126  
Johns concentrates his analysis on two aspects of the subsequent effort: the 
organisation of the various committees that oversaw ICBM development, and 
Schriever’s concept of concurrency.   
The chapter on committees focuses on Gardner’s work, but that on USAF 
organisation understandably concentrates on Schriever and on concurrency.  
There are other works that explain the detail of concurrency as envisaged by 
Schriever, but for now it is sufficient to note that Johns provided a very early 
attribution of the technique to him.   																																																								
122 These latter achievements are in fact related, and bear on military spaceflight applications.  A polar 
orbit – one where the satellite passes over both North and South poles of the Earth – is essential for a 
mission overflying all areas of the Earth’s surface, and this in turn is a common requirement for 
reconnaissance satellites.  Launches to achieve such orbits are constrained in populated areas by the 
need for an unobstructed north or south facing path over water or similar unpopulated terrain, which 
was the USAF motivation for developing Vandenberg AFB on the Californian coast as a launch site. 
123 Hartt, The mighty Thor  xi 
124 Hartt, The mighty Thor  52-3 
125 Claude J. Johns, 'The United States Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile program, 1954-
1959: technological change and organizational innovation', (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 
NC 1964 PhD), 
126 Johns, 'The USAF ICBM program', 39 
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Johns also describes the quartet of Air Force organisations that between 
them developed Atlas: the Ballistic Missile Division (BMD) of Air Research and 
Development Command (commanded by Schriever as the WDD in 1954-57, and 
latterly under the BMD title), the Ballistic Missile Center (BMC) – sometimes 
confusingly referred to as the Ballistic Missile Office (BMO), but in either case a 
component of Air Materiel Command, from which ARDC had been ‘spun off’, ‘SAC-
Mike’, a component of Strategic Air Command (SAC) responsible for developing 
operational doctrine and strategy for ICBM employment, and the Space 
Technology Laboratories (STL).127  This last organisation was established to assist 
with oversight of the development program, since it was felt that Convair, as prime 
contractor for the Atlas airframe, lacked the managerial experience and ability to 
supervise such a large project.  This decision ultimately drew censure on 
Schriever, since STL was a division of the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, which 
was involved in aerospace engineering.  This was felt to confer an unfair 
advantage on Ramo-Wooldridge, by giving them an oversight role in a program 
they would later be able to participate in as a supplier.  Johns outlines alternative 
supervisory arrangements that could have been employed, but in the end 
concludes that there were certainly strong grounds for making the decisions taken 
and some for believing that they were in effect the only practical ones.   
Overall, Johns’ achievement was in being the first to place the management 
of the ICBM and its development in the academic domain.  Working at the time he 
did, it is deeply regrettable that he did not interview the protagonists to any 
significant extent, citing time constraints and travel costs for this omission rather 
than any considerations of classification or security.128  His conclusions do not 
dwell on any particular contribution of Schriever, instead simply noting the strategic 
imperatives consequent on the Soviet’s demonstration of ICBM capability before 
that of the USA.  They can also be criticized for introducing material not supported 
anywhere else in the thesis – in his final chapter he notes ‘military conservatism’ 
consequent on the introduction of ICBMs into service and their impact on 
established military roles.  His observations may be valid, and are certainly 
interesting, but do not draw on any of the preceding analysis or sources cited.  His 
work constitutes a valuable first step in recording the history of the ICBM 
systematically, and of highlighting Schriever’s role, but the critique of Schriever’s 
motives must be sought elsewhere. 																																																								
127 Johns, 'The USAF ICBM program', 53-62 
128 Johns, 'The USAF ICBM program', 12 
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There are other composite histories of the USAF missile program.  In 1964 
(at the same time as Johns was submitting his thesis at UNC), the official historian 
of Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), Dr Ernest Schwiebert, was writing a 
contemporary history of the ICBM program.129  This work mixes interviews with 
authored chapters, and includes an interview transcript between Schriever and 
John F Loosbrock, an aviation journalist and commentator.  In the interview, 
Schriever validates the contributions of von Neumann and Gardner that Johns had 
identified.130  He also notes the changing strategic imperatives evident even at the 
time of the interview.  He connects the fact that the first-generation ICBMs on the 
US side had already been supplanted by second-generation systems such as 
Minuteman with an enduring western superiority over the USSR, but notes that this 
must be maintained through active development efforts, and that the diminishing 
prospect of a nuclear exchange between the great powers did not in itself preclude 
regional conflict.131  The bulk of the text is a comprehensive history of the 
development of the ICBM, with von Neumann’s and Gardner’s contributions 
highlighted.  Separate chapters dwell on management and organisational aspects, 
and the denouement of the STL/Ramo-Wooldridge issue alluded to above, in which 
Ramo-Wooldridge became ‘the Aerospace Corporation’ (a non-profit entity).132  
Critical opinion of the work is divided.  John Lonnquest, whose thesis will be 
considered shortly, describes it as being ‘of questionable reliability’, but Davis Dyer, 
in his history of TRW describes it as ‘authoritative’; frustratingly (particularly in 
Lonnquest’s case), neither substantiates their critique with examples or 
justification.133 
Lastly in the canon of ICBM histories, mention must be made of the work of 
Jacob Neufeld.  Neufeld worked as an official historian within the US Air Force 
History Support Office in Washington DC for many years.  He knew Schriever well, 
and was instrumental in the securing of the Schriever Archive now deposited at the 																																																								
129 Schwiebert, A history of the U.S. Air Force ballistic missiles .  AFSC was commanded at this time 
by General Schriever. 
130 John F Loosbrock, 'A look back - a look ahead: An interview with General Bernard A Schriever', in 
Ernest G. Schwiebert (ed.), A History of the US Air Force Ballistic Missiles (New York, NY: Frederick 
A Praeger, 1964). 
131 Schriever cites the continuing importance of tactical air power and the need for global mobility (at 
the time when AFSC was, under his direction, managing the development of the F/FB-111 and C-5 
aircraft for those respective roles for the USAF) without mentioning ‘Vietnam’ or ‘SE Asia’ at any 
stage.  He relies rather on mention of Korea; this seems a noteworthy omission in an interview given 
in 1964. 
132 Claude Witze, 'The USAF Missile Program: A Management Milestone', in Ernest G. Schwiebert 
(ed.), A History of the USAF Ballistic Missiles (New York: Praeger, 1965), 167-83. 
133 See John C. Lonnquest, 'The face of Atlas : General Bernard Schriever and the development of 
the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile, 1953-1960', (Duke University, Durham, NC 1996 PhD), 288 
and Davis Dyer, TRW : pioneering technology and innovation since 1900 (Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1998) 441 
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Library of Congress.  He wrote several works relating to Schriever, including 
journal articles, book chapters and longer works.  His contribution to the 
descriptions of the ICBM program was developed between 1976 and 1989.134  It 
deliberately restricts its scope to the Atlas, Titan and Thor programmes in the 
timescales stated in order to allow a suitable depth of coverage.  
Neufeld had direct assistance from Schriever, and from Colonel Vince Ford, 
who worked closely with Schriever, in writing his history.135  It begins by noting the 
early interest in pilotless aircraft, precision (free-fall) munitions and variants of the 
cruise missile within the US armed forces before recapping the origins of liquid-
fuelled rocketry in the USA.  It provides a detailed account of the original attempt to 
initiate a ballistic missile programme in the 1940s, before attention turned to 
developing nuclear cruise missiles.  Once again, it identifies von Neumann, 
Gardner and Schriever as the founding fathers of the ICBM program.  It provides 
clear detail of the impact that successive funding cutbacks and restorations had on 
the ICBM programme, and of the power struggle between the US Army and Air 
Force for primacy in the use of missiles in various forms.  It relates the potential 
conflict between development of Atlas as an ICBM and Thor as an IRBM (implying 
a difference in range), and of Schriever’s concerns that IRBM production would 
delay the rapid development of ICBMs.  It is thus a comprehensive technical 
history, written by a knowledgeable author with good access to primary material.  
John Lonnquest summarises it as a missed opportunity, noting that Neufeld 
“studiously avoided many of the critical issues…skirted the subject of concurrency, 
avoided …Ramo-Wooldridge’s controversial role, glossed over the all-important 
political dimension and did not adequately develop Schriever’s character”.136  While 
Neufeld does indeed omit or minimize coverage of the issues cited, this is harsh 
criticism; his work stands on its merits as a technical history, makes no unfulfilled 
claims, and as will be shown, Neufeld dealt elsewhere with Schriever’s character 
and personality. 
Schriever	and	Concurrency			
The second route into study of Schriever and his work is through his 
exploitation of concurrency.  This challenge to contemporary wisdom regarding the 
management of complex programmes is widely associated with Schriever, and 																																																								
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consequently needs some explanation.  At its simplest, concurrency is the 
superposition of the research and development, testing, and production phases of 
a project.  Where applicable, it can also encompass the training of operators, 
construction of ground facilities and installations and development of operational 
doctrine and plans, or in other words, the incorporation of non-materiel as well as 
materiel factors.  In the literature, it is identified as an American innovation.   
One early example is held to be the development of the depth charge by 
the US Navy during World War 1.  This exemplar is covered in some detail by 
Captain Wayne Foote’s MSc thesis, submitted to the Air Force Institute of 
Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB in 1986.   Foote’s definition of concurrency 
notes that the term itself was not used initially, but that the essential characteristics 
of what was then a ‘crash program’ were: 
 A significant threat demanding rapid response, great latitude in managing 
the crash program, unrestricted resources to draw upon and very close 
cooperation between the Program Office and highly motivated contractors. 
137 
 
Foote then charts the development of the concept during World War 2, 
including the differences between applying it to a ‘conventional’ challenge, such as 
aircraft procurement, and to programs where the weapons systems itself is 
innovative, as in the case of the Manhattan Project to develop nuclear weapons.138  
He finally makes the connection between these programs and Schriever’s work 
developing Atlas, crediting him with inventing the term ‘concurrency’ in 1958.   
Another author, G Harry Stine, also credits Schriever with pioneering work 
in concurrency, which he connects with a report entitled ‘Combat Ready Aircraft’, 
compiled by Schriever in 1950-51 when he was serving as Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Development at USAF HQ.139  In this report, Schriever addressed problems the 
USAF was then experiencing with the introduction into service of new combat 
aircraft.  In some cases (Schriever does not state which types he is referring to), 																																																								
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‘crash’ production of new types had led to their introduction to front-line units before 
initial design problems had been resolved.  These were remedied (expensively) by 
modification, sometimes requiring return of the aircraft to the factory.  Schriever’s 
report is notable for two reasons; firstly it is the earliest instance in USAF analysis 
where the development not just of hardware, but also of support infrastructure, and 
the training of personnel to operate the new system are regarded as multiple facets 
of one problem.140  Secondly, in the case of hardware, it notes the need to deal 
equally with the design, test and in-service engineering staffs and their problems.  
In tones reminiscent of a discussion of Clausewitzian friction, it concedes that no 
system is ever likely to be perfectly conceived and delivered, but that while endless 
test cycles are potentially as undesirable as front-line modification of defective 
systems, it is more likely than not that problems will need to be addressed at some 
stage. 
[concurrency] could delay delivery of the aircraft to combat units if the new 
design were found to be technically faultless and tests uncovered no 
functional deficiencies.  This is an extremely unlikely condition.  The reverse 
is probably more apt to occur.141 
 
Just as with the histories of the missiles themselves, concurrency, and specifically 
Schriever’s concept of it, has been the subject of substantial study in academia.   
The first doctoral thesis to address the issue fully was submitted at Duke 
University in North Carolina by John Lonnquest in 1996.142   To this day, it is still 
the thesis providing the most personal and detailed treatment of Schriever and his 
work.  Lonnquest begins by outlining the history of the USAF ballistic missile 
programme, starting with the initial studies in 1946, proceeding to the rejuvenated 
programme of the early 1950s, and from there moves to the thermo-nuclear 
breakthrough of 1953 and Schriever’s appointment to command the Western 
Development Division.  In a more detailed fashion than previously mentioned 
sources, he relates the relationships between Gardner, Schriever and von 
Neumann.  He highlights as pivotal Gardner’s nomination in 1953 to the newly 
created (and non-statutory) post of Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air 
Force for Research and Development by Harold Talbott, the incoming Secretary of 
the Air Force in the first Eisenhower administration.  Gardner was then introduced 
to Schriever by Col Vince Ford.  Von Neumann was induced to confirm the 																																																								
140 In other words, incorporation of factors lying in ‘concept space’ as well as in ‘technology space’, as 
differentiated in Chapter 1. 
141 USAF DCS/Development (Bernard Schriever), 'Combat Ready Aircraft',  19. 
142 Lonnquest, 'The face of Atlas', 
		 56	
estimates of size and weight for a thermonuclear warhead that had made the ICBM 
possible via a meeting at Princeton with Schriever on 8th May 1953.143  After 
describing the establishment of the Western Development Division of Air Research 
and Development Command under Schriever’s leadership, he details the 
alternatives to the Convair/Ramo-Wooldridge structure that were considered and 
rejected.  He devotes a chapter to the history of Ramo-Wooldridge before turning 
to the main subject of his analysis; Schriever and concurrency.144   
Lonnquest begins this portion of his work by noting that Schriever was 
already severely constrained by timescales and deadlines when he accepted 
management of the Atlas missile programme; delivery of an operational system 
was required by 1960.  Thus the first criteria for use of concurrency – a ‘crash’ 
timescale – had already been met.  Simple calculation, working backwards from 
the required in-service date, mandated concurrent design, development and 
production of hardware.  Given the extent of the infrastructure that would also be 
required to store, prepare and launch Atlas missiles, its construction would also 
need to be underway relatively early in the programme.  Thus, another criterion for 
concurrency had been met.145 
Lonnquest then pauses to review the history of concurrency, noting the 
World War 1 depth-charge example cited earlier, and instances of its use during 
World War 2 in aircraft production, conventional and nuclear weapons 
development.  He notes that its prevalence reduced after World War 2, being 
replaced by a constrained version known as the Cooke-Craigie Plan.  He then 
describes how Schriever combined features of this Plan with the contents of the 
‘Combat Ready Aircraft’ study.  The consequence of this was recognition of the 
importance of developing a weapon-system as a single entity, rather than as 
separate component parts.146  In the context of the ICBM, this plainly could apply to 
connection of development of the thermonuclear warhead and the missile to carry 
it.  The missing component of concurrency as understood at the time was a ‘flat’ 
management structure with the unrestricted resources identified by Foote and 
others.  Schriever now moved to attain these. 
Lonnquest notes the challenges faced by WDD, and specifically by 
Schriever and Gardner included competition from other projects.  Being a high 																																																								
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priority in the USAF did not translate into defence-wide priority.  Additionally, 
Schriever still needed budgetary approval from outside his organisation for major 
purchases; “as a result, on average it took just under nine months to get a major 
facilities contract approved”.147  Schriever’s solution, aided and abetted in its 
delivery by Gardner and by some of his trusted circle of colleagues including 
Colonels Ford and Boatman, was multi-faceted.  Ford began briefing Senator 
Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, who chaired the military affairs sub-committee of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy on the delays faced by the programme.  He also 
gained access to the Science Advisory Committee and through it the Technical 
Capabilities Panel, which prepared briefings for the National Security Council.  
Through these mechanisms, Senator Jackson’s sub-committee recommended to 
the President that the ICBM programme be placed on a wartime footing, the State 
Department’s interest was secured and eventually, President Eisenhower 
requested a briefing on the issue.148  The briefing, on 28th July 1955, was delivered 
by Gardner, Schriever and von Neumann.  The President appreciated the gravity of 
its content, and consequent to it, an NSC Directive was crafted and approved, 
stating in respect of the program that:  
…(3) The U.S. ICBM program is therefore a program of the highest priority 
above all others, except as directed by the President. 
(4) The Secretary of Defense will prosecute the program with all practicable 
speed, and all other Executive departments and agencies will assist the 
Department of Defense as required…149 
 
With this mandate in hand, the WDD sought to secure the last piece of the 
jigsaw in respect of a concurrent approach to ICBMs – clearing the bureaucracy of 
the procurement process.  On the same day as NSC Action No 1433 was signed-
off, Trevor Gardner asked the USAF Deputy for Budget and Program Management, 
Mr Hyde Gillette, to prepare simplified accounting and management procedures to 
reduce delays to the ICBM.  The so called ‘Gillette Procedures’ became a critical 
process by which Schriever circumvented the snail’s-pace methods of allocating 
funds to projects.  Lonnquest notes that application of them did not increase the Air 
Force’s overall budget allotment, but rather protected the Atlas program from 																																																								
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reallocation of funds to other projects, and allowed for approval of whole year’s 
spending programmes as one transaction, rather than piecemeal.150  
Lonnquest’s next chapter analyses Schriever’s application of the 
procedures outlined above, dwelling in particular on the management structures he 
created.151  He then describes the initial production and testing of the Atlas missile, 
and the early construction of support infrastructure.  He notes Schriever’s 
insistence on making the management structures of the programme’s contractors 
compatible with his own, down to exchanging liaison officers in the military fashion 
with key contractors.  He notes the impact of the growth of the ICBM programme to 
incorporate the Titan and Minuteman missiles, and its expansion to incorporate the 
intermediate-range Thor; he also remarks on the expansion of the WDD to 
encompass space-related programmes.  He says something about Schriever’s 
personality and management style, noting the contrast between his public persona 
(youthful, athletic, at times heroic) and his staff’s perception of him (aloof, distant, 
visionary but disorganised).  In making this assessment, Lonnquest leans both on 
contemporary public accounts of him, driven in part by US public concerns about 
the ‘missile race’, in part by Schriever’s realization that there was a public-relations 
aspect to his work, and on testimony from his contemporaries and colleagues 
regarding his attitude to his work.   
The following chapter expands on the public-relations aspect of 
management, and on two specific tools employed by Schriever: the Management 
Control System and Program Control Room (MCS/PCR), and the Commander’s 
Monthly Internal Management Conferences (more commonly known as ‘Black 
Saturday’ meetings).  The former was a combination of extensive communications 
and data gathering systems, reaching out from WDD HQ to contractor’s 
installations, and feeding elaborate displays in a secure room back at the 
headquarters.  The latter was a related process, where senior leadership was 
briefed monthly on problems and proposed resolutions.  As Lonnquest notes, “The 
AFBMD’s management control system, which included the PCR and Black 
Saturday, supplied Schriever and his managers with the information and 
management review structure that enabled them to use concurrency.”152  
Lonnquest then turns to analysis of concurrency as a concept, and to consideration 
of its overall efficiency.  The first significant observation is that Schriever’s concept 																																																								
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of a weapon system as an entity, rather than simply thinking about a piece of 
hardware in isolation, is an essential pre-condition; the former is what gives the 
manager separate strands of work in infrastructure, training, command and control 
and suchlike to develop concurrently.  He credits Schriever with first using the term 
in early 1955, though not with originating it personally, holding however that it 
originated in AFBMD.153  The AFBMD view of what it consisted of was that  
…concurrency was not a single, unified management approach.  
Concurrency was only one element of the AFBMD’s management 
approach.  In order for concurrency to be effective, the program 
management office also needed a high degree of centralized authority, 
adequate resources and a talented staff.  Concurrency did not exist 
separately, it was the sum of its parts.154 
Lonnquest credits Schriever with this narrow understanding of concurrency 
too – the overlapping of the development and production processes but not the 
other contributing factors.  This simple explanation served Schriever’s public 
relations purposes, in that it gave external stakeholders, such as members of 
Congress, quick reassurance that an effective management process was in place, 
even though the technical explanation of what was being managed was beyond 
their grasp.  Internally, its radical differentiation from other USAF processes 
reminded uninvolved colleagues of the ICBM programme’s privileged status.   
Concurrency also courted controversy when costs were examined.  As 
Lonnquest notes, “The commonly shared sentiment among senior officials was that 
concurrency did indeed save time, but at a frightful cost.  In 1961, Lt Gen Roscoe 
Wilson…described concurrency as ‘useful but very wasteful’ and said that the Air 
Force could only afford one or two such programs.”155  Schriever held the opposing 
view: that concurrency saved both time and money.  It did this, he held, by 
reducing overheads incurred during the shortened development cycle, and by 
delivering the weapon system sooner, which allowed it to achieve a longer in-
service life, and thus improved its overall value for money.  Lonnquest finds these 
assertions unproved; the evidence for concurrency’s effectiveness in reducing 
development time is comprehensive and conclusive, but the value for money 
assertion is both dubious and un-provable, not least because of the subsequent 
destruction of many of the AFBMD financial records.156  Schriever himself 
recognised the vulnerability of his claims and in 1957 asked the Air Force Inspector 
General to audit the AFBMD management processes.  At best, they received a 																																																								
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‘qualified pass’, with praise for the management information aspects, but with 
censure for serious flaws within budget control and the management of contracts. 
Lonnquest’s final substantive chapter tells the story of the conclusion of 
Atlas development in the historical context of the early space-age, Atlas’ relatively 
brief in-service life, Schriever’s further career and his attempts to perpetuate 
aspects of concurrency.  In terms of missile development, one of the most 
important implications of the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957 was the credibility it leant 
to Soviet assertions that they had a functioning ICBM in service, a claim not 
previously accepted by the USA.  At that point, Schriever conducted a further 
review of the Atlas programme to see if it could be accelerated in any way.  
Perhaps he would have been disappointed if any easy gains had emerged, but 
none were, in fact, forthcoming.  The ensuing public controversy about ‘the missile 
gap’ is well recorded elsewhere, and Lonnquest dwells on Schriever’s public 
testimony which became caught up with the 1960 presidential election, where 
candidates Nixon and Kennedy traded assertions about it, based on partial and 
selective access to relevant information.  He also expands on the questions asked 
about TRW’s involvement in Atlas, which finally played out in front of several 
Congressional investigations in 1958-9. 
Atlas came into service in 1959.  Lonnquest, having described the various 
test flights leading up to this milestone, records Atlas Series D being placed on 
alert in 1959, but rapidly being supplanted by Atlas-E (improved guidance system) 
and Atlas-F (capable of being located in and launched from above silos), before 
being withdrawn entirely by the end of 1965 as the Titan and Minuteman systems 
matured.  In keeping with the weapons-system view of Atlas, he notes also the 
infrastructure implications of moving from Atlas-D, which operated unprotected 
from an open launch-structure, through Atlas-E, which was stored in a ‘semi-
hardened’ bunkers but launched from an upright, exposed position, to the silo-
capable  (for storage) Atlas-F. 
As Lonnquest notes, Schriever’s career progressed as the Atlas 
programme matured.  In April 1959 he assumed command of ARDC and in 1961, 
he moved on again to command AFSC in four-star rank, the post he held until his 
retirement in 1966.   In 1960, Lonnquest notes that Schriever was on the receiving 
end of Air Staff criticism of the Gillette procedures he had employed at WDD.  
These had excluded the Air Staff almost in-toto from traditional oversight of the 
ICBM programme, and Schriever had to watch while they dismantled them.  
Lonnquest now notes that Schriever claimed they were an essential element of 
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concurrency, (“Despite Schriever’s protests that the Gillette procedures were an 
essential ingredient of concurrency…”)157.  This sits uneasily with his previous 
narrow definition of concurrency as overlapping development and production only.  
He also had to contend with opposition to the ‘weapons system’ doctrine; AFSC – 
Schriever’s new command – and its predecessor Air Materiel Command (AMC) – 
had traditionally overseen support functions for all in-service equipment, while 
other organisations had had responsibility for development.  Re-arranging 
‘vertically’, by system, instead of ‘horizontally’ by function was a challenge to the 
existence of AFSC and AMC, with all the vested interests that could be expected 
already attached.  Schriever participated in a panel review to reconcile this conflict.  
As might be expected, he took the ‘systems’ view, in opposition to the Commander 
of AMC, who embraced a functional view.  Also perhaps unsurprisingly, a 
compromise emerged, brokered by the third member of the panel.  It was 
implemented in the 1960-63 period, initially as the ‘designated systems approach’, 
later as the ‘375-series regulations’.  Lonnquest (and Schriever) feel, (and felt), that 
these failed, lacking two key elements of the Concurrency/Gillette process.  Firstly, 
although empowered compared to their predecessors, programme managers 
lacked the almost total autonomy that Schriever had enjoyed, leading to an 
increasing number of decisions being referred upwards for approval.  Secondly, the 
new procedures did not allow the bulk-approval of budget decisions, so the system 
struggled to keep pace with the piecemeal allocation of funds.  By 1962-3 even 
Schriever noted that he had been unable to replicate the WDD model on a 
widespread basis.158  This is the basis for Lonnquest’s concluding assertion that 
the concurrency model, defined narrowly, is not the overall reason for Schriever’s 
success in developing Atlas.  Rather it was the consequence of a unique and 
unrepeatable combination of circumstances.  Since it is not clear that Schriever 
himself was totally committed to the narrow definition of concurrency (his 
retrospective defence of the Gillette procedures being a case in point), this is not 
the only interpretation that can be laid here.  Another interpretation would be that 
concurrency broadly understood – including ‘crash’ priority, is not sustainable in 
routine circumstances, when not all programmes can be afforded such status. 
Lonnquest’s thesis remains the most complete in its treatment of Schriever 
and the ICBM programme.  Based on comprehensive access to informed 
individuals it offers genuine insight on Schriever’s personality.  It provides a 																																																								
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comprehensible explanation of concurrency for the non-specialist and avoids the 
entanglements of detailed technical treatments of missile engineering.  It is thus an 
invaluable source for the Schriever scholar.  However, for understandable reasons, 
not least of length and scope, it omits consideration of large parts of Schriever’s 
work.  Within these limitations, it is immensely useful, but it still left gaps for further 
study. 
Stephen Johnson wrote his thesis from the standpoint of a professionally-
qualified engineer turning to writing a history of project management within highly-
complex systems.159  He thus has a particular interest in the sociology of 
relationships between factions involved in development work, and in the 
management techniques appropriate to different projects.  His thesis, submitted at 
the University of Minnesota in 1997, is a comparative analysis of the management 
of the ICBM programme under Schriever, the management methods adopted 
within the NASA manned spaceflight programme and those of the European 
organisations ELDO and ESRO which attempted to develop a European launcher 
and satellite capability prior to the establishment of the European Space Agency.160  
Johnson describes his intent as being threefold: “the extension of the discussion of 
executive and managerial control from office...and shop floor workers in 
manufacturing to scientists, engineers and R&D, the extension of discussion of 
industrial research and organisation into the cold-war period, and the aerospace 
industry…and [analysis of] the effect of organization and management upon the 
technologies that these organizations create”.161  His status as a qualified engineer 
gives his work unique insight into Schriever, the challenges he faced and the 
solutions he adopted. 
Johnson considers Schriever’s work specifically in two chapters of his 
thesis.  Firstly, he makes a more comprehensive effort to identify Schriever’s 
technical mentors than Lonnquest did.  In his Chapter 3 he establishes the history 
of procurement within the US Forces, and specifically the Army Air Corps, from the 																																																								
159 Stephen B. Johnson, 'Insuring the future : the development and diffusion of systems management 
in the American and European space programs', (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 1997 
PhD), 
160 The European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) was a collaborative venture between 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, formed in 1961 and dissolved in 1974.  It attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to develop a European three-stage satellite launcher by combining separate national 
projects from the United Kingdom, France and Germany.  All the test flights of system failed to some 
extent; most were total failures.  After the dissolution of ELDO, its assets were subsumed into the 
parallel European Satellite Research Organisation (ESRO), which had comparatively been much 
more successful.  Re-brigaded as the European Space Agency, it went on to develop the Ariane 
series of commercial launchers under French leadership.  This has, in contrast to ELDO attempts, 
been a resounding success.  For more details, see, for example, Michael Sheehan, The international 
politics of space (New York: Routledge, 2007) Chapter 5. 
161 Johnson, 'Insuring the Future', 10-11. 
		 63	
first interaction with the Wright Brothers in 1908 until the end of World War 2.  He 
highlights the technical vision of General Hap Arnold and his interaction with 
Theodore von Karman during World War 2, and Arnold’s realization of the 
inevitable dependence of US Air Forces upon scientific and technical development 
in the future.  He sees Schriever’s first tangible contribution to the advancement of 
management technique as the introduction of Development Planning Objectives 
while working in the Pentagon Development Planning Office, and the harnessing of 
scientists as opposed to front-line commanders in defining them.162  He also 
highlights the roles of Lt Gen Donald Putt USAF and Dr Louis Ridenour in 
establishing Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) – the organization 
within which Schriever would achieve most of his managerial breakthroughs.  He 
notes the radically changed strategic outlook faced by the United States at the 
war’s end; developments in long-range systems, particularly missiles and jet-
powered aircraft meant that it would no longer be able to mobilize protected by the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  Johnson also identifies the poor state of 
preparedness at the outbreak of the Korean War, which prompted Schriever’s 
‘Combat Ready Aircraft’ study and, due to the increased complexity of the new 
types, validated the ‘weapons system’ approach.  He once again identifies the 
familiar trinity of Gardner, von Neumann and Schriever as architects of the ICBM 
programme and describes the establishment of the WDD and the involvement of 
Ramo-Wooldridge in the management function.163  
As might be expected, given his intent on teasing out the implications of 
Schriever’s management techniques, he identifies the impracticality of extant 
budgetary processes and the importance of the Gillette Procedures that supplanted 
them.  He also situates their impact on the rest of the Air Staff in some detail.  He 
notes the information-management importance of the PCR and ‘Black Saturdays’, 
but also their utility as public-relations tools.  Finally in Chapter 3, he notes the pre-
conditions he identifies as essential to Schriever’s methods: the perception of an 
imminent national threat, and continuing technical progress within the ICBM 
programme.164  In his summary, however, he notes that “the Soviets would not be 
quite as fearsome as Americans feared, and his [Schriever’s] scientific friends 
would fail to deliver a technological marvel”.165 
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In Chapter 4, Johnson teases out his analysis of Schriever’s understanding 
of concurrency. In his estimation, a key feature of concurrency was duplication of 
technology wherever doubts about practicality arose, as well as concurrent 
development of components within a single system.  Specifically, he is 
emphasising linkages with the Manhattan project, where two completely separate 
designs of fission weapon were developed in parallel and subsequently employed.  
In a similar fashion, he infers, Schriever oversaw development of Atlas and Titan 
missiles in an overlapping manner.  This is not a particularly convincing definition; 
Atlas was designed with the intent of entering service as soon as possible, and 
consequently eschewed the technically more efficient multi-stage design of Titan.  
The latter was always intended to be a follow-on system, though it also provided a 
guarantee against a critical failure of Atlas.  Johnson situates Schriever’s 
development of concurrency within general progress in systems engineering, 
noting individual aspect’s origins in earlier management methods, but crediting 
Schriever with their consistent application.  He provides deeper analysis of the 
problems encountered with the contract management aspects of concurrency, 
noting that although Schriever tried to brush aside the cost overruns that resulted, 
he eventually had to yield to accounting scrutiny.166  Johnson’s next insight into 
concurrency is perhaps his most valuable – when technical problems arose in 
development, the implied costs of the concurrent approach became very apparent.  
Additionally, although such failures were not unexpected for such a technically 
novel and challenging enterprise, the dramatic outcomes gave critics of the project, 
who had been rebuffed previously by Schriever’s demonstrations via the PCR of 
technically competent management, an easy path of attack.  At the same time as 
these difficulties were arising, Schriever was facing the controversy relating to 
TRW’s oversight role.  Johnson’s summary is that the employment of concurrency 
achieved the speed of development that Schriever hoped for, but that the costs 
were enormous and contributed to the later dismantling of many of Schriever’s 
innovations.  The difficulties encountered also highlighted the difference between 
pure science, relevant to establishing the theoretical basics of ICBMs, and the 
engineering challenges inherent in bringing them into service.167  
Johnson’s last contribution to the analysis of Schriever and concurrency is 
an examination of how it morphed into the 375-series regulations described by 
Lonnquest, and how those regulations addressed Secretary McNamara’s concerns 																																																								
166 Johnson, 'Insuring the Future', 103. 
167 Johnson, 'Insuring the Future', 107-08.  He returns to the analysis of the contrasting roles of 
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about cost control.  Johnson’s assessment is that Schriever was responsive to 
McNamara’s concerns, made particular efforts to train Air Force officers in the 
management techniques required to implement the new systems effectively and 
that McNamara was suitably impressed.  It is the author’s belief that while 
Schriever saw the centralising tendencies of McNamara as irksome, he had 
acquired wider management responsibilities with his assumption of command at 
AFSC, and he was forced to recognise that McNamara was implementing on a 
larger scale the practices of centralization and tight control of information flows that 
he himself had imposed on the Atlas programme a few years earlier.168  
Other theses have covered similar ground; Schriever’s status as the father 
of the USAF Ballistic Missile programme, and the honours accorded to him during 
his lifetime ensure his work is a recurring topic at the various US Staff and Warfare 
colleges, and also for military officers pursuing qualifications elsewhere.  Since 
many of the related courses are accredited at Masters level, the associated theses 
enter the academic mainstream.  Wayne Foote’s work cited above was one such 
effort.  Another is due to Captain Scott Mattson USAF, who submitted an MA thesis 
at Kansas State University in 1994 on Schriever and the ICBM programme.169  
Mattson’s work covers similar ground to the other theses detailed, but adds some 
insights not found elsewhere.  He favours a broad definition of ‘concurrency’, to 
include not only overlapping development and production, but also ‘parallel 
development’, which he describes as the dual sourcing of critical components from 
two separate suppliers.  He also cites development of the Titan missile as a further 
expansion of parallelism, noting that it shared some components with Atlas, but 
provided an alternate route to the ICBM if Atlas had failed.170  At the end of his 
thesis Mattson also ponders whether Schriever had a realistic chance of rising to 
head the USAF at the end of his tour at AFSC in 1966.  His conclusion 
encompasses the political context of the USAF at the time, with Secretary 
McNamara still firmly in control of the Defense Department, employing 
management techniques that Schriever disagreed with to pursue goals he was 
uneasy with.  Mattson concludes that Schriever had the latent ability to discharge 
the role, but would have been unsuitable to serve under McNamara.  He notes, 
however, the significance of Schriever rising to a major command in 4-star rank on 
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the strength of technical, rather than operational performance and acumen, and the 
important message that sent to other like-minded souls.  
Two other PhD theses are worthy of brief mention; both are histories of 
particular systems or concepts, rather than personal analyses, but Schriever 
features tangentially in both.  The first is a history of the X-20 Dyna-Soar 
programme, which was an unsuccessful attempt by the USAF to develop initially a 
sub-orbital and then orbital hypersonic space-plane.  Roy Houchin described the 
project in his PhD thesis submitted at Auburn University, Alabama in 1995.171  He 
notes that the project made good technical progress, and could reasonably have 
been expected to succeed, but that it failed for political and economic reasons.  
Schriever was involved with the programme almost from its inception to its demise.  
Houchin draws no direct conclusions about Schriever in either of his works, though 
elements of Schriever’s actions as he describes them, particularly where he was 
simultaneously progressing the ground infrastructure, the design of the platform 
and aspects of crew training and selection, echo his adoption of concurrency as a 
management tool for ICBMs.172 
The last PhD thesis to be considered here is that of Stephen Rothstein, at 
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Massachusetts in 
2006.173  His subject is the development of the ‘aerospace’ concept within the 
USAF.  Rothstein’s thesis is that ideas develop within organizations in the same 
way that institutions do within cultures.  He illustrates and demonstrates this by 
taking as a case study how the concept of ‘aerospace’ – air and space forming a 
single graduated, but indivisible operating medium – arose and developed within 
the USAF.  Again Schriever is essential to the exposition of the thesis, without 
being its central subject.  Rothstein notes Schriever’s changing attitude to manned 
spaceflight, seen initially as a distraction that might delay introduction of 
operational ICBMs, but later becoming much more important in his conception of 
how the USAF might harness emerging technologies to develop new roles.  He 
was not a quick convert to the idea, however, and his views brought him into 
conflict with General White, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in 1959.174  These 
conflicts played out particularly when Schriever was contemplating military manned 																																																								
171 Roy Franklin Houchin, II, 'The rise and fall of Dyna-Soar : a history of Air Force hypersonic R & D, 
1944-1963', (Auburn U, Auburn, AL 1995 PhD), 
172 Houchin, 'The rise and fall of Dyna-Soar', 482, 529 
173 Stephen M. Rothstein, 'Ideas as institutions: Explaining the Air Force's struggle with its aerospace 
concept', (Tufts U, Medford, MA 2006 PhD), Rothstein had previously addressed this topic as a 
Masters-level thesis (“Dead on Arrival?: the development of the Aerospace Concept 1944-58”)  at the 
School of Advanced Airpower Studies within the Air University at Maxwell AFB, Alabama in 2000. 
174 Rothstein, 'Ideas as Institutions', 237.    
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space missions, and to an extent in his involvement with space weaponization; 
they are discussed further in Chapter 5 and 6.175    Rothstein also analyses how 
Schriever’s struggles with organizational structures, and the debate between 
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ divisions of responsibility that played out when Schriever 
took command of AFSC interacted with the development of a new operational 
concept.  Ultimately, Rothstein’s aim is to summarise the status of the aerospace 
concept by analysing its origins: 
The bifurcation of air and space was first thrust upon the service in 1958 as 
a national security policy choice. Its structural and technological 
bifurcation—within the Air Force—was complete by the close of 1963. 
Cultural bifurcation emerged slowly and more fully thereafter over time. 
Conceptually, however, a significant connection between air and space 
remains. Aerospace is not the current picture in the Air Force’s head; the 
concept currently fails to capture the way the service sees the world and 
does not significantly influence the organization’s actions. Nor, however, 
has the idea disappeared.176 
Schriever’s importance to this debate lies principally in the posts he held 
and the projects he oversaw in the critical 1958-63 period, which played out against 
the backdrop of the cultural background that Rothstein describes.  
Theses	–	A	Summary		
The three PhD theses described in detail each discuss important aspects of 
Schriever’s work, but even taken together, still leave significant aspects untouched.  
Claude Johns produced an early summary of the first-generation (1954-59) ICBM 
programme, and became the first writer to identify the ‘trinity’ of von Neumann, 
Gardner and Schriever as its architects in the USA.  He analysed the administrative 
arrangements surrounding the programme, highlighting Gardner’s role, and gave 
an early analysis of how concurrency had been used within it, focussing on 
Schriever’s part.  Beyond that, he says little about any other aspect of Schriever’s 
conceptual or strategic viewpoints, and in the author’s opinion, missed a unique 
opportunity to interview key participants while their memories were fresh.  
Nonetheless, his description of Schriever’s understanding of concurrency was 
apposite and timely. 
John Lonnquest’s thesis stands as that giving the most personal treatment 
of Schriever and his work, but again it dwells exclusively on the ICBM programme 
and to a great extent on concurrency and its implications.  It fills some of the gaps 																																																								
175 For further comment on this disagreement between Schriever and White, see Chapter 5, p138 and 
Chapter 6, p166.   
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left by Johns, validates the roles of von Neumann, Gardner and Schriever, provides 
more depth in its analysis of concurrency and Schriever’s understanding of it, and 
says more than any other about how Schriever implemented it.  Finally, it provides 
some analysis of the Atlas missile and its short operational life.  But it says little 
about any other aspect of Schriever’s work, nor of the relationship between ICBMs 
and space systems, and in its own literature analysis, it occasionally fails to 
substantiate its criticisms.   
Stephen Johnson’s thesis covers Schriever’s work as one case study 
among three, again dwelling on the ICBM programme and its management 
challenges.  As might be expected of a thesis coming from an engineer, he offers 
significant insights on Schriever’s technical influences before once again 
concentrating on engineering management issues.   
Finally at PhD level, Roy Houchin and Stephen Rothstein both broaden the 
analysis by moving beyond consideration of ICBMs, in Houchin’s case by writing 
an account of the X-20 Dyna-Soar programme, in which Schriever played a part 
without ever having direct control of it.  Its most valuable contribution to a study of 
Schriever is that it shows that the ideas underpinning concurrency had applications 
beyond the ICBM.  Rothstein analyses the ‘aerospace’ concept as the USAF 
understood it at various times, and his work offers a useful insight on Schriever’s 
changing attitude to military spaceflight. 
In summary, Schriever’s work has received significant academic study, but 
the preponderance of it considers solely the ICBM programme and the 
management concept of concurrency.  There has been no attempt to study the 
interactions between the ICBM programme and the USAF’s manned and 
unmanned spaceflight aspirations, nor any of the strategic thought or conceptual 
development surrounding that interaction.  This thesis attempts to fill that gap. 
Schriever	Biographies		
 Outside academia, Schriever’s status as a significant actor in the field of 
military spaceflight was recognised early in his career.  There are consequently 
several volumes of straightforward biography of him available.  The earliest, and 
one which immediately attests to the significance of his work, is by Shirley Thomas 
(1920-2005).177   Shirley Thomas wrote 8 volumes of essay-style biographies of 																																																								
177 Shirley Thomas route to writing technical biographies must surely be one of the strangest 
imaginable.  In the 1950s, she worked as a celebrity journalist in and around Hollywood, reporting on 
‘red-carpet’ events for NBC and CBS.  Smitten by the dawn of the space age, she came to the United 
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space pioneers between 1960 and 1968.  She was guided in the selection of her 
subjects by an advisory committee, which included such luminaries as Lieutenant 
General ‘Jimmy’ Doolittle USAF, Major General Holger Toftoy (who led US Army 
Intelligence exploitation of captured German V2 technology at the end of World 
War 2 and who later commanded the US Army Space Programme at Redstone 
Arsenal), Senator Stuart Symington (the first Secretary of the Air Force (1947-50) 
and later member of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees) 
and Mr Harry Guggenheim (Director of the Guggenheim Foundation, which had 
funded Robert Goddard’s experiments in rocketry in the 1930s and Theodore von 
Karman’s researches at the California Institute of Technology)).  In Volume 1, 
alongside such pioneering figures as Goddard, Tsiolkovsky and von Braun she 
included an essay on Bernard Schriever.178  Her work is an amalgam of ‘human 
interest’ biography on one hand, revisiting the story of Schriever’s birth in 
Germany, emigration during World War 1 and naturalisation in the United States as 
recounted here in Chapter 2, supplanted with details of Schriever’s marriage and 
family life, and on the other an examination of the context of his work on ICBMs.  
Concurrency is mentioned, as is the connection between parallel sourcing of Atlas 
components and the ability to develop the Titan missile as a follow-on design in 
relatively short order.  Thomas also notes the role of TRW in Atlas management, 
and near the end of her account comments on Project SCORE – use of an Atlas 
missile airframe as a very early communication satellite.  She asserts that only 88 
people knew the nature and intended function of the launch, including Schriever, 
but not including the officer who actually fired it.179  Thomas’ study of Schriever is 
not in itself critical to an understanding of him,180 but its significance is that it 
demonstrates that in the earliest days of the space age, an eminent selection 
committee rated his contribution worthy of immediate inclusion in an extended 
series of studies, alongside the luminaries listed above and others such as John 
von Neumann, Theodore von Karman and Professor James van Allen. 
																																																								
Kingdom, enrolled at the University of Sussex, achieving a BA (1960) and PhD (1967) in 
Communications.  She founded the Aerospace Historical Society in the USA and taught Technical 
Writing at the University of Southern California; there is a memorial scholarship endowed in her 
honour at the California Institute of Technology in Aerospace Engineering.  See Karen Begen, 
'Remembering Dr Shirley Thomas', The Technograph (Newsletter of the LA Chapter of the Society for 
Technical Communciation), Vol  No October  2005) at 5-6, and Valerie J Nelson, 'Shirley Thomas 
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Fifty years after Thomas began her series of studies, another journalist 
produced the first (and so far only) full-length biography of Schriever.  After service 
in the US Army, Neil Sheehan worked in SE Asia as a journalist with UPI before 
joining the staff of the New York Times in 1964 and moving to Washington DC.  In 
1971 he obtained and published the ‘Pentagon Papers’, relating to a secret 
Pentagon history of the Vietnam War, and followed it with a biography of John Paul 
Vann, commenced in 1972 but not published until 1988.181  He recounts his 
decision to focus his next book on the Cold War, and how a chance encounter in 
the library of the Air Forces Association in Arlington, Virginia inspired him: 
…it’s about 1994 now. I was over at the Air Force Association in Arlington 
... And I was in their library and they keep files on prominent Air Force 
figures.   
And someone said to me you ought to look up Bernard Schriever.  So I 
asked the librarian for the file…opened it up.  And right there…was a 
photograph of this General leaning up against a table with all of these 
missiles around him…And I said this guy looks interesting. 
…he was famous within the Air Force, but not outside...So I called him and 
arranged to go over and talk to him and it began the first of 52 interviews 
with him. And then I realized that this man had stood at a pivotal point in the 
Cold War.182 
 
Sheehan’s biography of Schriever (which provided the background to 
Schriever’s funeral in Chapter 2) was published in 2009.183  As Sheehan alludes 
above, it was based on extensive access to Schriever and to his papers in the 
latter years of his life, as well as numerous interviews with colleagues and 
acquaintances.  It is a lengthy work (534pp) and is valuable not only for the 
extensive research that underpins it, but also because it combines a study of 
Schriever’s contribution to ICBMs with mention of his later work in military 
satellites, a subject almost totally ignored until now.  That is not to say that it does 
not pose problems of its own.  Sheehan’s research was voluminous and probing, 
including 52 interviews with Schriever, interviews with 117 other named 
contributors, access to Schriever’s diary and numerous other papers in his 
possession, as well as visits to all the significant archives and presidential libraries 
in the USA that bear on Schriever and his work.  Frustratingly, however, Sheehan 
omits footnotes and close referencing conventions.  Each chapter of his book has a 
list of sources and there is a detailed bibliography, but there is no mechanism to 																																																								
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connect individual assertions in the book with the primary sources.  All the tapes 
and other papers accumulated in its writing have been deposited at the Library of 
Congress, but they are currently in storage pending processing and conservation, 
and were initially withheld from researchers in the belief that Mr Sheehan wished 
the archive to remain closed (presumably during his lifetime).  This 
misapprehension on the part of the Library was resolved by the author in 2014.  
The collection has now been opened to researchers on a limited basis, and though 
at present it is un-catalogued by the Library, it reflects Sheehan’s methodical 
organisation.  Once organised, it will provide the means to test some of the 
assertions in Sheehan’s book. 
Sheehan’s book itself straddles the material already alluded to in academic 
analysis and the personal narrative found elsewhere.  On one hand, he offers 
valuable insights into the character traits of many of the key figures, and outlines 
their working methods.  And although he says nothing about concurrency, he 
provides context for many of the difficulties encountered in making it work.  But on 
the other, its eclectic structure and digressions limit its usefulness to readers 
seeking more precise details of Schriever’s work; two of its seven major sections 
barely mention Schriever at all.184  
In the end, his book must stand on its merits; it was written for a popular 
readership, it uses Schriever to provide a central narrative around which a history 
of the early Cold War and the Air Forces’ part in stabilizing it can be woven.  When 
its primary sources become more generally accessible, it may be possible to 
exploit them further; for now it appears to be a sincere but selective attempt to 
introduce Schriever and his career to a wider public. 
The Schriever Archive at the Library of Congress 	
This completes a summary of the extant literature relating to Schriever and 
his work.  In many cases, the authors were able to draw on primary sources; a 
number of them came from a USAF or other US military background, and would 
have had access to official archives and other reference material such as 
contemporary histories and policy documents.  Some were also able to interview 
Schriever and/or his contemporaries.  Throughout their research, however, there 																																																								
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was another major source of Schriever material that remained inaccessible.  Its 
recent unlocking has provided scope for new insights and conclusions.   
US and UK government security regulations are prescriptive about the 
secure storage of classified material.  Depending on precise classification, 
minimum standards of physical security are required, along with a regime of 
accountability and audit to ensure that material is not lost or misplaced.  Although 
there are exceptions for specific circumstances, a serving officer would not 
normally be allowed to retain classified material at home.  This was plainly not the 
case during Schriever’s career; he appears to have retained a significant holding of 
official papers, both classified and unclassified, during his active duty and 
afterwards.   
As recounted to the author by Mr Jacob Neufeld, who at one time directed 
the USAF Historical Studies Office (AFHSO), shortly after Schriever retired from 
the USAF, his first marriage ended.  The parting with Mrs Schriever was 
reasonably amicable, and initially, she remained resident in the former family 
home.  When she eventually decided to move to a smaller property, his collection 
of official papers was discovered. To prevent their dispersal or disposal, and to 
protect any classified content, the archive was collected by the AFHSO based at 
Bolling AFB in Washington DC.  Subsequently, the papers were stored first at 
Bolling, then latterly at the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at 
Maxwell AFB in Alabama. 185   AFHRA offered them to Texas A&M University 
(Schriever’s alma-mater) for archiving.186  Negotiations were never satisfactorily 
concluded, and in 2005 and 2007 the archive was donated to the Library of 
Congress by General Schriever and his second wife.187  It was collated and 
conserved, and finally opened to researchers in 2011.   
The Schriever archive is extensive, comprising some 87,000 items in 250 
containers.188   From 1931 onwards (when Schriever graduated from university and 
entered the US Army), it includes content from every decade of his life.  Within it, 
there are, broadly speaking, six categories of unclassified material.  A portion 
consists of copies of Schriever’s record of service in the USAF and related 
documents, including his working diaries for the period 1954-66.  The biggest 																																																								
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portion consists principally of duplicate copies of official correspondence produced 
under his supervision.  After that, there is a section devoted to Schriever’s 
speeches and writings, and a section relating to the co-authored work produced 
with Colonel Vince Ford (details of Ford’s career and relationship with Schriever 
appear below).  There are copies of two other book-length manuscripts, and there 
is finally a section of papers mainly relating to Schriever’s post-USAF business 
interests.   
The desk diaries are almost entirely hand-written by Schriever; while he 
was completing them, he appears to have been punctilious about keeping a record 
of his duty location, his major daily appointments and ‘action lists’ of matters on his 
mind, either as issues to resolve during a day or topics for discussion during 
meetings or appointments. Typically, they were written on office notepad pages, but 
occasionally they were written on whatever scrap paper was to hand.189 There are 
gaps in the record, though since the diary is unbound, it is generally impossible to 
tell if there are missing pages, or if no entries were written on a given day.190  Many 
entries are simply ‘bullet-point’ lists, but some are more discursive.   They are 
almost entirely devoid of personal opinions, views or comments; a singular, but 
arguably marginal, exception is on 8 February 1957 when Schriever notes simply 
“JVN Died” – a reference, without further comment, to the passing of his close 
friend and collaborator John von Neumann.  An indication of how exceptional this is 
comes from the fact that there are no pages or entries for 4 October 1957, 12 April 
1961 or 22 November 1963.191 
Much of the correspondence in the archive takes the form of retained 
carbon copies of letters or memoranda.  In many cases the intended recipient has 
to be inferred, since the carbon copy was removed before the salutation and 
signature were added to the letter.  In some cases the recipient’s name or job title 
is included, but others, particularly inter-office memoranda, are addressed using an 
impenetrable telegraphic code system which assigned a three to five-letter code for 																																																								
189 Some of the later diary entries are lists typed by secretaries on which Schriever made notes – for 
example the diary entry for 2 January 1964 is a typed list of appointments, subsequently annotated by 
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page.  Box 7 Folder 1, Bernard A. Schriever Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
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the appointment held by the recipient.  The codes do not give any obvious 
indication of sender or recipient – they are not in any way acronyms.  Thus, for 
example, in September 1959, Major General Ritland, then Commander of Air Force 
Ballistic Missile Division, prepared a draft policy statement on ‘Military Operations 
in the Aerospace Medium’.192  The drafting was led by Colonel Soper from the 
Plans and Policy Office, and a covering letter from General Ritland to General 
Schriever was also prepared.  However, within the Archive copy, Colonel Soper 
refers to his own office as ‘WDGP’, he is drafting for General Ritland (‘WDGV?’) to 
send to General Schriever (‘RDG’), and the draft is to be coordinated (i.e. reviewed 
and approved) by ‘WDGN’, ‘WDS’, ‘WDT’, WDZ’ and ‘WDGE’.  In some cases, the 
codes are reused or annotated often enough to be recognisable, but in many 
others they remain completely obscure.  It seems a reasonable inference that the 
bulk of the unattributed correspondence was either drafted by or for Schriever – he 
would have been unlikely to have retained many carbon copies from another office 
or department that did not involve him, and the received correspondence in the 
Archive appears usually to be a signed copy addressed to Schriever or his 
organisation.  There remains the residual risk either that drafted correspondence 
was not in the end sent or that occasional external drafts have been included, but 
this does not seem likely to be a common occurrence.193  
The next major sub-division within the Archive comprises the unpublished 
book manuscripts.  At least three times in his life Schriever collaborated with others 
to produce manuscripts intended for publication; in no case was the aim realised, 
but the manuscripts survive and are valuable for the insights they provide into 
Schriever’s thinking.  One never approached completion, and as it stands is plainly 
unpublishable, but the others are mature and essentially ready for publication; 
there follows a description of their contents and such context as can be 
reconstructed. 
The Vince Ford Manuscript 	
Colonel Vincent Thaddeus (‘Vince’) Ford (1907-2001) was a contemporary 
and colleague of Schriever’s.  Born in Connecticut, he graduated with an 
engineering degree from UCLA and joined the Air Corps two years before 
Schriever.  He trained as a pilot, was seriously injured in a flying accident, left the 																																																								
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Air Corps and worked in Hollywood for Universal Studios prior to rejoining the Air 
Corps, and later the USAF.  He did this twice – once during World War 2, and 
again post-war when he completed regular service between 1948 and 1964.  In this 
latter period he served as Military Executive to Mr Trevor Gardner, the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, and as Executive 
Officer to Schriever at WDD and ARDC.194 
At some time in 1957-58, Ford decided to attempt to record the history of 
the ICBM project ‘from the inside’, concentrating on events during 1954-57.  His 
intent was to record the personal history of the ICBM project rather than the 
technical detail, through the activities of three key players he knew or had known 
well: John von Neumann, Trevor Gardner and Bernard Schriever.  One driver for 
this was probably his awareness of the fragility of personal recollection – John von 
Neumann had died before he started the work, Trevor Gardner had resigned from 
the Eisenhower administration in 1956 and was taking no part in the ICBM 
programme at that point, and only Schriever remained actively engaged.195  The 
precise start date for this effort cannot be proven, but it can be bounded.  The first 
papers in the Schriever archive relating to the work are dated 1 March 1958, but 
they are included in a bundle reviewed by Ford in 1968 and marked as ‘1957-58’ 
work.196  It is obvious from the draft text that Ford had been closely attached to 
John von Neumann and had been deeply affected by his death; in later drafts he 
describes von Neumann’s final illness and death in great detail.  It therefore seems 
plausible to the author that von Neumann’s death in February 1957 acted as a spur 
to him to record his memories and experiences.  Finally, a very early draft of the 
opening chapter mentions the launch of Sputnik 1 (4 October 1957), which 
provides another bound.197  
A further prompt for publication may have come a little later.  In January 
1960, Schriever was anticipating public reaction to the publication of the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) inquiry into management of the ICBM Program.  On 13 
January 1960 he includes in his diary a draft White Paper outline, responding to the 
report.  In it, after noting that the entry into service of the Atlas ICBM had only been 
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held by the Dwight D Eisenhower Presidential Library (Dwight D Eisenhower Presidential Library, 
Abilene, Kansas; Accession Number A92-17) and from a copy of Ford’s service record. 
195 Trevor Gardner would return to public service in 1960 under the Kennedy Administration serving 
as an adviser on Space policy before his death in office in September 1963, aged only 47. 
196 Schriever Archive Box 184, Folder 7.  The annotation is in Ford’s handwriting.  
197 Ibid. 
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achieved through the efforts of identifiable individuals, he then proposed recording 
the history of the program: 
“One important element supporting such a course of action [a robust 
response to the GAO report] is the preparation of a factual document which tells 
the Air Force Ballistic Missile Story…The why, the where, the who and the how of 
each major milestone should be included.”198 
Schriever expands on this idea over several pages, culminating by 
proposing nine people to undertake the task: from HQ ARDC, Colonels Boatman 
and Ford, from BMC Colonel Bishop, from STL Dr Mettler and five ‘Helper 
Historians’ – ‘Williams, Rockerfeller, Ramo, Gardner and Schriever’.199  By this 
stage, Ford’s work, as noted above, was almost certainly underway, but this 
initiative may well have been both an impetus and a degree of official endorsement 
for it.   
There is one further cryptic diary reference of note – on 13 May 1960, 
Schriever’s diary includes the entry: “VTF Book (Medaris), Position USAF”.200  VTF 
are Ford’s initials, often used by Schriever in his diaries.  The Medaris reference 
probably relates to Major General John Medaris’s unsuccessful attempt to publish 
his book ‘Countdown for Decision’ while still serving in the US Army, related in the 
foreword of that book.201  Whether this entry refers to Ford’s own book, or whether 
in fact he was being asked to explore the USAF’s attitude to Schriever’s co-
authoring of his book with Sam Cohen, remains unclear. 
The bulk of the drafting by Ford appears to have taken place over two 
periods.  The first consisted of Ford dictating his source material for transcription 
and the subsequent editing of those transcripts. This material survives in the 
Archive as transcriptions of dictation ‘belts’ numbered from 82 to 138.202  (It is not 
clear whether belts 1-81 existed or were related to this project).  The main source 
for Ford’s work is Schriever’s 1954-57 diaries.  Much of the transcription is plainly 
from Ford reading pages of Schriever’s diaries verbatim, in their characteristic 
‘date, location, short/one-word topic’ style; in some cases, the dates match and the 																																																								
198 Schriever diary entry 13 January 1960, Schriever Archive Box 6, Folder 4.  Underlining in original. 
199 Along with Ford, Colonel Beryl L ‘Boat’ Boatman was a close colleague of Schriever.  ‘Colonel 
Bishop’ is probably Samuel W Bishop, who worked at the Ballistic Missile Center and who later 
contributed to other missile history projects.  ‘Dr Mettler’ is Ruben F Mettler, who worked for Trevor 
Gardner among others as a Department of Defense consultant.  ‘Williams’ is unidentified, ‘Rockefeller’ 
was probably Dr Alfred Rockefeller, the WDD Historian, while Ramo, Gardner and Schriever are 
obvious protagonists in the story. 
200 Schriever Archive, Box 6, Folder 5. 
201 John B. Medaris and Arthur Gordon, Countdown for decision (New York: Paperback Library, 1961) 
202 Ford appears to have used a ‘Dictabelt’ dictation machine, which recorded dictation via a stylus 
onto a plastic belt – consequently the pages of transcript in the archive are referred to by ‘belt 
number’. Schriever Archive, Box 184, Folders 8-10  
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contents correspond exactly with the diary originals elsewhere in the Archive.  Ford 
also refers explicitly to access to Schriever’s diary:  “I wish to continue with Benny’s 
personal notes because while this may seem a useless exercise in chronologizing 
a series of disconnected, single word think-pieces, they actually tell a coherent and 
continuous story…”203 Where Ford could not make sense of Schriever’s thoughts or 
ideas, he would dictate the ensuing question (‘Ask Bennie to explain this’, ‘Check 
the date’, and suchlike) straight into the transcript.  Frustratingly, if he found an 
answer to the question he does not appear to have gone back to the transcription 
to note it.  In other places, Ford cites Trevor Gardner’s notes,204 and in yet other 
places, he is dictating his own recollections, in relatively continuous prose but 
without great ‘diary style’ detail.205  Apart from the limit on the start of the drafting 
implied by the dated handwritten notes, there are very few clues as to when the 
dictation and transcription took place.  In one place, Ford has handwritten a note 
dated August 1965 referring to a ‘Herald-Tribune’ news article bearing on his work 
into the transcript.206  This sets an effective end-date on the dictation and 
transcription, albeit a conservative one.207  
The second round of dictation occurred during 1965.  Ford had retired by 
this time, and was plainly trying to move the book forward.  He conducted a variety 
of interviews to supplant missing information, and was also working on a detailed 
and complete draft of his text.  Topics covered included bioastronautics, the 
medical implications of manned spaceflight and the presentational aspects of 
military personnel flying as NASA astronauts.   He also conducted a substantial 
interview with Major General ‘Ozzie’ Ritland, and added some reminiscences of his 
own.208 Judging by the tape numbers cited, there are almost certainly gaps in the 
Archive regarding Ford’s work at this point.209 
Ford’s work ultimately yielded a very long text of some 1200 pages.  He 
admitted that it was un-publishable as drafted, but hoped that with editing it would 																																																								
203 Belt Number 102, Page 2, contained in ibid. 
204 For example Belt 106, Page 3 in ibid. 
205 The Schriever diary entries predominate in Belts 82-118, Ford’s narrative becomes more 
continuous after that to the end of the Belt sequence. 
206 Belt Number 122, Page 2 – Schriever Archive Box 184, Folder 10. 
207 There are no references to any events in the period 1958-65 in the transcripts, so it would seem 
likely that they were dictated and transcribed earlier in that period than later. 
208 For the Ritland Interview(s), see Schriever Archive Box 188, Folder 4.  Most of the interview 
material seems to have been gathered on 23-24 November 1965, though there are references to 
earlier meetings. 
209 Ford’s manuscript is cited directly only rarely in this thesis – chiefly due to the florid nature of the 
original dictation and the multiple edits, many un-attributable, that it contains.  Nevertheless, it 
provides the best description of some of the personal dynamics within Schriever’s immediate circle, 
and in particular, it informs as background the first half of Chapter 4 of this thesis relating to ICBM 
development. 
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yield a publishable text.  There is no evidence that Ford, either alone or with 
Schriever, sought to have it published during the 1950s or most of the 1960s.  
However beginning in 1968, Ford sought professional help with editing.  
Frustratingly, much of Ford’s correspondence relating to this survives only in 
(heavily amended) drafts, with the recipient identified by initials or nickname.  
Some can be identified with confidence, but other attributions are more speculative.  
The first letter about publication, dated 14 May 1968, is addressed to ‘Sam’, and 
describes the draft text in detail (which at that stage comprised 578 pages).210  
‘Sam’ is possibly Samuel S Vaughan, at that time an editor with Doubleday Inc.211  
Ford shared portions of the manuscript with an apparent friend of Trevor Gardner 
(‘Muriel’) for proof reading, and had apparently opened negotiations about 
publication with Doubleday Inc.212  This first round of Doubleday negotiations 
ended in apparent acrimony in October 1969.213  An approach to Harper-Row Inc 
followed, but again appears to have foundered.214  In 1969, Ford was in 
correspondence about arranging publication with ‘JD’ – John Ducas, a publicity 
consultant who had worked for TRW in connection with the ICBM programme when 
it had first been made public, and was also known to Schriever.215 216 217  He dealt 
with a Ms Betty Oswald at the RAND Corporation during March and April 1971, but 
RAND appear to have been unable to assist in publication.218  In August 1972, 
correspondence resumed with Doubleday Inc via an attorney.  Mr Samuel S 
Vaughn, by then the President of Doubleday, met the attorney (a Mr Botte) and 
assigned a professional editor to the project.  However, for reasons that remain 																																																								
210 Draft letter from Col Vince Ford (VTF) to ‘Sam’ dated Tuesday, 14 May 1968.  Schriever Archive, 
Box 184, Folder 4. 
211 Bruce Weber, 'Samuel S. Vaughan, Publisher at Doubleday, Dies at 83', New York Times, 1 
February 2012, sec. Obituaries. 
212 Correspondence between VTF and ‘Muriel’ dated November 1968 – October 1969.  Reference is 
made to ‘Mr Vaughan’, believed to be Mr Samuel S Vaughan and connected to August 1972 
correspondence described below.  Muriel was acting both as proof-reader and copy typist at this 
point.  Ibid. 
213 Note VTF to Muriel dated 22 October 1969: “Maybe we are still trying to recover from the traumatic 
Vaughn-Doubleday thing where we believed, in good faith”.  Ibid. 
214 VTF, in a note to John Ducas, states that “…the Harper-Row correspondence tells its own 
story…”, which was presumably a negative one.  This correspondence appears now to be lost.  
Schriever Archive, Box 184, Folder 5. 
215 For some biographical details of Mr Ducas, see New York Times, 'John Ducas, 70, Dies; A 
Publicity Consultant', New York Times, 29 September 1990, sec. Obituaries. 
216 There is one previous, typically cryptic, reference to J Ducas in the Schriever diaries.  Ten years 
earlier, on 14 October 1959, the entry ‘Jake-VTF-J Ducas’ appears, without further detail, as business 
to be discussed on a trip to New York.  Schriever Archive, Box 6 Folder 2. 
217 Ford submitted a draft of the book to Ducas on 1 April 1970, and exchanged correspondence with 
him until 18 February 1971 when he noted his frustration at the lack of progress in 9 ½ months: “-
NOTHING! NO REASON, NO EXPLANATION, NO COMMENT, PRO OR CON—NOTHING!!” VTF 
note (possibly to self), capitalization in original. Schriever Archive, Box 184 Folder 5. 
218 Correspondence VTF/Betty Oswald, Schriever Archive, Box 184, Folder 6.  Some of the letters 
were sent to Betty Oswald’s home address, suggesting that she may have been assisting in a 
personal rather than commercial capacity.  The RAND archive has no record of the project. 
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unclear, Doubleday rejected the manuscript in November 1972.219  Meanwhile, 
Ford sent sections of the text to a ‘Hi’ Hertell in September 1972 (another 
unidentified correspondent).220  The last documented attempt at this time to find a 
publisher occurred in 1973, when Mr Charles J V Murphy acted as a potential 
ghost-writer to secure sponsorship from the Foreign Policy Research Institute in 
Philadelphia for re-writing/editing the manuscript.  Murphy wrote to Schriever laying 
down the terms on which he would undertake the work, but no record exists in the 
Archive of how and why this effort foundered like all the others.221  It is possible that 
the sum to be advanced by the authors - $25 000 – to cover costs served as a 
deterrent.  Allowing for inflation, this equates to about $140 000 in 2014 values.  
Finally in 1984-85, Ford made one last attempt to publish: archive details 
are sketchy – they consist of a stock covering letter explaining the book and its 
intent, and separately a list of potential publishers.222  Reflecting changing times, 
the list of possible publishers includes several academic institutions: The University 
Presses at Brown University, Cornell, Chicago, Illinois, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and 
Wayne State, as well as the Smithsonian, Hoover and Naval Institute Presses and 
other commercial publishers are all listed.  There is no confirmation which, if any of 
the listed institutions was in fact approached, nor record of any results. 
Ford had already expressed his frustration many times with delays in 
bringing the publication to fruition, and stated frequently that it was principally 
loyalty to Schriever, Gardner and von Neumann (most explicitly Gardner) that had 
kept him engaged.  At the end of his efforts, Ford was left with his 1258 page text, 
still at his own estimation desperately in need of editing.  
Ford changed his mind several times about the title of the proposed book:  
“It’s My Country Too”, “24 Minutes to Checkmate” and “Three Special Immigrants” 
are all cited at various times, and he makes mention of having further possible titles 
in mind.  At the end of the project, at least 3 copies of the 12-1300 page manuscript 
existed.  One copy was held by Schriever, one ended up in the hands of another 																																																								
219 Letter from Mr Bill Henderson (Doubleday editor) to Mr David Botte dated 30 November 1972.  
Schriever Archive, Box 184 Folder 6. 
220 Single page memo by VTF (draft?) to ‘Hi’ Hertell.  It is possible that ‘Hi’ was a Doubleday contact 
and that this was therefore not a further attempt to secure a publisher.  There was also a publishing 
company active at the time in Chicago – the John H Hertell Co – but it appears to have concentrated 
solely on publishing Christian Bibles, so seems an unlikely outlet for Ford’s manuscript.  Ford was, 
however, a devout Catholic, so it is possible that he knew someone at the company. Ibid. 
221 Letters from Mr Bill Kiltner (FPRI) to Bill Richardson and from Charles Murphy to Schriever dated 
15 March and 17 May 1973.  Brigadier Gen Bill Richardson III was another associate of Schriever 
who had served under him at AF Systems Command and later worked for Schriever’s consultancy 
firm.  The letter from Mr Kiltner to General Richardson makes it clear that they were close colleagues, 
already collaborating on other writing and publishing projects.  Ibid. 
222 Schriever Archive, Box 181, Folder 11. 
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friend of Ford and Schriever – Mr George Stein of Manassas, Virginia, and Ford 
gifted his own copy to the Dwight D Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, 
Kansas.  Schriever’s copy passed into the hands of his family, but deteriorated due 
to damp storage conditions and was eventually disposed of.223  Ford’s copy 
remains in the library in Abilene and is available for consultation.  Mr Stein gifted 
his copy to the Library of Congress via the author during 2013 and after 
conservation it will become available for study as part of the Schriever Archive.224  
A brief examination of the copy in Abilene in 2013, limited by time available in the 
archive, suggested that both surviving copies are very similar if not identical.  
Unfortunately, both are photocopies of a hand-amended original; and the 
photocopying has served to make attributing the corrections excessively difficult.  
Nevertheless, the text is readable as drafted and is presumably roughly in the form 
that Ford would have wanted it to appear. 
Ultimately, the value of the Ford manuscript is twofold.  It compares 
portions of Schriever’s diaries over three years with other records, and it also 
synthesises Ford’s own experiences as a participant in the events described, and 
his research through interview and conversation with other participants.  Ford 
contributed significantly to Neil Sheehan’s research for his Schriever biography, 
and in some places, Sheehan’s debt to Ford is obvious (and is acknowledged).225  
To that extent, portions of Sheehan represent what Ford had always sought – a 
professionally edited version of his draft text. 
‘ICBM: The Prelude to Survival and Space’ - The Samuel Cohen 
Manuscript 	
In contrast to the rambling narrative of Ford, the other book-project that 
Schriever definitely collaborated on is much shorter, more focussed and would 
have been much more suitable for immediate publication as a co-authored work.  
Sometime, probably in late 1959, Schriever and his co-author Sam Cohen set out 
to write a book about the military implications of the ICBM and of military 
spaceflight.  																																																								
223 As recounted by Mr Ted Moeller (Schriever’s son-in-law) in conversation with the author during a 
family visit in 2011. 
224 There are numerous draft chapters of Ford’s book in the Library of Congress, developed across an 
extended time-frame.  It would probably be possible to assemble a copy of the manuscript as Ford 
envisaged it at various dates in its history, making reasonable guesses as to an editor’s direction, but 
Stein’s copy donated via the author is probably the most complete and consistent with the author’s 
intent at a given (unknown) instant. 
225 A particularly clear example is Ford’s account of the meeting in May 1954 where Trevor Gardner 
offered Schriever management of the ICBM effort over lunch.  This forms Chapter 36 of Sheehan, and 
draws directly on Ford’s account in his manuscript.  See Sheehan, A Fiery Peace  225-28 and 
Schriever Archive, Box 181, Folder 10,  ‘Sample Chapter 13’. 
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Samuel Theodore Cohen (1921-2010) was born in New York City and 
studied mathematics and physics at UCLA prior to joining the US Army in the 
aftermath of Pearl Harbor.  He was recruited into the Manhattan Project and 
worked on weapons design at Los Alamos.  After World War 2, he joined the 
RAND Corporation where he remained for the rest of his working life.  He invented 
and publicized the concept of the enhanced radiation (nuclear) warhead (the so-
called ‘Neutron Bomb’) and was a proponent of the use of nuclear weapons for 
tactical purposes in limited conflicts, in contrast to the prevailing orthodoxy of their 
use solely as a strategic deterrent.   
Unlike the relatively well-documented genesis of the Schriever-Ford 
manuscript and the accounts of attempts to secure a publisher, there is little in the 
Schriever Archive to explain the context, motivation or background to Schriever 
and Cohen’s work.226  Nor is there any explicit hint of who the intended publisher 
was, nor why the publication did not go ahead.  What does exist is a draft of a work 
entitled “ICBM: The Prelude to Survival and Space”.  The text is almost complete 
and ready to publish, all that appears to be missing are diagrams and/or 
illustrations, which are referred to in the text but not included in the draft.  The 
manuscript is in 11 Chapters and a Preface, and the copy held in the Archive (the 
only known copy) was compiled during August 1960, and acknowledged as 
complete by Schriever on 27 August 1960.227  The covering note detailing its 
compilation acknowledges the existence of illustrations – the unknown secretary(?) 
who compiled the covering note asks to be taken along on Schriever’s next visit to 
Air Force Ballistic Missiles Division to complete collation of photographs and 
illustrations.  The illustrations would in fact have been few in number and the text is 
perfectly readable without them. 
The writing of the Schriever-Cohen manuscript can be dated fairly 
accurately.228  Plainly it was complete by August 1960, the date of the draft’s 
covering note.  The text of Chapter 1 seems to imply that ICBMs were already in 
service: “using today’s technical capabilities it is possible for an ICBM to throw a 
																																																								
226 Cohen died at the age of 89 in 2010, and appears not to have left any papers.  The RAND 
Corporation and UCLA (the two most obvious likely recipients) confirmed to the author that they hold 
no deposit of his papers, and surviving members of his family have stated that they are unaware of 
his having held any significant quantity of correspondence or other papers requiring curating.   
227 The complete text, including the covering note, fills a single container within the Archive.  Schriever 
Archive, Box 180. 
228 There is a possible fleeting reference to Cohen and  book-writing in Schriever’s diary for 24 
October 1957.  Schriever’s handwriting is untypically difficult to read, but he may have discussed 
‘Book interest – Cohen’ with Vince Ford and with ‘T Walk’ (unidentified).  Schriever Archive, Box 5, 
Folder 3.  This is an isolated entry, and does not seem to have been followed up at the time. 
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sizeable nuclear payload to any point on earth.”229  Since the Atlas ICBM was the 
first such missile to enter service (on 31 October 1959), the draft would appear to 
have been written either after this date, or at least close enough to it to anticipate 
successful entry to service.  In Chapter 2, there are also references to Soviet 
successes with ‘Luniks’ (plural) which, since they would have been hard for an 
American to anticipate, suggest that writing occurred after September 1959.230  
Thus, sometime between November 1959 and July 1960 are the most likely dates 
for its authoring.   
Schriever’s diaries provide almost no corroboration of the proposed drafting 
dates.  In line with his strict demarcation between his personal and official lives, 
and the consequent almost total lack of personal appointments or business in his 
diaries, there are no references to co-authoring anywhere in the diaries for 
January-August 1960 – not even a mention on 27 August, the date when the draft 
text was acknowledged as complete.  The only specific references to Cohen in the 
diary at this time are on 14 October 1959, when he notes “Sue for Book (Sam 
Cohen)”, on 10 November 1959, when he made notes about low-yield nuclear 
warheads against Cohen’s name, and on 14 June 1960, when Schriever notes: 
“Get Cohen to rewrite and cut-down Cella paper and thus get to the right 
people”.231 
Although Sam Cohen died in 2010, Mrs Cohen survives, and through her 
family, the author attempted to establish any memories she had about the rationale 
for authorship or any other context for its writing that she could offer. Sadly, 
although Mrs Cohen has memories of her husband collaborating with Schriever on 
the text, she could recall little except that it was written in Washington in 
Schriever’s apartment.232  Thus the detail above is probably all that will ever be 
established about its provenance, barring discovery of any new correspondence.   																																																								
229 “ICBM: the Key to Survival and Space”, Chapter 1, Page 16.  Unpublished draft by B A Schriever 
and S T Cohen, contained in Schriever Archive, Box 180.  Hereafter referred to as if a published 
volume, and referenced by Chapter and Page Number as reflected in the draft (pages are numbered 
separately within each Chapter). 
230 Bernard Schriever and Samuel. T. Cohen, ICBM: The Key to Survival and Space (Library of 
Congress MSS Collection, 1959-60) Chapter 2 Page 13.  The Soviet Luna 2 and Luna 3 missions 
achieved their goals (impact on the Moon’s surface for Luna 2, and photography of the far side of the 
Moon for Luna 3) on 12 September and 4 October 1959 respectively. 
231 Schriever Archive, Box 6, Folder 4 and 5.  There is no clue who ‘Sue’ is or what her connection 
with the manuscript is; Colonel (later Brigadier General) Richard Cella worked for Schriever on 
several occasions, but it is unclear what paper is being referred to, nor, why Schriever wanted Cohen 
to do this work. 
232 “Though my mother does remember the time during which my father worked on the book you'd 
mentioned - she said my father had taken time away from work and he and General Schriever had 
holed up in his apartment for days at a time - I'm afraid she has no knowledge of what exactly the 
project entailed.”  Mrs Carla Nagler (daughter of Sam Cohen) in correspondence with the author, 
August 2012. 
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An attempt was made through textual analysis software to deduce whether 
authorship of individual chapters could be established, but due to the (statistically) 
small sample of text, and perhaps due to mutual editing or the involvement of other 
un-acknowledged contributors, the results were inconclusive. The text must 
therefore be taken to be the joint opinions of both authors. 
The Schriever-Cohen manuscript is a statement of the joint views of the 
authors on the utility of ICBMs, their history, the relationship between ICBMs and 
space capabilities and the utility of military spaceflight.  The dominant theme 
changes sharply between chapters and at times the analysis is laboured; the 
opening chapter about ‘The Evolution of Weapons’ includes an analysis of human 
combat starting in pre-historic times with hand-held weapons, while Chapter 4 
about ‘The Committees’ begins with a philosophical discussion on the nature of 
committees in general before dwelling on the workings of the various committees 
that oversaw the ICBM programme, including the (US) Scientific Advisory Board 
and the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee (the Von Neumann ‘Teapot’ 
Committee).  In yet other places, the text presents startlingly original analysis of 
strategic issues, including advocacy for space weaponization that will be examined 
in detail later.  Overall, and despite occasional textual thickets, the text provides a 
rare insight into Schriever and Cohen’s thoughts about the strategic implications of 
their work.  
Another Schriever-Cohen Manuscript? 	
In 2000, Sam Cohen wrote and self-published his memoirs.233  In these, he 
recounts his friendship with Schriever, which lasted from 1950 until Schriever’s 
death in 2005.  Much of his writing provides context for the relationship between 
Schriever, von Neumann, Ford and Cohen, and he also provides a caustic 
assessment of Schriever’s relationship with Robert McNamara.  But there is no 
mention of the ‘ICBM’ manuscript of 1959-60 or its authorship.  However, tucked 
away within it is mention of another Schriever-Cohen publishing venture, dated 
after Schriever’s retirement in 1966.  Cohen recounts: “[Schriever] requested of me 
that I write a book for him, which would express our common views on what had to 
be done about our defense, particularly the tactical nuclear part of the equation.  I 
wrote the book…However, for his personal and political reasons, he backed away, 
and it never saw the light of day.”234  In the Schriever Archive, there is another book 																																																								
233 S. T. Cohen, Shame : confessions of the father of the neutron bomb ([United States]: Xlibris, 2000) 
234 Cohen, Shame  437 
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length manuscript, which appears to be the text of this book, now finally in the 
public domain.235  It has no title and no attribution or accompanying 
correspondence, thus identification of this MSS as the text referred to by Cohen is 
speculative.  Like the acknowledged Schriever-Cohen manuscript, it is a late draft, 
plainly almost ready for publication.  Compared to the ‘ICBM’ manuscript, there is 
slightly more handwritten amendment in this later(?) text, and what there is 
appears to be in the same handwriting in both.  The style of layout and typing is 
similar in both, and finally the later text deals at some length with tactical nuclear 
issues as described by Cohen.  In the absence of a title page, or any supporting 
correspondence or cross-references elsewhere in the Archive, the reader cannot 
be sure of its identity, but it does not seem fanciful to make the connection.   
Conclusion		
This chapter establishes that Schriever’s life and work have already been 
studied, in some aspects extensively.  But with a few notable exceptions, academic 
research has concentrated on the ICBM programme, and within that the concept of 
‘concurrency’.  Popular biographies have used Schriever’s status as an ‘immigrant 
boy made good’ for human interest and his work with ICBMs as a prism through 
which to refract the history of the Early Cold War.  While these are worthy goals, 
they omit interesting facets of his life and work.  There are good reasons for this, 
principally the paucity of source material, and the blanket of classification and other 
security issues that covered large parts of the early space age.  The opening of the 
Schriever archive for research and the aggressive (and very welcome) programme 
of declassification pursued by the National Reconnaissance Office have provided a 
new opportunity to assess his work and to attribute reasons for his successes and 
failures.  So what has been covered and what is left to say about Schriever and his 
work? 
Schriever’s contribution to the development of ICBMs was recognised as 
significant while it was still underway, and many scholars have made reference to 
it.  He is seen by some as architect of an essential element of Cold War deterrence 
theory, and by others as a significant figure within the discipline of systems 
management of complex projects.  It is worth noting that in both cases, but 
particularly the latter, he was a technically-competent manager rather than a 
working engineer, and in this respect he stands in contrast to other comparable 
figures such as Wernher von Braun, who began his career in pre-war Germany 																																																								
235 Schriever Archive, Box 183, Folders 8 and 9. 
		 85	
actually designing and building rockets.  His understanding of bureaucratic 
organization and the lobbying that can be required to gain support for a project is 
also of note; the accounts of his leadership of the WDD are full of records of him 
flying regularly between California and Washington DC to brief and lobby 
leadership and administration figures in the Pentagon and elsewhere.  He also had 
a keen appreciation of the need to demonstrate the effectiveness of his 
management skills to Congress.  His name is inextricably linked with the concept of 
concurrency, although analysis of its effectiveness as a technique is inevitably 
clouded by competing definitions; taken as a narrow concept it is not in itself 
sufficient to account for the ICBM project’s success, but interpreted more broadly, it 
is hard to see that it was applied consistently.  
What is missing in all this is an analysis of Schriever’s motivations and 
understanding of where missile and space forces fitted conceptually and doctrinally 
into the Air Force of his times.  There has also been very little attempt to analyse 
his understanding of the significance of space systems, both manned and 
unmanned, to relate those to developing air-power understanding and to see if the 
techniques Schriever employed in developing such systems bear any relationship 
to those employed in ICBM and IRBM development.  This thesis attempts to fill that 
gap, using the methodology outlined in Chapter 1.  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 look in turn 
at test cases to apply the methodology and analyse Schriever’s successes and 
failures.
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CHAPTER 4 – THE VIRTUOUS PATH: ICBMS AND 
RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES 
Introduction		
As was noted in Chapter 2, Bernard Schriever is widely identified today as 
the ‘Father of the ICBM’ within the USAF.  He also played a significant part in the 
introduction of reconnaissance satellites into USAF service.  His management of 
the Atlas ICBM project brought it into operational service within the stipulated time 
limits, and although Atlas had a relatively short service life, it met the demands 
placed on it until more advanced systems became available.  The first part of this 
chapter looks at Bernard Schriever’s involvement with the ICBM programme from 
its earliest days, and analyses it against his technical, policy and administrative 
achievements.  The second part, repeats the analysis as it applies to 
reconnaissance satellites.    
ICBMs	and	the	USAF		
The first formal display of interest by the US Armed Forces in ballistic 
missiles predated Bernard Schriever’s entry into the Scientific Research and 
Development field, but only by a slim margin.  The initial impetus in fact came from 
General of the Army ‘Hap’ H Arnold, who, as was shown in Chapter 2, was well 
acquainted with Schriever.  At the end of his US Army Air Forces career, and 
inspired by the report on future technologies prepared for him during 1944-45 by 
the Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) under the leadership of Professor Theodore 
von Karman, 236 Arnold began to advocate for the development of long-range 
missiles and satellites.237 Schriever arrived at the Pentagon in January 1946, and 
almost immediately, Arnold summoned him and put him to work.  His first 
appointment was in the Scientific Liaison Office of HQ AAF (soon to become HQ 
USAF).  This office provided the secretariat function to the Science Advisory Board 
(SAB), the successor organisation to Von Karman’s SAG, but after General 
Arnold’s retirement, the SAB was soon fighting for survival.  Schriever recalls 																																																								
236 Theodore Von Karman, Towards New Horizons: A Report to General of the Army H H Arnold 
submitted on behalf of the AAF Scientific Advisory Group by Theodore von Karman (Washington DC: 
AAF SAG, 1946) was requested by Arnold in December 1944, completed in December 1945 and 
circulated as a classified document in 1946.  Three volumes (vv 8-10) bear on various facets of 
missile technology. 
237 Robert Perry dates Arnold’s first statement to this effect to November 1945, though also noting the 
US Navy’s parallel interest in a satellite programme during October 1945.  See Robert L Perry, 
Origins of the USAF Space Program 1945-1956 (AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-4-10) (Air 
Force Systems Command, 1962) vi 
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attending the first SAB meeting in 1946 and supporting its work during 1946-49; it 
would be some time, however, before ICBMs were its most pressing concern; 
several attempts were made within the USAF to dissolve it.238  The early USAF 
enthusiasm for ballistic missile development soon waned, as evidenced by the 
cancellation on budgetary grounds of the Convair MX-774 missile programme in 
1947 – at the time, the only long-range ballistic missile in development.239  After his 
year’s attendance at the National War College in 1950, Schriever returned to the 
Pentagon to direct the Development Planning Office, to find the outcomes of the 
(civilian) Ridenour report of 1949 and the parallel (military) report of the Anderson 
committee had led to major rearrangements within the Research and Development 
community.  Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) had been created 
during 1950-51 to provide a focus for research and development activity within the 
USAF.  Additionally, in 1951 the USAF re-entered ICBM development with the 
initiation of the MX-1593 programme, a low-rate development contract placed with 
the Consolidated-Vultee (Convair) Corporation.  Although this was a significant 
milestone, the technical problems that had beset the MX-774 had not been solved 
and progress was slow.240 
In 1954, the USAF ICBM programme received a boost from the 
complementary outcomes of the committee referred to as the ‘Teapot’ committee 
headed by John von Neumann, (properly, the Strategic Missiles Evaluation 
Committee and sometimes also simply known as the ‘von Neumann Committee’), 
and a parallel report from the RAND Corporation.  Their validation of the practicality 
of an ICBM, and the need to develop one as soon as possible, led to the formation 
of the Western Development Division (WDD) within ARDC.  Charged with 
developing a practical ICBM as soon as possible, Schriever was appointed its 
inaugural, and only, commander.241 
																																																								
238 For Schriever’s role in the early SAB, see Jacob Neufeld (ed.), Reflections on Research and 
Development: An interview with General Bernard A. Schriever and Generals Samuel C. Phillips, 
Robert T. Marsh, and James H. Doolittle, and Dr. Ivan A. Getting, conducted by Dr Richard H Kohn 
(Washington DC: Center for Air Force History, 1993) 35.  For details of the early tribulations of the 
SAB, see Gorn, Harnessing the genie  45-50. 
239 In 1947, the principal technical reason cited for cancellation of MX-744 was the inability to develop 
a missile of sufficient range using then available fuels and rocket motors, but in 1957-58, Schriever 
testified to Congress that concerns over warhead yield and weight were major problems.  For an 
outline of the cancellation of MX-744, and the state of ICBM research during this period more 
generally, see Beard, Developing the ICBM  53-57 
240 Ridenour and Anderson were not the only committee chairmen advocating for improved R&D 
organisation.  The work of the Findlater Commission was also notable.  For more details of the 
genesis of ARDC, see Dennis J. Disch Minnie L. Weaver John J. Stanley, An Air Force command for 
R & D, 1949-1976 (Office of History, Air Force Systems Command, 1976) 8-11 
241 John L. Frisbee (ed.), Makers of the United States Air Force (USAF 50th Anniversary edn., USAF 
warrior studies, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1995) 290 
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Ballistic	Missiles	–	Schriever	and	Technical	Progress		
On 2 August 1958, Schriever’s desk diary gives a rare insight into his 
personal feelings.  The entry in its totality reads:  
“1.     4 Years complete today. 
2.     Atlas 4B.  17:16EST    successful – we did it. 
First Free World ICBM – all three engines.” 
Schriever is commenting on the successful Atlas test flight achieved that 
day, the tenth such attempt (preceded by six failures and three that had reached 
their limited goals) of the programme.242  It was the first time, as he notes, that an 
Atlas had been successfully launched in its intended three-engined configuration. 
It would be another year before the Atlas would be declared operational in 
USAF service, but as far as Schriever was concerned, his major effort relating to it 
was now complete.243  He had achieved his goal significantly quicker than the 
Teapot Committee had thought possible, and even slightly ahead of the RAND 
estimate.244  Meanwhile, the WDD had simultaneously assumed responsibility for 
delivery of the Thor Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, which entered service in 
late 1958, initiated development of the Titan ICBM as a backup system in the event 
of Atlas failure and begun work on the Minuteman solid-fuel ICBM as a follow-on 
system.  Under Schriever, it had also assumed responsibility for much of the early 
US military space effort.  Against this backdrop, let us now examine Schriever’s 
contributions in detail. 
The first thing to make clear is that in running the Atlas programme, 
Schriever was managing a family of industrial contractors.  He was quite sure not 
only that this was the case, but that it was in essence a good thing.  Speaking in 
1957, he noted: 
																																																								
242 Diary entry for 2 August 1958 in Schriever Archive, Box 5, Folder 9.  Underlining in the original.  
For a listing of Atlas test firings, see Walker and Powell, Atlas  265. 
243 It is telling that on the date that Atlas was declared operational (31 October 1959), Schriever 
appears to have made no comment in his diary.  There is no diary page with that date, and the 
dominant themes for the October entries that do exist  are future aerospace systems – Atlas is not 
mentioned at all.  Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 9. 
244 The Teapot Committee had predicted development to take 6-8 years, i.e. likely to deliver an 
operational missile during 1960-62 while internal USAF estimates in 1953 had suggested 1965 as a 
goal.  The RAND report suggested that 1960 was achievable.  The full Teapot Committee report has 
not been declassified, but an extract from it containing the time estimate is in a pack of historical 
documents prepared for Schriever in 1956.  The RAND report is publicly available.  See Schriever 
Archive, Box 3 Folder 7 and Bruno W. Augenstein, A Revised Development Program for the ICBM 
(RAND Report SM-21) (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1954) 34 
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“...Close cooperation with industry is especially important for the Air 
Force.  Being the youngest of the three Services and operating equipment 
whose military history spans only a few decades, the Air Force does not 
have establishments like the arsenals, gun factories, ship yards and similar 
facilities created by the other Services long ago to develop and 
manufacture much of their material.  Instead, the Air Force has relied, from 
the very start, on the assistance of industry and has, thereby, gained 
considerable experience in the management and monitoring of weapon 
systems contracts. 
  To keep pace with the rapid expansion of its responsibilities , the 
Air Forces has commensurately expanded its special organizations for the 
management of its research and development contracts – the Air Research 
and Development Command -… Above all, the Air Force’s system of 
contracting for most of its research and development projects has greatly 
stimulated the growth of research facilities in the aircraft and allied 
industries, increased the capabilities of industrial and scientific 
organizations, and enhanced the scientific efforts of educational as similar 
institutions.  All of these factors are now paying off in the Air Force’s pursuit 
of its Guided Missiles effort.”245 
  
Schriever had in fact placed himself one step further removed from direct 
involvement with the programme than this quote might suggest.  His greatest 
innovation as an engineering manager at WDD was to insert the Ramo-Wooldridge 
(R-W) Corporation as a ‘system integrator’ to manage the overall development 
programme.  His management role thus became monitoring progress against 
USAF and DoD timelines, including overseeing R-W’s work.  He faced significant 
criticism for this innovation for a variety of reasons, but persisted with it.246  Central 
to effective prosecution of this role, however, is an engineer’s understanding of the 
problems being addressed, and Schriever’s technical grasp of the demands of the 
ICBM programme was clear from the start.   
Sometime in 1954, possibly in September or October, Schriever drafted a 
briefing to be delivered in ‘Rome’, outlining WDD’s intent in the management of the 
Atlas programme.247  Schriever’s handwritten notes make clear his understanding 
																																																								
245 Bernard Schriever, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, 
New York, NY, 29 January 1957.  Press copy of speech in ‘Earlybird’ Files, Boxes 110-111, National 
Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC. 
246 For details of the concerns relating to R-W’s position within Atlas, see for example Neufeld, 
Ballistic Missiles  125-26 
247 Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 9. From the briefing content, it can be inferred it was intended to 
take place at the Rome Air Development Center at Rome, NY rather than in Italy.  The notes are 
simply titled ‘Rome Presentation’, and are mainly undated, although reference is made within them to 
a meeting during 21-22 September 1954.  There are plainly several drafts of the same presentation 
contained in the source, as Schriever adjusted its content; the analysis here draws on a composite of 
the various drafts.  Schriever’s desk diary does not indicate when the presentation was delivered, but 
it does highlight a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board in Omaha, Nebraska during 27-29 
September 1954, where Schriever also spoke on similar lines.  It appears possible either that the 
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of the technical challenges that would be faced by the programme.  He outlined the 
technical advances that had led to the initiation of Atlas, and the further advances 
that would be required.  The principal enabler had been the breakthrough in 
lightweight thermonuclear warheads that had occurred in 1953.   Specific warhead 
weights are not discussed in the Rome presentation, but Schriever has made the 
marginal note ’23 000ft/sec’ in this section.  This is the speed required of a ballistic 
missile with a range of about 6000 miles, a speed/range combination in common 
discussion at the time.  The implication is that Atlas would require the performance 
to accelerate one of the new lightweight warheads to this speed.  He notes the 
advantages of the lightweight warhead, improved missile performance from the 
reduced weight for a given yield and the relaxation in accuracy allowed because of 
the greater yields possible.  He discusses the speed profile of warhead re-entry 
into the atmosphere and how it would affect heat-dissipation.  CEP figures of 3 and 
5 miles are noted as significant and Schriever analyses the total number of 
weapons that would be required for different levels of damage to a reference target 
set at each CEP.248  Schriever also notes that supplies of fissile material should be 
adequate to support the warheads by 1958-60. 
Schriever then lists technical challenges still to be overcome.  Within the 
various drafts in his notes, he highlights the need to settle on the configuration of 
the missile (number of stages and number of engines per stage), the problems of 
nosecone design (referring to protecting the warhead from heating during 
atmospheric re-entry), the guidance options that might be possible (he compares 
‘radio/radar’ with ‘control’, a synonym for an early inertial navigation system, and 
the various hybrid solutions that these might yield), the challenges posed by engine 
and missile body design and the need for various test facilities during the 
development programme.  This is a comprehensive list of the challenges he would 
face over the next few years and it is plain that he had a good grasp of how they 
might be addressed. 
One way of measuring Schriever’s engineering involvement in Atlas 
development is to look at the periodic reports he gave to his senior management 
and other audiences during the development period.   We will review the 
administrative methods by which Schriever gave direction to his team shortly, but 
for now we will establish that throughout, he retained a sound understanding of the 																																																								
meeting venue changed or that Schriever delivered essentially the same presentation twice.  For the 
desk diary, see Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 17. 
248 ‘Circular Error Probable’ (CEP) is a common metric for weapon accuracy; it represents the radius 
within which 50% of the weapons fired at a given target will lie.  Smaller CEPs equate to more 
accurate systems. 
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technical issues being addressed.  He invariably prepared the briefings personally 
– almost all the notes for them are in his own handwriting.  They plainly show his 
grasp of the engineering challenges being faced during this complex project.  
During April and May 1955, Schriever delivered two significant progress reviews.249  
The first may have been to the Secretary of the Air Force (the draft presentation 
notes only include the date, not the recipient and Schriever’s desk diary is very 
sparse in 1954-55), the second was definitely to the Air Force Council, but taken 
together they provide a comprehensive review of progress.  Schriever notes the 
analysis conducted of ‘stage and a half’ versus two-stage missiles,250 early work on 
warhead design, scoping of the requirements for test facilities later in the 
programme, and early work on guidance systems.  Again Schriever is plainly in 
command of his brief, but he makes his own philosophy clear in a note for the April 
presentation:  “Judgement factors – I’m not the expert – hundreds of man-months 
by high caliber teams”.251  He then lists the multiple service and commercial 
organisations forming his community of experts. 
In 1956, Schriever continues his round of reports and presentations.  The 
record of these briefings becomes harder to read for four reasons.  Firstly, 
classification of the records in the Schriever archive occasionally intrudes – most of 
the notes relating to a briefing to the von Neumann Committee in January 1956 are 
withheld due to their content.  Secondly, the briefings appear to have become 
slightly more elaborate, and make greater use of charts displayed to the audience, 
copies of which do not survive.  Thus analysis of the content of the briefings 
becomes harder, being based only on Schriever’s speaking notes (though these 
are plainly still his own work).  Thirdly, the programme itself had become more 
complex, involving parallel development of Atlas and Titan missiles, and the 
addition of the Thor intermediate range ballistic missile to the WDD portfolio.  
Finally, Schriever devoted increasing time and effort to briefing other projects, 
specifically the early space systems that were beginning to show military promise.   
A good snapshot of the state of the overall effort was delivered to the Air 
War College at Maxwell AFB by Schriever on 16 May 1956.  Here Schriever is 																																																								
249 Schriever Archive, Box 3 Folder 10. 
250 Despite the clear theoretical advantages, there was considerable technical concern at the time 
about igniting a second stage during flight.  Atlas therefore employed a ‘stage and a half’ design 
where the missile launched with three engines running (a ‘sustainer’ and two ‘booster’ engines).  
During flight, the two booster engines were jettisoned to save weight, leaving the sustainer engine to 
power the missile for the remainder of its powered phase.  The Titan missile, introduced as an 
alternative to Atlas to provide design redundancy, employed a true two-stage configuration.  See also 
Chapter 2, p37. 
251 Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 10. 
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plainly speaking as an engineering manager, rather than a hands-on engineer.  
Aside from the recent acceleration of the missile programme, Schriever identifies 
four stages that he sees the missile programme passing through.  The first had 
been completed in 1954 and comprised the organisation of WDD and analysis of 
missile requirements.  The second phase, also completed by this date, had been 
the selection of contractors to lead on development of the various components of 
the missiles.  The third stage, which he describes as the ‘hi-level’ stage had been 
the evaluation leading to the acceleration of the programme during the summer of 
1955.  The fourth stage, which was in progress as he was speaking, was 
fabrication and test of the missiles themselves, which would lead to operational 
capability.252  Schriever says little in his notes about the performance of the 
missiles under test at the time, but he does expand on the technical features of the 
design that would enhance the operational utility of the missiles.  Towards the end 
of his address, he discusses the possible vulnerabilities of a missile barrage.  
Having noted its short time of flight overall, he remarks that detection of a missile 
attack would nonetheless be possible.  He then points out that incorporation of 
‘chaff’ – strips of aluminised foil designed to confuse radar to be deployed by the 
incoming warheads – or blowing up the redundant missile bodies or varying the re-
entry trajectories would all act as potential protection for the warheads.253 
 By 1957, the tone of Schriever’s briefings are changing and the technical 
content relating to missiles is reduced in favour of comment on other topics such as 
the space programme. Nonetheless, he was still briefing at the highest level.  On 
11 January 1957 he participated in the annual Department of Defense briefing to 
the National Security Council (NSC) on the Ballistic Missile Program.  The NSC 
minutes are a rare record of a briefing by Schriever compiled by the recipients.254  
The technical portion of Schriever’s contribution was evidently brief, and is 
summarised as follows in the NSC Minutes: 
“…General Schriever then indicated the major difference between the Atlas 
1 ½ -stage missile and the 2-stage Titan missile.  In so doing he was 
assisted by models of these missiles, which had been brought to the 
Cabinet Room. He predicted that the first launching of the flight test missile 
Atlas would occur in the course of 1957. The first guided flight of an Atlas 
missile was likely to occur in 1958. The corresponding dates for tests of the 
Titan missile would be approximately one year behind the similar 																																																								
252 Schriever elaborated on this series of necessary steps, increasing it to a five-step series in a 
nearly contemporary article.  Bernard Schriever, 'The USAF Ballistic Missile Program', Air University 
Quarterly, Vol IX No 3  1957) 
253 Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 11. 
254 Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 12.  Memorandum of Discussion at the 309th Meeting of the 
National Security Council, Washington, January 11, 1957,   (Washington DC: www.history.state.gov) 
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developments on Atlas…” 
 
The correspondence between Schriever’s notes and the NSC minutes is 
very clear, giving confidence that his notes were used as drafted. 
From this point on, Schriever’s briefing notes become sparse and then non-
existent in the Library of Congress archive – there are no briefing folders retained 
for 1958-60.  He was, however, making an increasing number of public speeches, 
but without his technical grasp of the programme, and his determination to meet 
engineering deadlines to schedule waning in any way. 
The last aspect of Schriever’s engineering management techniques to be 
considered is how he co-ordinated the development effort and tracked progress 
across the country.  As noted briefly in Chapter 2, Schriever made two major 
innovations in his technical management techniques to meet the demands of the 
programme: he instituted a comprehensive management information system to 
feed data from the burgeoning number of contractors involved in the programme 
directly to his Headquarters in California, and he orchestrated monthly review 
meetings (informally known as ‘Black Saturday’ meetings since they invariably took 
place on the first or last Saturday of a calendar month).  Schriever plainly 
recognised their innovative nature and described them thus: 
 “The ballistic missile program is nationwide in all aspects.  The work of 
seventeen major system contractors located in every part of the United 
States has to be coordinated and kept in phase… To keep abreast of the 
entire program, the efforts of all the members of the management-
development team are closely monitored in a central place in BMD-the 
Program Control Room.  The joint BMD-BMO-R-W Program Control Room 
is the nerve center for the project.  As a management tool it provides 
"management visibility" by displaying information on the status of every 
aspect of the project in graphic form.  This management information is 
provided through frequent visits with contractors, use of the extensive 
communications network between BMD and the contractors and field 
offices, written reports, and periodic meetings of BMD, BMO, and R-W 
personnel…Any problems are spotted early and acted upon quickly. [They] 
are given immediate treatment and their status is considered each time a 
review is made.   
 
The program pulse is felt continuously. It is presented formally once a 
month to key members of the management team. In these presentations, 
the rule of "management by exception” is followed. There are hundreds of 
items that could be considered. It would take several days to treat them all. 
Instead, only progress and problem areas are noted and discussed.”255 
 
																																																								
255 Schriever, 'The USAF Ballistic Missile Program',  (Air University Quarterly).  
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The importance of both processes was underlined much later, when 
Stephen Johnson interviewed both Schriever and one of his staff, Charles Terhune, 
for a journal article.256  Johnson noted: 
 
 [fn46] “Some historians have questioned whether the Control Room served 
any real purpose aside from showmanship. My conclusion is that some of 
the people in the WDD saw that it had  "show" purpose, and concluded that 
is all that it was for. After interviewing Charles Terhune, I am convinced that 
it served a real purpose in giving the "official" status at any time, and in 
providing a central information repository. [See Charles Terhune, telephone 
interviews with author, Sep.-Oct. 1998, Washington, D.C.; Schriever, 
interview with author, Mar. 4, 1999].   
 
[fn47] Schriever believes that the idea for "Black Saturday" was his own, 
because his philosophy of management was to dig out the problems, and 
not to spend time on the status of things that were going well. He did not 
recall seeing this practice on any other programs at that time. It also seems 
that Schriever's group soon began to use computers for the MCS, with 
Ramo-Wooldridge. This would make it one of the earliest applications of 
computers to management communication.” 257 
 
Johnson’s assertion about Schriever’s early use of computers can also be 
validated from WDD correspondence.  On 25 January 1955, Schriever noted in a 
memo to Colonel Morris (the head of the Air Materiel Command Purchasing Office 
at WDD)  “I wish to make a matter of record the importance of proceeding with the 
computer facility…as rapidly as possible”.  On 28 January in a subsequent memo 
on the same topic to him he added “I have discussed [the construction of the 
computer facility] in detail with Dr Wooldridge…”.258   This is a relatively visionary 
view of the utility of IT in a management environment for early 1955. 
Ballistic	Missiles	–	Schriever,	Policy	and	Strategy		
In this section this thesis looks at Schriever’s attitudes to the policy issues 
relating to nuclear weapons and ICBMs, to his understanding of their broader 
context, and to his recognition of wider issues falling within ‘policy space’ as 
defined in Chapter 1. 
On the date of its creation in September 1947, the USAF was the only 
nuclear-capable armed service in the world, but even by then, the CIA was 
predicting that the USSR would achieve an equivalent capability sometime in the 
1950s.  There was thus no significant debate within the fledgling USAF about the 
need for nuclear weapons, only about the means for their delivery.  The evident 																																																								
256 This is the same Stephen Johnson who’s PhD thesis was referred to in Chapter 3. 
257 Johnson, 'Bernard Schriever and the Scientific Vision',  (Air Power History). 
258 Both memos in Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 6. 
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potential of ballistic missiles had been demonstrated during World War 2, validated 
in US eyes by the Von Karman studies and others, and only the difficulty of 
matching nuclear warhead dimensions and weight to a missile of sufficient range 
alluded to above, hindered their development.   There was, however, the issue of 
which service or services should possess and manage them.  This debate was 
largely fought out during 1945-47 as defence staffs struggled to migrate from a 
wartime to a peacetime (but Cold War focussed) footing, as the USAF emerged 
from the Army’s shadow and, from Schriever’s point of view, as they sought to 
learn the scientific and technical lessons of the preceding conflict.259  
Schriever was evidently unsure about some of the decisions made; he 
made his own feelings clear about both the strategic insights and follies of this 
period during his USAF oral history interview in 1973, when he reflected on the 
balance between nuclear and conventional force development (what he describes 
as equipping for ‘limited wars’) at the time: 
“…during the period right after World War II when we had a monopoly on 
the nuclear bomb and we certainly could deter the rest of the world with our 
strategic forces, we became completely nuclear weapon minded and 
oriented, I think that was quite natural…We really didn't get to seriously 
thinking about [limited wars] until Korea hit us. We had a period where we 
were thinking about air defense against a strike from the Soviet Union and 
our own strategic strike capability against the Soviet Union, and that's about 
all.”260 
 
Schriever had no doubts, however about the need for deterrence.  Later in 
the same interview, he noted: 
“I don't see that there was any arms spiral on account of that. Each country 
had to build its ICBM force.  I think the ICBM plus the submarine launched 
missiles really have created a standoff so to speak in strategic forces, 
which, from the standpoint of an all-out war, has reduced, I think, the 
probability of an all-out war by a very significant factor. The fact that we 
can't knock out their forces and they can't knock out ours without suffering a 
very, very devastating retaliatory strike has a tremendous deterrent 
significance. I said during the time of the ICBM program that the reason I 
feel the ICBM is so important and the program is so important is because 
it's the weapon system that is most likely not to be used. That's what 
deterrence is all about.”261 
 
This is hardly an unexpected view from someone in Schriever’s position; it 
reflects the conventional views on nuclear deterrence from the time.  Even Air 																																																								
259 For a clear exposition of the positions taken by the various parties in this period, see Neufeld, 
Ballistic Missiles  17-23 
260 Bernard Schriever, interviewed by Major Lyn R Officer and Dr James C Hasdorff on 20 June 1973 
for  Office of Air Force History, HQ USAF 
261 Schriever, 'USAF Oral History Interview',  10.. 
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Force Doctrine provided support for Schriever’s wish to develop the ICBM within 
the USAF. Within its 17 (total) pages, the first edition of AFM 1-2 ‘USAF Basic 
Doctrine’ noted:  
“Weapons systems must be constantly evaluated in terms of their capability 
of exercising a decisive influence toward the accomplishment of the 
objective…The effect of the advent of this [modern air] force in the conduct 
of war is to make modern war total – Its threat more imminent, its impact 
more sudden, its expanse more extensive, and destruction exceedingly 
more devastating…The establishment of adequate air forces in-being 
calculated to be decisive is, therefore, the paramount consideration for the 
security of the United States.”262 
 
Essentially, Schriever was pushing on an open door in seeking to develop 
the USAF’s deterrent capability, though fierce arguments nonetheless raged 
internally as to what form that deterrent force should take.  Schriever had, however, 
much more work to do in other areas of policy space.  He had to face the demands 
placed on him to deliver a potentially operational system, not just a piece of 
hardware.  This was felt important enough to be mentioned explicitly in direction 
issued to ARDC and WDD.  Firstly, General White, Vice Chief of Staff of the USAF 
directed Lieutenant General Power, the commander of ARDC: 
1.  The immediate goal of the ICBM effort is the earliest possible attainment 
of an initial operational capability. To achieve this goal, it is essential that a 
Development Plan, specifically encompassing an initial operational 
capability, be implemented with minimum delay. 
 
2. An initial operational capability is envisaged as one which would provide 
a capability of operationally employing prototype weapons during the latter 
phase of the development program. It should include one or two prototype 
operational bases. 
 
3. Initially, the ICBM will probably incorporate certain marginal technical 
features. Early systems undoubtedly will undergo a great deal of revision 
and change as the development progresses. These developmental 
considerations will have direct influence over many aspects of operations, 
training, logistics, etc., as related to the initial operational capability. For 
these reasons, early implementation of the Development Plan mentioned 
above will require flexibility of action and singular direction. It is believed 
this direction can best be provided by your Command.263 
 
General Power then passed on this direction to Schriever: 
 																																																								
262 AFM 1-2 USAF Basic Doctrine,   (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1953) 5-6, 17.  
This first, brief, publication was not well received – for a critique of early USAF doctrine writing efforts, 
see Dr James A Mowbray, 'Air Force Doctrine Problems: 1926-present', Air Power Journal, Vol 9 No 4  
Winter 1995).  However, note that this ‘basic’ (at the time the accepted term for ‘strategic’) publication 
clearly supported possession and maintenance of ‘decisive’ systems such as ICBMs. 
263 Memo dated 18 November 1955 VCAS USAF to Cdr ARDC.  Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 7. 
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My memorandum to you dated 29 July 1954 stated that the primary mission 
of the Western Development Division is, "To manage the development 
program for the Atlas Weapon System, including ground support and the 
development of operational, logistic, and personnel concepts." As a result of 
recent letter instructions received from Headquarters USAF, this mission is 
expanded to include the development of an initial operational capability for 
the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) as soon as practicable.264 
 
Thus he needed to regard the ICBM system as the sum of all its component 
parts and capability, even including initial basing.  Writing in 1957, Schriever 
remarked:  
“from the beginning BMD [the Ballistic Missile Division] had a staff to study 
system operational planning. With the addition of the responsibility for initial 
operational capability, the operational planning staff has expanded 
considerably in both size and mission. From it have come not only the 
operations, personnel, logistics, and installations concepts which furnish the 
guidelines for the organization and employment of the IOC force, but the 
actual detailed plans that are at the present time being put into effect”265 
 
He also noted the innovative nature of these arrangements: 
“Assignment of the initial operational capability to WDD was, therefore, a 
departure from the established procedure of limiting ARDC's responsibilities 
to research, development and testing of new weapon systems.”266 	
He held to this view in later life too.  During an interview in 1977, he noted 
in the context of ICBM development: 
“and, of course, paralleling all of this is the need to train people way in 
advance of when they go in the field, the need to develop your whole 
logistic system, your support system and so forth … supply and 
maintenance and the whole works.” 
 
Schriever also confirmed the equal status of ‘soft’ issues in his eyes by 
noting that he charted their progress alongside hardware development: 
“It was a chart about as long as this room and we had all of the important 
elements in it. The R&D, then we had each one of the major subsystems, 
the logistics. the training - everything in a conceptual. way with objective 
dates on the chart that we would have to achieve certain things in order to 
reach the end objective of having an initial operational capability.”267 
 																																																								
264  Memo dated 14 December 1955, Cdr ARDC to Cdr WDD.  Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 7. 
265 Schriever, 'The USAF Ballistic Missile Program',  (Air University Quarterly) 
266 Bernard Schriever, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, 
New York, NY, 29 January 1957.  Press copy of speech in ‘Earlybird’ Files, Boxes 110-111, National 
Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC. 
267 Both quotes from Bernard Schriever, interviewed by Dr Edgar F Puryear Jr on 29 June 1977 for 
USAF Oral History Program.   
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This highlights that Schriever had to pay particular attention to the non-
hardware aspects of the ICBM program, and that he regarded such issues as 
equally important in fulfilment of USAF strategy and national policy. 
Ballistic	Missiles	–	Schriever	and	Administrative	Action		
The final aspect of Schriever’s management of the Ballistic Missile 
Programme that should be considered is how he shaped administrative practices 
and procedures to achieve an early operational capability.  The areas he 
manipulated to achieve this overlap to a significant extent – they include 
Schriever’s engineering management techniques and use of management 
information systems, which arguably straddle the policy space and the 
administrative space.  The administrative areas worthy of study in this section are 
Schriever’s understanding of ‘concurrency’ (as described in Chapter 3), the action 
taken by Schriever to prioritize the ICBM programme within government, and the 
specific budgetary processes (the ‘Gillette’ procedures also outlined in Chapter 3) 
that provided the means for Schriever to circumvent bureaucracy and achieve 
timely progress.  According to Major General Osmond Ritland, who served as 
Schriever’s deputy on several occasions during his career, these actions were 
presaged by the recommendations of the Von Neumann (Teapot) Committee 
report of 1954.  He wrote:  
“the Von Neumann Committee made certain recommendations, which the 
US Air Force adopted: (1) to take maximum advantage of the scientific and 
technical state of the missile art and advance that art as quickly as possible, 
(2) to proceed with all aspects of the program concurrently, and (3) to 
streamline administrative and control procedures”.268 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, the origins of the term ‘concurrency’ are contested; 
Foote asserts that Schriever was the first to use the term explicitly, and certainly, 
his ‘Combat Ready Aircraft’ study of 1951 is significant in its development and 
application within the USAF.  The Von Neumann recommendation promoted a 
concurrent approach due to the extremely stringent time constraints associated 
with the programme, but Schriever also saw it as a cost-saving measure: 
“I contend that we did the missile programs at a lot less cost under the 
concurrency management approach than if it had been done by the so-
called fly-before-you-buy thing. The indirect costs that are associated with 
these major programs always run as high as direct cost, so you've got an 
even split, and your indirect costs keep going.  There is no way that you can 
save money by having your programs stretched out by two, three or four 																																																								
268 Osmond J Ritland, 'Concurrency', Air University Quarterly, Vol XII No Winter-Spring 1960-61  
1960) at 241 
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years.”269 	
Whatever the ultimate rationale, Schriever supervised the concurrent 
approach to system development throughout his management of ICBMs.  Perhaps 
underlining the budgetary effect he attributed to it, he made specific mention of it 
when briefing the ‘Mahon’ committee (the Department of Defense sub-committee of 
the House Appropriations Committee) on 26 February 1957: “Earliest Attainment – 
REAL OBJECTIVE FORCE IN BEING – How [?], Integration with 
development…Concurrent Planning and Actions”.270  He spoke at greater length on 
the topic in January 1958, when he addressed the Economic Club of New York, 
devoting about half of his remarks to explaining ‘concurrency’ to a business-
oriented (but not defence-focused) audience.  He began by emphasizing the 
difference between concurrency and the customary sequential approach, 
presenting it as a ‘break with tradition’.  He noted that it applied equally to hardware 
development, eschewing “fashion[ing] hand-wrought prototypes before venturing 
into production tooling”, and to integrating the other aspects of the system 
“spending our funds, concurrently, on research, development, testing, production, 
manpower training, base construction and other phases of our program”.  He also 
emphasized the synergistic nature of this concurrency; “all elements act, interact 
and re-act with each other, with constant feedbacks from each element of the cycle 
to all other elements.”271 
Schriever’s endorsement of concurrency thus seems consistent through the 
critical development period of the ICBM.  But that period was critical for other 
defense systems too.  Without prioritization, ICBM development would have fought 
for resources against other programs, and progress would have been slowed to an 
unacceptable extent.  Although the greatest credit for the acceleration and 
prioritization of the ICBM program lay with civilians, Schriever played a key part 
too.   
As noted earlier, much of the impetus for the ICBM program had come from 
the report of the Teapot Committee.  That Committee had been established in 1953 
by the Undersecretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, Trevor 																																																								
269 Schriever, 'USAF Oral History Interview',  11..  Schriever’s response was given in the interview in 
relation to the Minuteman ICBM, which followed Atlas and Titan into service, but its context makes 
clear that he applied it overall to the ICBM programme. 
270 Schriever’s briefing notes for the meeting (emphasis in original), Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 
12. 
271 Bernard Schriever, ‘Equation for Survival: Lead Time equals Leadership’.  Presentation at the 
Annual Meeting of the Economic Club of New York, NY, 21 January 1958.  Press copy of speech in 
‘Earlybird’ Files, Boxes 110-111, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 
Washington DC. 
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Gardner, who then oversaw the revival and acceleration of the Atlas programme, 
including the creation of WDD.  Roughly simultaneously, President Eisenhower 
commissioned a report from the Technological Capabilities Panel, chaired by Mr. 
James Killian, his Special Assistant for Science and Technology into a variety of 
Defense issues.272  When its report emerged in February 1955, it included two 
specific recommendations that would affect Schriever and the affairs of WDD.  
Firstly, it recommended “that the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile 
(with about 5500 nautical mile range and megaton warhead) continue to receive 
the very substantial support necessary to complete it at the earliest possible date”.  
Secondly, it recommended that “There be developed a ballistic missile (with about 
1500 nautical mile range and megaton warhead) for strategic bombardment…”273.  
This in itself said little about the priority of the ICBM, so in July 1955, Gardner, von 
Neumann and Schriever briefed the President on the status of the ICBM 
programme.  The precise content of Schriever’s briefing cannot be determined – 
but he gave an outline of its context in an oral history interview:  
Trev Gardner, and myself and Johnny von Neumann briefed the President 
on the program. ... And the President was aware of the program but had 
never really been given [a] detailed briefing on the thing and the briefing 
was supposed to have taken an hour, I think and we were there for damn 
near two hours with all the questions and everything. The President had 
quite a few questions…Well, the result of that was the program was given 
the highest national priority. … so we got the priority, [Secretary of Defense] 
Wilson approved a streamlined procedure in the Pentagon in which he set 
up the Ballistic Missile Review Committee, … where he himself sat as 
chairman.274  	
Schriever also testified to the importance he attached to the briefing when 
he gave an interview in 1964 to Mr. John Loosbrock, which was included in Dr 
Ernest Schwiebert’s quasi-official history of the ICBM programme.  In response to 
the question “From your own memory of ten years of involvement with the ballistic-																																																								
272 For details of the interaction between the various reports and committees on this topic see Max 
Rosenberg, Plans and Policies for the Ballistic Missile Initial Operational Capability Program 
(Washington DC: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1960) iii-iv 
273 “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack”.   Report by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the 
Science Advisory Committee to the President of the United States (The Killian Committee Report) 
dated 14 February 1955.   Available at www.history.state.gov , accessed 2 May 2015.    
274 Schriever, 'Interview with General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Retd) 29 June 1977',  4-5..  
Although not quoted directly here, Vince Ford’s account of this meeting in his putative memoir of 
ICBM development also provides context.  In particular, Ford noted that Vice-President Nixon took a 
keen interest in the briefing, and advocated for development of a rapid operational capability.  Ford 
additionally cites an encounter between Nixon and Schriever in Nixon’s office in the Capitol where he 
questioned Schriever keenly to improve his understanding of the ICBM programme.  Schriever 
Archive, Box 184, Folder 10 (Ford MS, Dictabelt 123).  Many years later, in 1979, President Nixon 
would offer the post of NASA Administrator to Schriever (among others).  See T. A. Heppenheimer, 
The space shuttle decision: NASA's search for a reusable space vehicle (NASA SP-4221) 
(Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA History Office, Office of 
Policy and Plans, 1999) 115. 
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missile program, is there a single event or a single person that stands out in your 
mind?”, Schriever, after nominating John von Neumann and Trevor Gardner as 
persons of note said: “The one event that stands out is the first time that von 
Neumann and Gardner and I briefed President Eisenhower in July 1955.  This 
briefing led to the establishment of the ballistic-missile program as the number-one 
national-priority effort…”275 
The only significant concern that Schriever had about the outcome of the 
Killian report was the priority it also attached to other projects, most specifically the 
Intermediate Range ballistic missile – this was the 1500-mile range weapon 
mentioned above which would become the Thor.  Schriever had made his initial 
concerns clear in a memo for the record composed in December 1954.  This 
paraphrased a message he had sent that day to General Power, in which he said 
he voiced concern about dilution of industrial expertise and fostering undesirable 
competition for test facilities between various missile projects.  He also feared that 
this expansion of the programme would allow other services, or even the DoD 
centrally, to exert undue influence on its execution.276  He then expanded on these 
ideas in a memo that he probably composed to General Power in September 
1955.277  The author refers to general concerns about ‘interference’ between the 
ICBM and other programmes, specifically mentioning the TBM (tactical ballistic 
missile), though the memo later expands on range and categories of missiles, the 
‘scientific satellite’ and the ‘military satellite’.  He then expands on the nature of that 
interference, seen as most likely to be conflict over access to industrial contractors 
and to test facilities needed by multiple programmes, rather than through dilution of 
management.  Schriever was eventually forced to manage the Thor programme in 
parallel with Atlas; since it could be brought into service quicker than the ICBM it 
served to address US security needs, even though its restricted range meant it 
would have to be based in Europe to threaten targets in the USSR.   
Schriever’s final significant achievement relating to ICBMs in administrative 
terms was the introduction of devolved budgetary arrangements to streamline 
procurement.  He described the pressing need for such arrangements and the 
means he employed to achieve them:  																																																								
275 Schwiebert, A history of the U.S. Air Force ballistic missiles  21-22.  At the time of writing, Dr 
Schwiebert was the official historian of Air Force Systems Command, and Schriever was its 
Commander.   
276 Bernard Schriever Memorandum for Record Interaction of TBMS with ICBM dated 20 December 
1954.  Schriever Archive, Box 3, Folder 5. 
277 The memo, in Schriever Archive, Box 1, Folder 8, is held only in carbon copy and cannot definitely 
be attributed to Schriever – it is addressed to General Power, dated 23 September 1955, but is 
unsigned.  Context and style, however, suggest that it is Schriever’s. 
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“From a management sense, we had to clear away the bureaucracy above 
us or else we never would have been able to get it done. And it was 
obvious to me that after we got the program started, there was no way that I 
could get the job done unless we streamlined the decision making process 
and I made … a flow chart of all the places I had to touch base and get 
decisions made in connection with the program. I brought that briefing in, I 
gave it myself with the little document which showed all the places I had to 
go and briefed Trev Gardner… he said, come on we're going down to see 
Don Quarles. Don Quarles was at that time Assistant Secretary for R&D at 
OSD level …We went down to his office … We didn't have a previous 
appointment.  But Trev went storming in there and said, Don you've got to 
see this and Quarles never sat down. I … went through the whole chart 
exercise and he stood there and didn't say anything … and Quarles said 
we've got to do something about it. So, he said, Trev, you set up a study 
group to go into this thing in detail and come up with specific 
recommendations as to what should be done. Well he set up Hyde Gillette 
… who was a deputy assistant secretary on the financial side  Well we 
loaded the study group pretty much with people who knew and who would 
come up with the right answers and it was called the Hyde Gillette study, 
they came up and it took them a couple of months to do it but it was done 
very rapidly.”278 
 
Jacob Neufeld confirms both their origins and effects: 
“…Gardner established a committee under Hyde Gillette, the Air 
Force deputy for budget.  With Schriever’s guidance, the committee 
devised a set of administrative procedures which made WDD solely 
responsible for planning, programming, and directing ICBM 
development…Overall, these Gillette Procedures cut the number of 
review levels from 42 to 10.”279 
Ballistic	Missiles	and	Schriever	–	an	Assessment		
This account of Schriever and the ICBM began by noting Schriever’s 
reaction to a major milestone in ICBM development – the first successful flight-test 
of an Atlas missile in its intended operational configuration.  Within 18 months, 
Atlas had become an operational system, delivered in accordance with the system 
for operational capability development that Schriever had pioneered.  Although 
Atlas had a relatively short operational life, the Thor IRBM had entered service 
alongside it (actually slightly before it), and the Titan and Minuteman follow-on 
systems represented more operationally useful and long-lived successor systems 
forming the backbone of the US deterrent capability throughout the 1960s and 
early 1970s; Minuteman in a modified form remains in service today.  By any 
objective standard, Schriever succeeded in his task.   
																																																								
278 Schriever, 'Interview with General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Retd) 29 June 1977'. 
279 Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles  120 
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Note also that Schriever understood the technical challenges he faced in 
developing the ICBM, and that within the constraints of the ‘system integrator’ 
construct he implemented, he remained engaged with them as a professional 
engineer, monitoring each issue until it was driven to resolution.  Thus it seems 
reasonable to assert that he oversaw the reduction of technical risk throughout the 
programme. 
Regarding policy and conceptual risk reduction, Schriever did not face 
significant doctrinal or conceptual challenges in introducing the ICBM into USAF 
service; conceptually, it was seen as a highly efficient, high-speed, long-range 
delivery system for nuclear warheads – a ‘more effective bomber’.  He did, 
however, understand and address the challenges of maturing the experimental 
nature of the Atlas into an operational system. This included the challenges of 
addressing personnel and training requirements, infrastructure design and logistic 
support issues alongside technical risk reduction.  He accorded these matters 
equal priority alongside technical development, charting their progress in parallel 
with engineering development and applying his understanding of concurrency as a 
management tool. 
Finally, Schriever shaped the administrative space to enable rapid 
development of the ICBM capability.  He briefed and lobbied at the highest levels to 
gain the prioritization necessary for his project, having shaped the creation of the 
organization that would deliver it.  He then recognized the administrative friction 
that would have precluded timely development, and manoeuvred to introduce the 
Gillette Procedures that gave him the budgetary and administrative autonomy 
needed to deliver Atlas.  Intuitively, he applied pressure along all three of the axes 
of development identified in Chapter 1 and success ensued.  In the second part of 
this chapter, this analysis will be repeated for another successful initiative, the early 
USAF attempts to develop a reconnaissance satellite. 
The	USAF	and	Early	Satellite	Reconnaissance		
It is not the intent in this thesis to analyse the history of American 
Reconnaissance Satellites in detail for its own sake.  Rather, it seeks to explore 
Schriever’s involvement with the technical, conceptual and organisational aspects 
of their development.  However, this analysis will be much easier to follow after a 
short summary of how the USAF entered the space-based reconnaissance era. 
Theodore von Karman’s ‘New Horizons’ report of 1944 laid much of the 
groundwork for later ICBM development, but it says nothing about reconnaissance 
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satellites.  Nevertheless, early interest by the US AAF and USAF is not hard to find.  
The first major study into potential satellites – the 1946 ‘Preliminary Design of an 
Experimental World-Circling Spaceship’ RAND Study – noted that “It should also 
be remarked that the satellite offers an observation aircraft which cannot be 
brought down by an enemy who has not mastered similar techniques”.280  The first 
Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, made a passing reference to satellites in 
his first Annual Report, but this was primarily directed at the potential of a geo-
stationary bombardment satellite.281  At about the same time, General Hoyt 
Vandenberg, then Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, staked the USAF’s claim to 
ownership of military satellites: “The USAF, as the service dealing primarily with air 
weapons -- especially strategic – has logical responsibility for the satellite”.282   
Follow-up RAND studies explored many applications of satellites; the most notable 
for reconnaissance satellites was that produced in 1951 by J E Lipp and others; it 
analyzed possible orbits and observation mechanisms and likely targets.283   This 
work led to a further commission for RAND, which became the Project FEED 
BACK study.284  The FEED BACK study made a firm recommendation that the 
USAF should move to develop a reconnaissance satellite as soon as possible: 
“The over-all conclusion to be drawn …is that reconnaissance data of 
considerable value can be obtained, and that complete coverage of Soviet 
territory with such pictures will result in a major reversal of our strategic 
intelligence posture with respect to the Soviets.  RAND has been working 
on the satellite vehicle for 8 years.  During this period the metamorphosis 
from a feasibility concept to a useful reconnaissance purpose has occurred.  
Cognizance is now being turned over to the Air Force with recommendation 
that the program be continued on a full-scale basis.”285 
 
Submission of Lipp’s report in 1951 had coincided with the USAF 
establishing Air Research and Development Command (ARDC – the ‘parent’ 
organization from which WDD would be established in 1954).  Among the activities 
they undertook during 1951-54 were investigations of how a satellite could be 
powered and of possible sensors for a reconnaissance payload.286  By December 																																																								
280 Project Rand, Preliminary design of an experimental world-circling spaceship  10 
281 Noted in Robert Silverberg, First American Into Space (Derby, CT: Monarch Books, 1961) 23 
282 ‘Statement of Policy for a Satellite Vehicle’ General Hoyt S Vandenberg dated 12 January 1948.  
Reproduced in David N. Spires, Orbital futures : selected documents in Air Force space history 
(Peterson Air Force Base, CO: Air Force Space Command, United States Air Force, 2004) Vol 1, 19-
20 
283 J. E. Lipp et al., R-217 Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance (Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corporation, 1951) 
284 Perry, Origins  33 
285 The RAND Corporation, R-262 Project FEED BACK Summary Report (RAND, 1954) Summary, p 
vii 
286 Perry, Origins  34 
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1953, concerned that multiple studies and research efforts were becoming 
uncoordinated, ARDC brought them together into one programme, initially known 
as Project 409-40, the ‘Satellite Component Study’.  Although there is a clear 
conceptual link from the original RAND report of 1946 to the operational systems 
deployed in the late 1950s, the transition from conceptual study to actual project 
took place in late 1954 and early 1955.   
ARDC issued a Systems Requirement Document for an ‘Advanced 
Reconnaissance System’ in late 1954, followed on 16 March 1955 by the 
publication of ‘General Operational Requirement No 80’ (GOR 80).287 288  Three 
companies submitted proposals in response to this requirement (Lockheed, RCA 
and Martin; a submission was also sought from Bell Aerospace, but they declined 
to submit one).289 The responses formed the basis of ‘Weapons System No 117L’ 
(WS-117L)290 and WDD was assigned responsibility delivering against this 
requirement; there would be technical overlap with the USAF’s missile program, 
but Schriever was already involved and had already anticipated some of the issues 
that would arise in developing a useful capability.  Ultimately, WS-117L would yield 
several satellite systems, of which “Corona” would become the most successful.  In 
1956, ARDC placed a contract with Lockheed for development of WS-117L and the 
programme began in earnest.   
In 1958, WS-117L activity underwent a re-organization with the 
establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).  ARPA was 
formed in February 1958 in order to:		
“[create] a U.S. capability to launch and use spacecraft, after the Soviet 
Sputnik launch. Subsequently it was given a broader charter, to advance 
defense technology in many critical areas and to help the DoD create 
military capabilities of a character that the Military Services and 																																																								
287 There are several sources for publication dates for the various ARS/GOR80/WS-117L documents.  
This section draws on dates in declassified documents published online by the National 
Reconnaissance Office at http://www.nro.mil/foia/declass/WS117L_Records.html .  There are over 
1000 numbered documents published in the WS-117L archive (as at August 2015), and many 
thousands more in related lists, each allocated a unique reference number; they are hereafter referred 
to as ‘NRO WS-117L Archive, Document XX’.  The chronology used here is at NRO WS-117L 
Archive, Document 2.  The 1955 draft of GOR 80 is at …Document 260.  Related NRO archives will 
be referenced in similar ways – all are accessible via the NRO FOIA website. 
288 Nomenclature for the early systems is complicated by these shifts.  ‘ARS’ is used in some 
literature to denote the satellite systems prior to assignment of the WS-117L designation, and (less 
correctly), WS-117L is occasionally taken to refer to the film-return photo reconnaissance satellite 
only, presumably on the grounds that it was the most successful and best known of the early systems.  
Further confusion is then engendered by the ‘Discoverer’ name and cover-story applied to the 
‘Corona’ payload. 
289 “Chronology of Air Force Space Activity” (undated), NRO WS-117L Archive, Document 52, “WS-
117L Development Plan” dated 2 April 1956, NRO WS-117L Archive, Document 52. 
290 The ‘WS’ designation was a fruit of an ARDC study in 1950 by Major General Gordon Saville, 
which provided a stepping stone to concurrency.  See Daso, Architects of American air supremacy  
168  The Atlas missile was ‘WS-107A’. 
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Departments were not able or willing to develop”291	
 
Management of WS-117L was transferred to ARPA, but, since ARPA 
lacked (and was not intended to possess) extensive development facilities, it 
directed the USAF to submit a management plan for WS-117L, and in effect 
became the top-level management agency for the programme, with the USAF 
acting as their executive agent to carry out the activity.292  One of ARPA’s first 
actions (on 28 February 1958, a mere 3 weeks after its formation) was to split the 
Corona photographic reconnaissance satellite off from the overall WS-117L 
programme for separate development.293  Several technical configurations were 
considered for Corona, but eventually development centred on use of the Thor 
IRBM as the first stage, with a booster stage developed by Lockheed with a Bell 
Aerospace rocket motor – collectively known as ‘Agena’ – incorporating the 
reconnaissance payload.  The system worked by exposing conventional 
photographic film, which was then ejected from the main satellite in a small body 
designed to survive re-entry.  This re-entry body deployed a parachute and was 
intended for pick-up in mid-air by a suitably equipped aircraft, which recovered the 
capsule and its film cargo for subsequent development and processing.  The cover 
story promulgated about the satellite was that it was intended to develop a 
capability to return objects from space (in 1958, no satellite had ever returned 
intact from orbit), and utilized the name ‘Discoverer’. 
Prototype Discoverer/Corona launches took place from January 1959 until 
August 1960, carrying a variety of payloads, including an early attempt to fly a 
camera, and two flights carrying experimental sensors for the MIDAS missile-
warning programme.  Eventually, a capsule was successfully recovered from orbit 
on 11 August 1960 (carrying only a US Flag, which was then presented to 
President Eisenhower in the incident described in Chapter 2).  The next Discoverer 																																																								
291 Sidney G. Rees, Richard H. Van Atta, and Seymour J. Deitchman, DARPA Technical 
Accomplishments: An Historical Review Of Selected DARPA Projects Volume 1 (Alexandria, VA: 
Institute for Defense Analyses, 1990) 1 
292 “Chronology of Air Force Space Activities”, NRO WS-117L Archive, Document 52, 6. 
293 Some of the transfer activity was to provide an apparent cover within the USAF for the nature of 
the satellite mission.  Announcements were made about the cancellation of elements of WS-117L 
which provoked indignation and outrage within the USAF.  The programme was then ‘reinvented’, 
ostensibly as a scientific research satellite, with the original (but now covert) reconnaissance mission 
restored.  See Kenneth E Greer, 'Corona', Studies in Intelligence (supplement), Vol  No 17  (Spring 
1973), reproduced in Kevin C Ruffner, Corona : America's first satellite program (CIA Cold War 
records; Washington, D.C.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1995).  For a detailed description of the development of the cover story, and an evaluation of 
alternative Corona configurations, see Robert L Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance:  Volume 
I Corona (National Reconnaissance Office, 1973).  He describes the cover mission and its rationale at 
p xiii-xiv and the various satellite configurations at 34-39. 
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mission (launched on 18 August 1960 with the capsule recovered on 20 August 
1960) yielded useful photographic coverage of the USSR and Corona became an 
operational system. 
ARPA also promoted the other elements of the WS-117L programme, with 
varying degrees of success.  “MIDAS” was an attempt to supplant the warning of 
an incoming ICBM attack on the USA provide by ground-based radar with a 
satellite based launch-warning capability.  This used the infra-red emission from an 
ICBM launch to return a warning to a ground station.  Even though no part of the 
system had to return to Earth, the technical challenges were substantial.  Unlike a 
reconnaissance satellite, which could be launched at a planned time to follow a 
predictable orbital path and ground track against nominated ground targets, an 
infra-red warning satellite had to maintain continuous coverage over a large area 
for an indeterminate time.  Along with the limitations of infra-red sensors, which 
were, and which remain, technically challenging, there were significant engineering 
challenges in designing a surveillance satellite for the intended mission profile.  
MIDAS payloads required the greater performance of an Atlas first-stage, coupled 
with the Agena upper stage developed for Discoverer/Corona.  The first 
(unsuccessful) test launch was attempted on 26 February 1960, and the first 
operational MIDAS mission took place during May-June 1963.  Although it did 
deliver a limited capability, it never fulfilled its design goals, and effective launch 
warning was not achieved until the advent of the ‘Defense Support Program’ 
satellites in the early 1970s.294   
The other WS-117L system – “SAMOS” – had originally seemed more 
promising than Corona.295  It was a reconnaissance system based on onboard 
development of photographic film and subsequent broadcast of a TV picture of the 
negative from space directly to a ground station.  Although in theory this was 
quicker and less accident-prone than the capsule recovery technique, there were 
operational limits imposed by the quality of broadcast achievable.  SAMOS 
launches spanned October 1960 – November 1962, and some carried electronic 
intelligence payloads as well as cameras.  There was a proposed alternative use 																																																								
294 Although focussed on the DSP family, Jeffrey Richelson, America's space sentinels : DSP 
satellites and national security (Modern war studies; Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999) 
provides some background on MIDAS.  A detailed description of the technical and management 
travails of the MIDAS program was given by Dr Rick Sturdevant at the 2010 AIAA Conference.  Rick 
W. Sturdevant, 'AIAA 2010-8812 - From the Pied Piper Infrared Reconnaissance Subsystem to the 
Missile Defense Alarm System: Space-Based Early Warning Research and Development, 1955-
1970', AIAA SPACE 2010 Conference & Exposition (Anaheim, CA, 2010). 
295 This was certainly the view of ARPA policy makers.  See Robert F Piper, WDD-AFBMD-SSD 
Space Programs 1954 - 1966 (AFBMD History Division, 1966) 9 
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for SAMOS capsules, but although in principle more technically advanced as a 
reconnaissance system, SAMOS was outclassed and outperformed by Corona as 
an operational capability.296  
Satellite	Reconnaissance	–	Schriever	and	Technical	Progress		
In many respects, the technical management of the satellite programme 
mirrored that of the ICBM – indeed for much of the period under discussion, they 
also overlapped.  Schriever was appointed to head the WDD in July 1954, and 
delivered the Thor missile into service during the winter of 1958-59; Atlas had 
followed in October 1959.  Both missiles, when adapted for use as launchers, were 
key to the reconnaissance programme as noted above.  But there were significant 
additional challenges posed by satellite operations, and it is reasonable to ask 
about the understanding Schriever had of them.   
The first indication of Schriever’s grasp of his new responsibilities is found 
in a draft memo in his archive.  Markings suggest it was prepared by Schriever for 
Lieutenant General Tommy Power – the commander of ARDC – sometime in late 
1955.  In it, Schriever highlights both the synergies between the ICBM and satellite 
programmes (for example the small increase in velocity required to inject a payload 
into orbit) and the areas where the requirements diverged (specifically highlighting 
controlling the flight-path of the satellite and supplying power for its payload).297 
A further indication of Schriever’s grasp of the technical challenges he 
faced is included in the development plan for WS-117L, which he issued on 2 April 
1956.298  Schriever signed the foreword as Commander of the WDD of Air 
Research and Development Command, and recommended strongly that it be 
adopted.  The plan outlines the specification for a satellite system (at that time 
favouring the TV-readout method of returning pictures).  It includes a proposed 
schedule for construction and test, a list of facilities required and estimated costs.  
A few specific examples from this document will emphasize Schriever’s grasp of 
the technical challenges. 
Schriever envisaged a graduated development of WS-117L capability.  
There was plainly an operational imperative to deliver a limited reconnaissance 
capability as quickly as possible, but he also envisaged what mature systems could 
deliver and outlined a reasoned and graduated means of achieving it.  He saw, 																																																								
296 For details of the alternative use, see Chapter 5 p126 et seq in this thesis. 
297 Memorandum for Lt General Power, “Interactions Amongst Ballistic Missile and Satellite 
Programs.”  Schriever Archive, Box 1 Folder 2. 
298 NRO WS-117L Archive, Document 858. 
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overall, 8 programs nested within WS-117L.  Program I was solely experimental, 
intended to gather environmental data and prove concepts, but Program II would 
yield “…a Visual Reconnaissance [system] with a capability of mapping…features 
at a ground resolution of 100 ft and a locational accuracy of one-half mile…”.  
Program III would introduce an electronic intelligence capability (referred to at the 
time generically as a ‘Ferret’ capability), Program IV would be a more accurate 
photographic system and Program V an advanced ‘Ferret’.  Program VI would be 
the definitive TV-based system (Program II had admitted the possibility of a film-
return system yielding quicker results), Program VII was intended to be the first 
infra-red missile launch system and Program VIII a surveillance (i.e. wide-area 
coverage) ‘Ferret’.299  The plan also described in detail the various sub-systems – 
the ‘spaceframe’, propulsion systems, an auxiliary power supply to run the sensor 
payload (this would be tailored to the needs of the varying sensors, and envisaged 
eventual development of solar cells to charge batteries, and on-board nuclear 
power generation for higher-power systems).  He noted the challenges of guidance 
systems, and that the capability required was currently beyond the capacity of the 
ICBM guidance-system programme, and finally outlined the various sensor 
payloads that would yield the required target data.300  He had scoped the potential 
of the Thor and Atlas first-stage launchers (although at this stage the choice of the 
upper-stage booster was left open, he had a clear idea of the performance it would 
need to deliver).  Lastly he outlined the launch flight path, including a calculation of 
the impact point for the discarded first-stage and envisaged the orbital altitudes 
best suited to data collection and rebroadcast.301  Although it is most unlikely that 
Schriever developed the entire plan personally, his foreword to it indicates his 
technical understanding of the challenges it contained.  Two days after he issued it, 
he began a series of briefings on the WS-117L programme, speaking at the Air 
Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral on 5 April, discussing aspects of it 
with the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation on 10 April and briefing the Science 
Advisory Board (the von Neumann Committee) on 12 April; this final meeting was 
attended by General Nathan Twining, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force.  
Comment on these events in Schriever’s diary gives some insight on the content of 
these briefings.  For the SAB briefing, he had to balance technical detail with 
																																																								
299 Schriever envisaged these programs as forming an ‘Experimental’ system (Program I), a ‘Pioneer’ 
System (II-III), an ‘Advanced’ System (IV-V) and an ‘Ultimate’ System (VI-VIII).  Ibid, Pages B-7 and 
C-2 
300 Ibid, Page B-9. 
301 Ibid, Pages B-5, B-6. 
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explanation of his intended management strategy for the programme, but his notes 
again make clear his grasp of the technical challenges he faced.302 
Subsequent diary entries reveal both Schriever’s continuing technical 
awareness of WS-117L and his personal involvement in its progress.  On 28 or 29 
May 1958 (there is a one-day discrepancy of dates in his diary), a briefing was 
delivered to the National Security Council Planning Board about WS-117L.  The 
diary includes an outline of a 117L briefing by Schriever, which covers the multiple 
collection strategies of the overall WS-117L programme (visual/photographic, 
‘ferret’ and IR missile launch detection), likely detection ranges, revisit times or 
coverage areas for the various systems and the operational advantage they would 
confer.303   At the end of 1958, he was involved in chartering a scientific review of 
WS-117L (the precise nature of the problem that provoked it is unclear, other than 
that from the identity of those involved – ‘Din’ Land and Dick Leghorn, who’s work 
in reconnaissance is considered further below – it probably originated with the 
photographic payload); Schriever’s belief in the urgency of the situation is clear.304  
Just prior to assuming command of ARDC, in March 1959, he is taking an interest 
in the progress of Discoverer/Corona launches.  He notes on 16 March 1959 the 
delivery of a ‘Support Package (Photographic)’ for Discoverer at Point Arguello – 
this may well be the payload for Discoverer 4, the first to carry a camera, launched 
from Point Arguello (later renamed Vandenberg AFB) on 25 June 1959.305  With his 
appointment to command ARDC in April 1959, his diary entries and 
correspondence on reconnaissance issues moves to a more managerial focus, but 
it is clear that Schriever understood the technical aspects of satellite design and 
development in a very similar way to his understanding of ICBMs. Both SAMOS, 
with its reliance on downloading imagery, and MIDAS with its reliance on immature 
sensors would be hard to describe as successes; MIDAS eventually matured into 
DSP, and SAMOS was simply overshadowed by the unexpected success after 
initial difficulties of Corona, but Schriever’s understanding of the issues involved is 
clear. 
																																																								
302 Schriever Archive, Box 4 Folder 11. 
303 Schriever Archive, Box 5 Folder 7. 
304 Diary entry 6 December 1958, Schriever Archive, Box 5 Folder 10. 
305 Diary entry 16 March 1959, Schriever Archive, Box 5 Folder 13. 
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Satellite	Reconnaissance	–	Schriever,	Doctrine,	Policy	and	Strategy		
Perhaps surprisingly, Bernard Schriever faced significant conceptual and 
doctrinal challenges in introducing his ideas for strategic reconnaissance into the 
USAF.  An indication of the problem can be found in the USAF’s foundational 
doctrine.  At the instant of its foundation, the USAF employed doctrine codified 
during World War 2.  Army Field Manual FM 100-20 ‘Command and Employment 
of Air Power’ had been written in 1942-43 based on experiences of air campaigning 
in North Africa.306  This document, unsurprisingly given its origins, dwells on the 
integration of air and land offensive operations.  It admits the possibility of 
(strategic) aerial reconnaissance, but says little about its practicalities.307  After the 
formation of the USAF, it took until 1953 for it to supplant FM 100-20.  The first 
(1953) edition of the manual ‘United States Air Force Basic Doctrine’ makes barely 
a mention of the potential of Air Reconnaissance or Surveillance, noting simply that 
“[the air medium]…permits unparalleled observation of any point on the earth's 
surface”, spending the rest of the document largely emphasising the merits of 
destruction of the enemy and his equipment.308  Subsequent revisions (in 1954, 
1955 and 1959) made little change to this – in fact, the 1959 edition added 
emphasis to the importance of ‘firepower delivery’.309  Yet outside the formal 
doctrine process, informed thinking had already begun to reconsider the role of 
strategic reconnaissance in the Cold War.310  Writing in 1963 for a reissue of a 
1940s collection of papers, Amrom Katz of the RAND Corporation outlined the 
problem elegantly: 
…reconnaissance is essentially uncivilized.  We have no current literature, 
no standing references, no time-proved and -tested philosophy. 
It is not that we do not write. We ozalid, multilith, photostat, and print - we 
staple, bind, and fold.  We deal with documents of all sizes, shapes, and 
formats.  We give them "Standard Distribution" and we proceed immediately 
to file, lose, retire, and bury these thoughts, proposals, and discussions. 
																																																								
306 Mowbray, 'Doctrine Problems',  (Air Power Journal) 
307 FM 100-20 defers consideration of reconnaissance to a subsidiary publication – FM 1-20, which in 
turn places strategic reconnaissance (which it refers to as ‘Air Reconnaissance for Air Force Aviation’) 
among the range of options, without ever admitting its primacy. 
308 United States Air Force, AFM 1-2 United States Air Forces Basic Doctrine (Department of the Air 
Force, 1953) 7.  The third edition (1955) rewords the line on reconnaissance, but again subordinates 
it to other roles. 
309 Jonny R Jones, Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine 1947-1992 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
University Press CADRE Papers, 1997) 8, 48. 
310 It should not be imagined that the USAF was ignorant of the purpose and requirement for strategic 
reconnaissance; plainly both conventional and nuclear bombing campaigns during World War 2 had 
required appropriate reconnaissance to develop targets and plan missions.  However, there is no 
evidence from doctrine that the AAC ever considered gathering such information as a core role of Air 
Power.  
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As a result, anyone who chooses or is forced to enter this field of 
reconnaissance has to go through agonizing rediscovery, redefinition, 
resifting, and regurgitation of old thoughts and basic ideas. Restatement, 
not reaction, is the order of the day.311 
 
A key thinker in this respect was Colonel Dick Leghorn, closely followed in 
USAF circles by Colonel Richard Philbrick.  Both contributed papers to Katz’s work 
cited above.  In Leghorn’s opinion, perhaps due to its roots in the Army Air Corps, 
and the associated emphasis on Close Air Support in many campaigns during 
World War 2, reconnaissance as a role was seen as essentially tactical in nature, 
being commonly associated with immediate post-strike battle damage 
assessment.312   
Leghorn had served in Europe as a (tactical) reconnaissance pilot in the 
AAF, having been called up for service when working for Eastman Kodak.  He was 
intent on returning to them when he was demobilized, but was persuaded to return 
to active service in 1946 to direct the photography of the US Atomic Bomb tests 
(Project CROSSROADS) at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific.  Experience of the destructive 
potential of nuclear weapons, together with access to the post World War 2 
assessment of bombing campaigns, convinced Leghorn of the emerging 
importance of true strategic reconnaissance.313  He outlined his ideas in an address 
at the opening of the Boston University Optical Research Laboratory in December 
1946.  Although much of his thought had gone into relatively technical 
improvements in aerial reconnaissance, such as merging radar and photographic 
information, he also spoke more generally about the importance of strategic 
information gathering.  Speaking about proposed research objectives for 
reconnaissance, he said, “strategic operations will dominate the military scene and 
will assume the position of prime importance…long-range reconnaissance of any 
place on earth from established bases will be a necessity”.314  Although he had not 																																																								
311 Amrom H. Katz, Selected readings in aerial reconnaissance : a reissue of a collection of papers 
from 1946 and 1948 (P-2762) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1963) vi  'Introduction to the 
1963 Edition'. 
312 Leghorn outlined these ideas in conversation with the author at a social meeting in April 2011.  He 
expanded on Schriever’s interpretation of them, and recorded these ideas more formally in an 
interview with Mr Neil Sheehan.  See Footnote 342 immediately below. 
313 For details of Leghorn’s World War 2 service record and subsequent recalls to active duty, see the 
biographical summary published online by US Air Force Space Command 
(http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/biographies/bio.asp?id=9942 accessed 2 February 2015).  For details 
of the influence of his experiences at Bikini Atoll, see R Cargill Hall, 'From Concept to National Policy: 
Strategic Reconnaissance in the Cold War', Prologue: the Journal of the [US] National Archives, Vol 
28 No 2 - Summer  1996) 
314 Richard S Leghorn, 'Objectives for Research and Development in Military Aerial Reconnaissance', 
in Amrom H. Katz (ed.), P-2762 Selected Readings in Aerial Reconnaissance: A Reissue of a 
Collection of Papers from 1946 and 1948 (Santa Barbara, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), 54. 
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yet foreseen the potential of space-based systems, he was outlining the 
circumstances in which they would be useful.  In 1947, he was talking to Schriever 
about similar matters.  He recounted their meeting in an interview with Neil 
Sheehan, which contributed to Sheehan’s biography of Schriever: 
“Leghorn said Schriever was one of a few in the Air Force and Government 
who saw the need for aerial and satellite reconnaissance.  He said when 
Schriever summoned him to Washington, he [Schriever] drew a ‘graph’ of 
four squares on a sheet of paper in his Pentagon office. The top two 
squares represented the USA, and the bottom two the USSR. BAS put ‘P+’ 
in left top square because, he said, US clearly outweighed the Soviets in 
power. But then put ‘I-‘ in right top square because he said the US was 
lacking gravely in information about the Soviets; their country was closed to 
us, with little of use published or broadcast, very difficult to penetrate with 
agents, and thus extremely hard to get any reliable intelligence. In the 
bottom left square Schriever wrote ‘P-‘ for the Soviets because they were 
behind the US in power, but then wrote ‘I+’ for them in the bottom right 
square because they able to learn so much about us -- our society was 
open, they were able to penetrate with agents, much of use was published 
and broadcast. Leghorn's mission, Schriever was thus saying, was to come 
up with methods of reconnaissance that would overcome the information 
gap.”315 
 
Leghorn returned to industry, initially working at Kodak, but in 1951 was 
recalled to active duty in connection with the Korean War.  He was soon working 
indirectly for Schriever, who by now was Assistant for Air Force Development 
Planning.  Initially their work centred on forthcoming reconnaissance aircraft such 
as the U-2, which Schriever was involved in developing; Leghorn was unconvinced 
of the practicality of satellites as reconnaissance platforms, although Richard 
Philbrick (mentioned briefly above) had been an early advocate for them, and had 
been in regular contact with Leghorn.316  Hall asserts this endured until Sputnik was 
launched (“only the launch of an artificial Earth satellite in 1957 prompted them 
[Leghorn and ‘Din’ Land] to change their minds and actively support direct 
development of reconnaissance satellites”).317  A more nuanced change of heart, in 																																																								
315 Transcribed and expanded by the author from Sheehan’s verbatim notes at the Library of 
Congress.  Sheehan Archive, Box 7; the interview between Sheehan and Leghorn took place on 15 
November 1996 at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington DC.  Col Leghorn recounted 
substantially the same story in conversation with the author in April 2011, at which point he indicated 
the 1947 date for the encounter. 
316 See Richard  Philbrick, 'Trends in Reconnaissance - a paper presented to the reconnaissance 
symposium (Topeka, KS, Tuesday, November 23, 1948)', in Amrom H. Katz (ed.), P-2762 Selected 
readings in aerial reconnaissance : a reissue of a collection of papers from 1946 and 1948 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1948).  Katz footnotes Philbrick’s remark about satellite 
reconnaissance specifically at page 4. 
317 Hall, 'Concept to National Policy',  (Prologue: the Journal of the [US] National Archives).  Leghorn 
had participated in an Air Staff study (the ‘Beacon Hill’ study/report) in 1951-52 seen by some as 
another counter to early enthusiasm for satellite reconnaissance.  It plainly identified the need for 
strategic reconnaissance – often referred to in the literature as ‘pre-D-Day’ reconnaissance, but did 
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conjunction with Schriever, is claimed by Robert Perry.318  However the change of 
mind occurred, the combination of Leghorn and Schriever’s shared enthusiasm for 
strategic reconnaissance, and Schriever’s exposure to research work coming from 
the RAND Corporation gave him the impetus to advocate for satellite 
reconnaissance as soon as the establishment of the ICBM programme made 
launchers an accessible goal; in doing so, however, he was moving well beyond 
established doctrine.   
A rare piece of evidence of Schriever’s persistent interest in satellite 
reconnaissance survives from 1951.  In the wake of a RAND corporation proposal 
for further research and development on satellite reconnaissance, Schriever 
arranged a conference on 16 February 1951 to determine the types of information 
from a satellite that would be useful to end users; the USAF Director of Intelligence, 
Major General Cabell, responded directly to Schriever with a list of indicative 
targets.319  It seems likely that Schriever and Leghorn captured their shared ideas 
during January 1953 in the Development Planning Objectives for Intelligence and 
Reconnaissance.  Sadly, no contemporary historians seem to have been able to 
locate a copy of the finalized Objective, and it is possible that no copy survives, but 
Cargill Hall cites Leghorn’s description of it to him in 1995 correspondence: “The 
DPO called for high-altitude balloons and eventually Earth satellites to provide 
wide-area search of the Soviet Union, with close-area surveillance provided by high 
altitude airplanes and second-generation satellites”.320  Schriever departed the 
Pentagon shortly afterwards to take command of WDD and the early ICBM work, 
but the establishment of the Eisenhower administration during 1953 and the 
subsequent transfer of responsibility for satellite development to WDD in 1955 
must have been welcome to Schriever.  It certainly guaranteed that development 
was entrusted to someone who was already persuaded of their utility. 
Subsequent activity by Schriever ensured that other non-equipment lines of 
development were also pursued enthusiastically.  The WS-117L development plan 																																																								
not believe that satellites would be practical soon enough to be a useful contributor, preferring instead 
more advanced aircraft and exploration of balloon platforms.  See Merton E.  Davies and William R. 
Harris, Rand's role in the evolution of balloon and satellite observation systems and related U.S. 
space technology (R-3692) (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corp., 1988) 30-39 
318 Perry asserts a connection to Leghorn’s support for ‘inspected disarmament’, and a belief that the 
Soviets would not cooperate in the necessary inspection regime.  See Perry, History, Vol 1  10-11, 14. 
319 Memo from Director, USAF Intelligence to Colonel Schriever dated 17 March 1951 “Research and 
Development on Proposed RAND Satellite Reconnaissance Report”.  The National Security Archive, 
George Washington University, Washington DC, Bernard Schriever collection. 
320 Hall, 'Concept to National Policy',  (Prologue: the Journal of the [US] National Archives).  Hall 
notes the probable loss of the DPO in footnote 41.  Schriever made a direct reference to it in an 
interview with Neil Sheehan in connection with Sheehan’s biography of him – Sheehan noting: “Never 
formally put out DPO on Reconnaissance.  Wanted to hold close. Was highly classified”  Sheehan 
Archive, Box 3. 
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referenced above details not only the technical specification of the platform, but 
also looks at the required ground infrastructure, such as locations for down-link 
stations for reception of images transmitted by the satellite (in the SAMOS concept 
of operations) and also considers what analytic capability might be needed within 
the Intelligence staff to process the new information gained, and the training 
requirements for personnel assigned to the programme.  Throughout, Schriever 
was convinced of the importance of reconnaissance activity to the USAF, and the 
potential of satellites in supplying a significant part of it.  Cautious advocacy and 
liaison between the RAND corporation and the Pentagon, for example in the 
formulating of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance DPO, served to put him in the 
best place to deliver the capability once others were persuaded of the need. 
Satellite	Reconnaissance	–	Schriever	and	Administrative	Action		
When WDD were charged with developing the ARS in 1955, Schriever’s 
first concern was that it should not interfere with ICBM and IRBM development.  
Within that stipulation, the programme could be run on similar lines to the 
concurrent ICBM programme.  He made his concerns clear in a memo to General 
Power on 23 September 1955, in particular the need for satellite and ICBM 
programmes to share specialized test facilities such as engine test stands, of which 
only a few existed nationally, and the effect of proliferating programmes on the 
ability of industry to retain sufficient qualified personnel – another national 
shortage.  He used this latter concern to justify defending the USAF primacy in 
both missile and space systems development; if programmes were dispersed 
between the Services, the necessary coordination with the industrial base would 
become much harder.321  However, two major administrative factors were about to 
complicate Schriever’s delivery of an effective satellite reconnaissance capability.  
The first was a serious clash between the uniformed and civilian management of 
the Air Force relating to funding, the second was the interposition of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) as a new layer of programme management. 
Secretary Donald Quarles was installed as Secretary of the Air Force on 14 
August 1955, having previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Development.  He was also the first Secretary to come from an 
overtly technical background, and could thus be hoped by the Air Force to be 
sympathetic to aspirations for acquisition of advanced weapons and systems such 																																																								
321 Memorandum for Gen Power – ‘ICBM-TBM Interference and Dilution of Manpower’  Schriever 
Archive, Box 1 Folder8.  The title suggests concern about interference between the ICBM and other 
missiles, but the main text makes clear that it applies to satellites too. 
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as satellites.322  Yet almost immediately, he was issuing direction to reduce such 
activity and extend development times, principally to serve the needs of the 
Eisenhower Administration’s budgetary policies.  While reference to the capability 
of satellites to deliver ‘pre D-Day intelligence’ might have played to the President’s 
wartime experiences, his drive to achieve savings in defence expenditure, which 
strongly influenced his second term in office, led to public clashes between the 
Administration and the USAF Senior Leadership.  (The resignation of Trevor 
Gardner as Assistant Secretary for Research and Development mentioned in 
Chapter 3 was a direct result of the public disagreements played out around this 
issue).  In 1957, Quarles turned his attention to the USAF satellite programme.   In 
the NRO Archive of WS-117L documents there is a 4-page summary of the 
influence of Sputnik on WS-117L activity; although its context and date are unclear, 
it summarizes the situation succinctly, firstly outlining the relatively steady progress 
made up until October 1956 (when the WS-117L contract was awarded to 
Lockheed).  It then describes Secretary Quarles’ instructions of March 1957: “1.  
Slow down.  2. No orbital testing prior to January 1960.  3.  Conduct development 
along conventional lines”.323  These restrictions were enforced by the withholding of 
funds from the program. 
The best description of how Schriever circumvented these restrictions and 
delivered an operational capability during 1960 is in an NRO history of Corona.  At 
least two of the authors were personally involved in the Corona program (and were 
well known to Schriever).  One of them (Colonel Oder) played a leading role in 
management.  The history was written at a high classification in 1987 before 
declassification in 1997.324  Schriever first successfully persuaded AF 
Headquarters to sustain WS-117L funding for the remainder of the financial year 
while he sought a better solution.  He then tried unsuccessfully to adapt WS-117L 
as a reserve system for the troubled ‘Vanguard’ scientific satellite being developed 
by the US Navy.  This attempt foundered too on the double grounds of breaching 
budgetary ceilings and compromising the administration’s ‘Space for Peace’ policy, 
but it laid the bedrock for the ultimately successful tactic.  The scheme, known as 																																																								
322 George M. Watson, The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force 1947-1965 (Washington DC: 
Center for Air Force History, 1993) 149 
323 NRO WS-117L Archive, Document 988.  The document is anonymous, though a handwritten note 
on the front page states ‘Done for Col Evans, SSD’; it must date from after November 1959, and 
might form the outline for an essay, or possibly a speech.  It includes further analysis of the influence 
of ARPA. 
324 Frederic C E Oder, James C Fitzpatrick, and Paul E Worthman, The Corona Story (Sunnyvale, 
CA: National Reconnaissance Office, 1987).  Col Oder had been Schriever’s head of the WS-117L 
program within WDD, and Col Worthman had headed development of the aerial recovery system 
developed for the balloon-based overflight reconnaissance system known as Project GENETRIX. 
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‘Second Story’, was devised principally by Col Frederic Oder, who worked on 
Schriever’s staff in the WS-117L office; it is summarized succinctly in The Corona 
Story:  
 “It involved an announced cancellation of the WS-117L program, an 
overt establishment of an Air Force scientific satellite project as a follow-on 
to the marginally-limited Vanguard, and covert reestablishment of the 
reconnaissance program under overall cognizance of the CIA, with the 
Western Development Division retaining technical management 
responsibilities.”325 
 
The authors also make clear that Schriever was intimately involved with this 
plan from the outset: 
“The ‘Second Story; proposal had been entirely concocted within 
Schriever’s own organization…Schriever scheduled a formal meeting with 
State and CIA for late September, by which time he planned to have the 
‘Second Story’ proposal in a form suitable for official submission.”326 
Schriever thus proposed trading ultimate ownership of the programme for 
CIA sponsorship, and an opportunity to remain involved in its technical direction.  
Before this plan could be carried out, however, the Soviets launched Sputnik 1 and 
some of the objections to developing military satellite systems evaporated.  Oder et 
al recount that initially, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General White, was told 
to plan on accelerating development of the reconnaissance satellite in response.  
The setback of disapproval from Donald Quarles and James Douglas (Deputy 
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force respectively) was then 
overcome via a direct appeal to the Secretary of Defense, and an adequate level of 
funding was secured.327 
Management issues were further complicated during 1958-59 by the 
interposition of ARPA as the military agency responsible for advanced research 
and development.  ARPA initially took over direction of the military satellite 
programme, although the ‘Second Story’ plan took Corona out of their hands.  
Schriever and his colleagues seem never to have had a positive opinion of this 
Agency; in the memo prepared for Col Evans detailed above, the assessment of 
them is scathing.  ARPA’s influence is summarized:  	
“ARPA Period of Management 19 May 1958 – 17 Nov 1959…constant 
requirements for new development plans…period characterized by 
																																																								
325 Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The Corona Story 12. 
326 Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The Corona Story  12 
327 Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The Corona Story  9-14 
		 118	
instability, indecision, rapid changes in objectives and funding”328  
 
In February 1959, two of Schriever’s staff shared views on the same issue:  
“I have no hope that ARPA can be turned into a useful activity of any kind... 
Somehow we should be able to make use of the fact that industrial interest 
has governed many of their actions to an extent almost – if not quite – 
illegal.”329 	
That Schriever shared at least elements of this view is made clear in a letter 
he sent to General White (Chief of Staff of the Air Force), also during 1959, 
complaining about ARPA’s influence on elements of the reconnaissance satellite 
effort.  It is in essence a summary of the complaints alluded to above about rapid 
changes in objectives and funding, noting their effect on morale among the staff, 
and the wasteful nature of expending money on elements of the programme only to 
have them re-prioritized or abandoned before completion.  He concluded by asking 
“that these matters be brought to the attention of ARPA …and that every effort be 
made to provide greater program stability in the future…”330 Some of this confusion 
probably arose from the need to publicly cancel elements of the satellite 
programme then covertly reinstate them – a fact which was not always made clear 
to those criticizing ARPA.  Schriever, however plainly saw the need for stable 
management as key to delivering effective systems.  This view was also held 
outside Schriever’s immediate circle; a similar sentiment can be found in an NRO 
summary of the period:  
“The only management problems of any consequence arose well outside 
the program structure, chiefly from ARPA‘s efforts to re-orient the covert 
program (now called CORONA) toward some rather variable objectives of 
its own choosing.”331 	
As noted above, Schriever also incorporated elements of concurrency in 
Corona development; the direct appeal to the Secretary of Defense and the 
sponsorship of the CIA implied in ‘Second Story’ principles assured the programme 
of priority status, and the reconnaissance payloads could be developed in parallel 
with the missiles which were being adapted to become the first generation of 
space-launch vehicles.   
																																																								
328 NRO WS-117L Archive, Document 988 
329 ‘Memorandum for Colonel Curtin: ARPA and NASA’ by Colonel William Sheppard dated 7 
February 1959.  Schriever Archive, Recently Declassified Documents folder. 
330 Letter General Schriever to General White dated 1 August 1959, Schriever Archive, Recently 
Declassified Documents folder. 
331 Robert L Perry, Management of the National Reconnaissance Program 1960-1965 (Langley, VA: 
The National Reconnaissance Office, 1969) 8 
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Reconnaissance	Satellites	and	Schriever	–	an	Assessment		
Once again, Schriever managed the development of a technically 
challenging programme by paying attention to each of three strands of 
development: managing technical progress, developing conceptual maturity and 
assuring adequate management structures.  His grasp of the technical issues at 
hand permeate much of his correspondence and diary entries, and although as in 
the ICBM programme he was an engineering manager rather than a working 
engineer, he plainly had a sound grasp of the principles involved.  He also 
appreciated the non-equipment challenges he faced; his advocacy of the 
importance of access to information, dating back to 1947 and his initial foray into 
scientific and technological development is noteworthy both for its originality and 
for the succinctness with which he expressed it.  Finally, he managed to chart a 
path through the management obstacles and uncertainty caused by the 
overt/covert duality of parts of the programme, the creation of ARPA and its 
involvement in satellite development and the changing priority attached to the 
programme at various times due to budgetary and political considerations. 
In the next two chapters, this thesis examines instances where Schriever 
was unable to maintain progress along the three axes of development activity, and 
the fates that befell programmes where this happened.
		 120	
 CHAPTER 5 – MANNED SPACEFLIGHT: A PET 
PROJECT 
	
Introduction		
Chapter 4 looked at two specific projects where Schriever successfully led 
the development of an advanced capability through attention to three lines of effort: 
technical risk reduction, improving conceptual maturity and gaining administrative 
freedom of manoeuvre.  Although it is impossible to prove categorically that it was 
only by attention to those factors that Schriever led the projects to successful 
conclusions, it is unmistakeable that he paid attention to them and ultimately 
delivered a useful capability.  In this chapter and the next, this thesis considers the 
opposite case; two aspects of military spaceflight where Schriever held strong 
views as to their value, and in each case took action to develop them, but also in 
each case with at best limited success.  It will explore which of the three key 
aspects he worked for, and which he either ignored or paid insufficient attention to.  
In each case, it will show which aspect contributed to the failure.  Again it is not 
conclusive proof that only these factors guarantee success for a project, but 
together, the two analyses will suggest their importance.  In this chapter, it looks at 
Schriever and his advocacy for military manned spaceflight; in Chapter 6, it will 
look at space weaponization, and in particular, orbital bombardment systems. 
Military	Manned	Spaceflight		
Proposals for military manned spaceflight arose from the same sources as 
the coincident civil space programme; very early awareness of the possibilities of 
orbital motion, growing understanding of the challenges of sustaining human life in 
such circumstances and finally detailed technical study of their implications.  The 
1946 RAND report devoted a chapter to consideration of whether their analysis 
(aimed at proving the practicalities of an unmanned satellite) would also validate 
manned spaceflight possibilities, concluding in the affirmative.332  Formal civil 
space planning was emerging at the same time.  Wernher von Braun had indicated 
possibilities in the first debrief he gave to Allied intelligence officers in May 1945, 
not quite 3 weeks after the German surrender; in this he outlined his view that the 																																																								
332 Project Rand, Preliminary design of an experimental world-circling spaceship  Chapter 14, pp 211-
12 
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state of the rocket and missile art in 1945 resembled that of the manned bomber at 
the end of World War 1, and that equivalent rapid growth in spaceflight possibilities 
could be anticipated.333  As was noted in Chapters 1 and 2, von Braun’s earliest 
work in the United States was in the service of the US Army, rather than of the Air 
Force; additionally, the circumstances of the late 1940s rewarded a certain 
discretion on the part of the Paperclip cadre – there were plenty of senior officials 
in the United States who felt that too many Germans had entered the United 
States, or failing that, that the ‘wrong’ ones had been allowed in.  As Tom Bower 
notes: 
“…the military wanted the Germans to be given immigration visas so that 
they and their families could eventually become American 
citizens….attempts inside the State Department to mediate between 
conflicting officials had failed…[State Department] feared that for America 
to admit indoctrinated Nazis, while publicly demanding that Argentina and 
other Latin American countries should expel Nazis…would place the 
department in an indefensible position…But the War Department had no 
time for State Department bickering.”334 
 
Annie Jacobsen provides more detail both on the attempts to indict various 
members of the Paperclip cadre, and on their conditions and morale while settling 
in the United States.335  Although she notes that they assimilated into the pleasures 
of life in America relatively quickly, there were still limits to the degree of public 
profile they could adopt.  Ten years later, there would be far fewer constraints on 
what they could do, and von Braun would play his part as an advocate for military 
manned spaceflight, but at this stage, their public personae were more closely 
controlled. 	
The USAF recognised that many of the particular challenges of manned 
spaceflight would come from the nature of the human occupants, rather than the 
dynamic aspects of orbital flight.  In 1948, the Air Force School of Aviation 
Medicine at San Antonio, Texas, arranged a pioneering panel discussion on 
‘Aeromedical Problems of Spaceflight’, and in 1949, the Air Force established a 
Department of Space Medicine within the Aeromedical Laboratory at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, with Hubertus Strughold as Head of Department, and 																																																								
333 Neufeld, Von Braun  204-5 
334 This is a grossly simplified account of the complex conflict between the State Department, the 
Justice Department and the Department of Defense that occupies most of Chapter 10 of Bower, 
Paperclip . 
335 Jacobsen also provides an account of the various attempts to investigate Paperclip personnel for 
war crimes during the late-1940s – see Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip , Chapters 12-14. 
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subsequently Professor of Space Medicine.  Subsequent symposia and other 
events arranged by this Department and related organisations testify to an 
enduring interest in the challenges of human spaceflight, culminating in Schriever 
appearing with von Braun, Dornberger and Strughold at a Symposium in 1958.336   
The next formal interest in manned military spaceflight was probably the 
1956 announcement by Air Research and Development Command of a study into a 
‘Manned Ballistic Rocket Research System’.  This study spawned a plethora of 
follow up studies and proposals.337  Eventually, these formed a basis for the 
activities of the ‘Man-in-Space Task Force’ at Air Force Ballistic Missile Division 
HQ.  During 1958, they devised a multi-phase approach known as the ‘Air Force 
Manned Military Space System Development Plan’ to enable their stated goal of a 
manned lunar mission.338  The first phase of this plan was referred to as ‘Man-in-
Space Soonest’, often abbreviated ‘MISS’.  It envisaged progress through 
unmanned, then primate-occupied and then man-carrying flights in Earth orbit.  It 
would be followed by three later phases spanning a developed orbital spacecraft, 
unmanned lunar reconnaissance and manned flights first around and then onto the 
lunar surface.  Notwithstanding the national imperatives to achieve parity with, and 
then superiority over, the Soviet Union (who had achieved orbital flight with Sputnik 
1 just as this planning activity ramped up) in the ‘Space Race’, the reliance on 
anticipated developments of advanced launch boosters, including use of exotic 
propellants, must have made the intended lunar landing in 1965 appear somewhat 
optimistic even then.   
The creation of NASA out of NACA in 1958 and the award to them of the 
national manned spaceflight programme did little to dampen the USAF’s 
enthusiasm for spaceflight, although in the first instance, the MISS programme was 
folded into the NASA Mercury programme.  As well as its deep involvement in 
aspects of the NASA manned space programme, the USAF was also busy 
developing the X-15 experimental hypersonic aircraft (in conjunction with NACA 
and then NASA) and the proposed ‘Dyna-Soar’ X-20 boost-glide platform.  Both 																																																								
336 The 1948 panel is described in, Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean  34  The 
formation of the Department of Space Medicine is noted in David N. Spires, Beyond horizons : a 
history of the Air Force in space, 1947-2007 (2nd edn. Peterson Air Force Base, Colo.: United States 
Air Force, 2007) 73.  An example of early interest in human spaceflight being explored publicly is the 
1951 symposium sponsored by the Air University School of Aviation Medicine – see 'Physics and 
medicine of the upper atmosphere; a study of the aeropause. ', Clayton S. White and Otis O Benson, 
Proceedings of 'Physics and medicine of the upper atmosphere' at Air University School of Aviation 
Medicine, Randolph Field, TX on 6-9 November 1951.  This later symposium will be described shortly. 
337 Office of Information Historical Division, SSD AFSC USAF Chronology of Early Air Force Man-in-
Space Activity, 1955-1960,   (Los Angeles AFS, Los Angeles, CA, 1965) 
338 Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean  91. 
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these latter, and especially the X-15, had their origins in extending the performance 
of conventional aircraft, but alongside this, the USAF continued to plan for the 
implementation of a true military manned spaceflight capability. 
Firstly the USAF proposed a series of military manned missions using Air 
Force procured Gemini capsules, which were sometimes referred to as ‘Blue 
Gemini’ missions.339  These came to naught, though the US military services were 
allowed to sponsor experiments to be carried on NASA Gemini missions.  Next, the 
USAF pursued the experimental single-seat recoverable prototype mentioned 
above, known alternatively as the X-20 and the Dyna-Soar. X-20 would have been 
launched atop an Atlas booster, and would have had unique (at the time) abilities 
to manoeuvre in orbit.340 
In 1963, the X-20 Dyna-Soar programme was cancelled by the Department 
of Defense, while construction of the first prototype was underway.  In its place, the 
USAF was given a new programme intended to determine the true utility of 
manned spaceflight as it related to military tasks – the Manned Orbiting Laboratory 
(MOL).  It was the culmination of USAF studies going back to 1958, which had led 
to a formal proposal in early 1963.  When the X-20 programme was cancelled, 
MOL was seen as its replacement.341  As proposed, it envisaged the launch of a 
large experimental capsule, sandwiched between a developed Titan booster and a 
Gemini capsule carrying a crew of two Air Force astronauts.  Capable of a 30-day 
mission, and providing a ‘shirt-sleeve’ environment in which the astronauts could 
conduct a variety of experiments to determine the limits of human capability in 
orbit, this ambitious mission would have given the USAF a true long-endurance 
manned spaceflight capability.  For two years the MOL programme continued in the 
public eye; during 1965, however, its management changed such that its nature 
and objectives became hidden.342  This was in fact because of the growing interest 
in the programme displayed by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), who 																																																								
339 For a description of the Blue Gemini programme, see Barton C. Grimwood James M. Hacker, On 
the Shoulders of Titans: a History of Project Gemini (NASA SP-4203) (Washington, DC: National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Scientific and Technical Information Division, Office of 
Technology Utilization, 1978) Ch6-2 
340 The most comprehensive description of the Dyna-Soar programme is contained in Houchin, The 
rise and fall of Dyna-Soar   There is also a substantial treatment of the programme in Mark Erickson, 
Into the unknown together : the DOD, NASA, and early spaceflight (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air 
University Press, 2005) Chapter 4. Walter Dornberger was heavily involved in Dyna-Soar 
development via his employment as a consultant to the Bell Aerospace Corporation. 
341 Carl Berger, History of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program (MOL) (Washington DC: The 
Department of the Air Force MOL Program Office, 1970) 50-51 makes clear that ‘…the X-20 program 
would be cancelled in favour of the MOL Program’. 
342 In Schriever’s papers at the Library of Congress is a press cutting from Time magazine (Time, 
'Bioastronautics for Survival', Time, 6 August 1965  p. 58.) describing an account of MOL goals and 
progress given at a conference of the AIAA.  Although short, it is succinct and demonstrates clearly 
that the MOL was still ‘in the public domain’ at that point.  Schriever Archive, Box 25, Folder 7. 
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wanted to use it as a platform for an operational manned reconnaissance system.  
Since the very existence of the NRO was itself classified at that time, their 
involvement led to the MOL ‘disappearing’.  The MOL programme was in turn 
cancelled in 1969, before significant hardware had been produced.343  With its 
cancellation, the USAF’s last attempt to manage a manned space programme with 
bespoke hardware ended.  The role of the USAF and the Department of Defense’s 
involvement in the subsequent Space Transportation System (STS – the ‘Space 
Shuttle’) programme still lay in the future, but that was never a USAF-only project.  
Military	Manned	Spaceflight	–	Schriever	and	Technical	Progress		
From his earliest reflections on the potential of military spaceflight, Bernard 
Schriever plainly envisaged it including manned missions.  It was not, however, 
until the closing stages of his career that he was actually given a manned 
spaceflight programme to manage.  Thus, for much of his working life his 
understanding of the technical challenges implicit in the role must be deduced from 
his writing and speaking, rather than from concrete results.  Schriever’s first major 
public statement on spaceflight, which at the time gained him a certain notoriety in 
Department of Defense circles, was to the Air Force Office of Scientific Research 
Astronautics Symposium at San Diego, California in February 1957.344  In it, he 
identified clearly the extension of effort required to get from the envisaged 
unmanned satellite to a manned capability:  
…However, before man can be committed to space vehicles, a tremendous 
amount of human factors research will be necessary. 
 
Later in the same speech, he amplified this.  Referring specifically to extended 
duration missions, he said:  	
…it will be necessary to extend the navigational program and the space 
medicine program characteristic of this type of sustained flight.345 
 
The following year, Schriever publicly demonstrated his commitment to the 
scientific and technical effort to solve the problems of manned spaceflight; he co-																																																								
343 The Titan IIIM booster, which would have launched the MOL was developed within this time 
period, though MOL was not the only payload intended for it.  On 3 November 1966, a Titan IIIC was 
launched on a sub-orbital flight carrying a mock-up of the MOL and an unmanned Gemini capsule 
(which would have been used to carry crews to the MOL) to prove the heatshield modifications to it 
intended for the MOL mission.  Although not an operational MOL, this flight was the nearest that MOL 
hardware got to orbit. 
344 Schriever recounted in 1995 that: “…I made a speech concerning military space and indicated that 
space would play an important role for national security in the future.  The next day, I received a wire 
from the Secretary of Defense’s office: “Do not use the word ‘space’ in any of your speeches in the 
future”…”   Text of Schriever’s remarks reprinted in Spires, Orbital Futures  20-26 (Vol 1) 
345 Spires, Orbital Futures Document I-2, pp 20-26. 
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chaired a major session of a 3-day symposium at the USAF School of Aviation 
Medicine in San Antonio, and additionally presented a paper on ‘The Weight 
Limitations and Capabilities in Rocket Propulsion for Manned Space Operations’.  
In it, he confirmed his belief that then current systems would be suitable for 
adaptation for man-carrying missions.346 
Aside from the content of Schriever’s paper, the San Antonio Symposium 
also confirms his continuing contact with the German ‘Paperclip’ cadre.  The 
Symposium overall was co-chaired by Major General Otis Benson, a senior USAF 
medical officer, and Dr Hubertus Strughold.  Schriever chaired the first session and 
delivered his paper on Day 2, alongside contributions in the same session from 
Wernher von Braun and Walter Dornberger.  Dr Strughold chaired the closing 
session on Day 3, and delivered two papers during the Symposium.347  A USAF 
film of highlights of the Symposium survives, showing a short extract from each of 
the speakers across the three days of the symposium. Apart from confirming the 
physical presence of the speakers listed to attend, the thanks extended to 
Schriever by Dornberger and von Braun appears sincere (von Braun and 
Dornberger spoke at the session chaired by Schriever).348  
Within the year, the Soviet Union stole a lead on the USA in space by 
launching Sputnik.  Part of the USAF reaction to this was the establishment of an 
ad-hoc committee of scientists by HQ Air Research and Development Command 
(ARDC) under the chairmanship of Dr Edmund Teller, in response to a DoD 
request for details of each of the Single Services’ ongoing space programmes. The 
Committee appears to have met only once, over 22-23 October 1957, rendering its 
report some 5 days later.  The USAF believed that the request for information was 
preparatory to one of the Services being nominated as lead-command for 
spaceflight within the DoD (and in plain expectation that the USAF would be the 
deserving winner).  In fact, as David Spires recounts in his introduction to his 
reprinting of the Teller Committee final report, their hopes were dashed, and the 
																																																								
346 'Physics and medicine of the atmosphere and space', Otis O Benson and Dr Hubertus Strughold, 
Proceedings of '2nd Int. Symp on Physics and Medicine of the Atmosphere and Space' at San 
Antonio, TX on 10-12 November 1958 
347 A comprehensive summary of the Symposium was published by Cornelius A Tobias, 'Meetings - 
'Space Science'', Science (The Journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science), 
Vol 129 No 3353  (3 April 1959 ).  The Symposium proceedings amplify and confirm Schriever’s 
understanding of the challenges at hand, and demonstrate that he was working as an equal with 
researchers and engineers such as von Braun and Strughold.   
348 The original film is held by the US National Archives – posted online at 'Coverage of the second 
International Symposium by the School of Aviation Medicine showing scenes of the opening session.', 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ewOQ_v30PA>, accessed 17 December 2016  
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DoD used the collected outcomes of their trawl for information to establish the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) as champion of DoD spaceflight.349   
There is clear evidence that Schriever was aware of, and interested in, the 
Teller Committee deliberations, even though he did not attend their October 
meeting. At the time, he was fully occupied running the WDD component of ARDC 
developing ICBMs.  Nonetheless, on 21 October (the day before the Teller 
Committee meeting opened), he spoke about it to a trusted colleague who would 
be an ARDC attendee at it, Colonel Paul Blasingame.  Schriever notes in his diary 
for that day: “Paul Blasingame – Teller report to Douglas [James H Douglas, then 
Secretary of the Air Force]…  1.  Why did it happen?  2.  ICBM-IRBM, Impact 
permissible, Tech[nical] feasibility.  3.  Scientific Flights – Hi[gh] alt[itude] research.  
4.  Missions with a purpose.  5.  Spaceflight – unmanned, manned.”350  These 
seemingly disconnected headings mirror closely the final structure of the Teller 
Committee report.  In particular, ‘Why did it happen’ is the title of the first section of 
the main report, it is closely followed by an analysis of the impact of ICBM and 
IRBM breakthroughs in the USSR, and following sections discuss the high-altitude 
research problems that spaceflight will pose.  The phrase ‘missions with a purpose’ 
does not appear in the report, but the Summary within the report includes a 
reference to ‘stunts with a purpose’, and the report concludes with a strong 
endorsement of a proposed USAF manned spaceflight programme.  Given that the 
conversation between Schriever and Blasingame took place prior to the 
Committee’s meeting, the conclusion that they were shaping its discussions and 
outcomes is inescapable.  It is also clear that Schriever was still identifying the 
specific challenges of manned spaceflight.351  As noted, the Teller Committee 
report did not have the desired effect, at least from the USAF’s point of view.  
ARPA’s establishment followed, and the MISS project was incorporated into 
NASA’s Project MERCURY.   
It is at least possible that Schriever at this point tried to initiate another 
USAF manned spaceflight programme.  This arose out of the SAMOS (unmanned) 																																																								
349 Spires, Orbital Futures  216.  The Committee Report follows immediately as Document II-6.  
350 Schriever Archive, Box 5, Folder 3.  Diary Entry for 21 October 1957.  In a marginal annotation in 
red crayon, Schriever then listed six people he believed to be ‘Anti Ed Teller’.  The names read 
‘Tuggs’, ‘Valley’, ‘Fitts’, ‘Spilhaus’, ‘Walk/Walh’, ‘Bulow’.  The context is completely unclear, and most 
are unidentifiable, at least to the author.  ‘Spilhaus’ may refer to A F Spilhaus, who was a science 
‘populariser’ in the press at the time, ‘Bulow’ might be Senator J W Bulow/Buhlow, sometime governor 
of South Dakota who lived in Washington at the time, and ‘Fitts’ might be Paul M Fitts, a former USAF 
Lieutenant Colonel, then a psychologist at Ohio State University with interests in ‘human factors’ 
research and ergonomics. 
351 There is additionally an earlier entry in Schriever’s diary for 15 September 1957 – ‘Go see Edward 
Teller’ – but the context is completely unclear.  It is, however, at least possible that Schriever and 
Teller discussed the issue directly.  Schriever Archive, Box 5, Folder 3. 
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reconnaissance satellite programme being developed by the USAF in parallel with 
the Discoverer/CORONA programme previously described.  SAMOS-E, the visual 
reconnaissance element of the programme was technically a more advanced, and 
more challenging programme than CORONA, based on a heavier orbiting payload.   
Sources for the description of the potential manned SAMOS capsule are 
elusive; the most complete account has been assembled by Dwayne Day, who 
published his account in a three-part article in ‘Spaceflight’ journal in 2002-3.352  
Day does not provide detailed references to his source material.  Fragments of 
primary material relating to this programme are beginning to emerge through the 
ongoing NRO declassification efforts, validating Day’s thesis, but there are still 
many gaps.353  Consequently, the quotes from his article that follow are lengthy, 
and must be judged strictly on their merits as regards overall plausibility. 354  Plainly 
Day had access to some primary material, and he cites an interview he conducted 
with Mr Jack Herther, a key figure who worked for the Itek Corporation (the 
SAMOS camera design company) and who was heavily involved in the design of 
the SAMOS capsule.    
At this time, technical requirements were driving up the size of the SAMOS 
reconnaissance capsule (Discoverer/CORONA sacrificed sophistication for early 
availability; SAMOS (at the time known as part of ‘Sentry’) was intended to deliver 
higher resolution imagery (implying a bigger camera), via film readout techniques 
(yielding quicker delivery of results and avoiding the need for a recoverable film 
capsule).  The ‘large camera’ version of SAMOS/Sentry would be known as 
SAMOS E-5.  Day asserts that:  
…members of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (BMD) office that 
managed the Sentry satellite program in Los Angeles became convinced 
that they also needed to develop a recoverable satellite, like CORONA. 
Unlike 
CORONA, however, whose recovery vehicle was so small that it could fit 																																																								
352 Dwayne A Day, 'A sheep in wolf’s clothing: the Samos E-5 recoverable satellite -- Part 1', 
Spaceflight, Vol 44 No 10  (October 2002), Dwayne A Day, 'A square peg in a cone-shaped hole: The 
Samos E-5 recoverable satellite -- (part 2)', Spaceflight, Vol 45 No 2  (February 2003), Dwayne A 
Day, 'From cameras to monkeys to men: The Samos E-5 recoverable satellite -- Part 3 ', Spaceflight, 
Vol 45 No 9  (September 2003).  The articles were reprinted online via The Space Review in 2009. 
353 One document validating the core of Day’s thesis explicitly has reached public circulation.  A 1965 
CIA Summary Memorandum, almost certainly written by Mr Albert ‘Bud’ Wheelon, the CIA Director for 
Science and Technology, notes “For instance, one version of SAMOS (E-5) was warped around to 
provide a space vehicle capable of supporting a military man into space”.  ‘A Summary of the National 
Reconnaissance Problem’, A D Wheelon (?), 13 May 1965.  NRO Declassified Collection of 
CORONA, ARGON and LANYARD Records, Document 1D0008, p10. 
354 Perhaps the most useful volume for correlating Day’s account is History of Discoverer Volume II - 
Rough Draft (Los Angeles, CA: Air Force Systems Command SAMSO History Office, 1959), recently 
declassified by the NRO.  Despite its ‘draft’ status, with no identified author and an uncertain 
publication date, it provides a comprehensive description of the Biomedical programme associated 
with Discoverer and further evidence of Schriever’s interest in the problems it addressed. 
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inside an oil drum, they wanted a larger recovery vehicle.  
Exactly why the members of BMD decided in the fall of 1958 that they 
needed a large recoverable capsule is unknown and remains one of the 
important mysteries in this story. …. It may have been a coincidence that 
this new requirement for a large recoverable capsule emerged only a few 
weeks after Lockheed proposed a manned recoverable capsule and at the 
same time that NASA was undertaking Mercury. But the leaders of the Air 
Force space program, particularly Lieutenant General Bernard Schriever, 
clearly coveted the manned spaceflight role, and it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that they were covertly trying to develop their own manned 
spaceflight capability.  In late September 1958, Air Force leaders in 
Washington, DC, undoubtedly acting upon the advice of members of BMD 
in Los Angeles, issued a directive that: 
“consideration… be given to the use of a recoverable 
satellite in order to achieve maximum accuracy, 
information content, reliability of receipt of collected 
data, and reuse where economically feasible.”  
 
…By January 1959, with ARPA approval, the Ballistic Missile Division 
issued a revised “development plan” for Sentry that formally established the 
goal of developing a large recovery capsule, … Surprisingly, the BMD plan 
mentioned almost nothing about actual reconnaissance requirements, ... In 
many ways the Air Force was designing this new reconnaissance system 
backwards—defining the capsule first and leaving out the details of what 
would fit inside of it and, most importantly, what it would do. 
At some point in this process, Lockheed added another requirement to the 
spacecraft design—the capsule had to be pressurized. “It was just 
specified: Thou shalt pressurize,” camera designer Jack Herther explained.  
This requirement had nothing to do with the reconnaissance mission, and 
whether Lockheed had added it at Air Force request or not remains unclear. 
Pressurization only complicated the spacecraft design.  The pressure shell 
and pressurization system added weight that could have been devoted to 
payload. 
Pressurization was unneeded for a film return system - CORONA was 
unpressurized. But the pressurization requirement allowed the Air Force, 
and Lockheed, to develop key technologies necessary to a manned space 
program. Although the Air Force was out of the manned space effort, 
building a large pressurized capsule capable of carrying a man kept the Air 
Force half a step behind NASA—as opposed to out of the race completely. 
They were cloaking a manned spacecraft program in the veil of a military 
reconnaissance satellite.355 	
And later: 
 
Herther had never been happy with the compromises forced upon Itek by 
the need to fit their camera inside a volume constrained, pressurized re-
entry vehicle, but he had no idea why the Air Force had imposed those 
requirements. It was only four decades later, with the declassification of 
information concerning the E-5 and its origins in Lockheed’s October 1958 
Sentry Man in Space proposal, that Herther thought the pieces started to 
fall into place. The Air Force was less interested in the reconnaissance 
mission than it was in developing the capabilities necessary for manned 
space flight. “I was naïve,” he admitted. But in retrospect, it all made sense. 																																																								
355 Day, 'A sheep in wolf's clothing',  (Spaceflight) 
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“As I now look at the documentation and understand why they wanted the 
camera to come back, which caused the pressurization, which caused the 
mirror, which caused the configuration to be so favorable to the recovery 
process that it compromised the reconnaissance ‘stable table’ notion…” 
Herther shook his head in disbelief. “It’s just the hard way to do it,” he 
said…356 
 
In June 1959, ARPA (who retained control of finances) cancelled SAMOS 
E-5.  Day reports Schriever’s outrage at this and the subsequent coordinated 
protests from the USAF. 
Air Force officials were incensed by ARPA’s decision to terminate the E-5 
camera. Major General Osmond Ritland, Commander of Ballistic Missile 
Division, complained to Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White. 
Lieutenant General Bernard Schriever, the head of BMD’s parent 
organization, Air Research and Development Command, and a former 
commander of BMD, also complained to White. Schriever sent a letter to 
White declaring “should the ARPA decline to continue the recovery 
program… it is recommended that the Air Force immediately support this 
urgent development.” In other words, with ARPA refusing to fund the Sentry 
E-5, the Air Force would have to find additional money in its own budget to 
pay for the recoverable capsule, taking it from another non-space program. 
Responding for General White, Deputy Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay 
told Schriever “I am completely sympathetic with your point of view and 
have taken action through Secretarial channels to restate the Air Force 
requirement to the director of ARPA and request reconsideration of its 
support in FY 60.”357 
 
SAMOS E-5 was thus reinstated.  Day then provides extensive description 
and analysis of the camera systems developed for the various SAMOS variants 
and the conflicts and overlaps between these options and the extant CORONA 
systems (including the compromises required to fit them within the E-5 pressurized 
capsule); these need not concern us here.  He next recounts that after several 
unsuccessful test launches, SAMOS E-5 was cancelled (for the second and final 
time) in December 1961, with the sole exception that a test flight already scheduled 
for March 1962 could proceed as planned.  In Day’s account, towards the end of 
the programme (perhaps with cancellation already threatened), Schriever made 
one final attempt to capitalize on the SAMOS E-5 pressurized capsule, and the 
available SAMOS E-5 hardware to further military manned spaceflight: 
Air Force officials were also proposing other missions for their new 
pressurized spacecraft. These missions had nothing to do with gathering 																																																								
356 Day, 'From cameras to monkeys to men',  (Spaceflight) 
357 Day, 'A sheep in wolf's clothing',  (Spaceflight).  Note in this instance also that Curtis LeMay, who 
had not had the easiest relationship with Schriever regarding introduction of ICBMs, is completely 
supportive of his concerns. 
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intelligence. 
… 
In October 1960 General Schriever proposed flying a primate on a 
Discoverer mission. Mice and monkeys had been part of the original 
Discoverer program, to mask the true mission of the satellites with their 
CORONA reconnaissance cameras. But the primate life support system 
had been delayed and once the CORONA cameras became available in 
June 1959 the CIA immediately incorporated them into the satellite. 
Program directors abandoned the life sciences research and work on the 
primate life support system for Discoverer was canceled. 
Now, with CORONA operating and the primate cover story dormant, 
General Schriever wanted to fly the small primate mission to obtain 
information for future manned missions… In December 1960 the Office of 
the Assistant for Bioastronautics at the Air Force’s Air Research and 
Development Command—ARDC, the Command that General Schriever 
was in charge of—issued a report titled “Bioastronautics Capability and 
Requirements for Manned Space Operations.” The report was a justification 
for putting a military man in space.  
In April 1961, only three days after Yuri Gagarin became the first man to 
orbit the earth, the Air Force Systems Command, which Schriever had 
recently molded from ARDC and Materiel Command, issued a proposal for 
a “Bioastronautics Orbital Space System,” or BOSS.  BOSS was to use a 
Samos E-5 capsule to carry a large primate— a chimpanzee—on a long-
duration flight up to fourteen days. It would be a relatively high altitude 
mission, exposing the test subject to the radiation belts. According to the 
proposal, a mockup of the life support system was already built and the Air 
Force was seeking permission to build a test vehicle.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Charles W. Craven wrote the report and General Schriever and Major 
General Osmond J. Ritland, the commander of Space Division, which was 
part of Systems Command, approved it. In the introduction Craven bluntly 
stated: “This is not a biomedical program to collect a great amount of data 
from animal orbital flights, but is a system to determine the feasibility of 
manned military operations in space.” 
…The BOSS proposal was apparently approved in June 1961—probably by 
the Air Force’s military leadership and not its civilian leadership. But BOSS 
was not funded and it went nowhere… And by late 1961, Undersecretary 
Charyk cancelled the Samos E-5.358 
 
This long account of the travails of Samos E-5, if accurate, shows 
Schriever’s enduring interest in human spaceflight.  It is possible that he wished to 
protect the pressurised capsule for some misplaced technical concern relating to 
reconnaissance, but it seems more likely that he was, as Day suggests, preserving 
the capability to move quickly to deliver a manned USAF capsule if NASA’s 
Mercury programme had encountered any major problems.  The BOSS report, 
delivered with Schriever’s endorsement, and his willingness firstly to actually 
execute the Discoverer ‘cover story’ and secondly to adapt the SAMOS E-5 to a 
primate flight via BOSS, links directly back to his initial enthusiasm as outlined in 																																																								
358 Day, 'From cameras to monkeys to men',  (Spaceflight) 
		 131	
San Diego in 1957 for exploration of the bio-medical implications of manned 
spaceflight. 
Schriever’s next expression of understanding of the technical factors 
implied by manned spaceflight can be found in the USAF Space Plan for 1961.  
This plan, prepared at the request of the Secretary of Defense, appears to have 
been drafted at Schriever’s direction or at least under his supervision.359  Among 
other things, the report goes into considerable detail proposing a new family of 
rockets to provide a comprehensive range of launch capabilities graduated by 
payload and orbit requirements, then turns to the demands of manned spaceflight.  
It notes:  
The significant restrictions in payload capability have, to date, mediated 
seriously against adequate considerations being given to man’s potential 
usefulness as an integral component in space vehicles regardless of their 
objective or mission.  This negative approach has resulted in a most serious 
lack of a well conceived, integrated and supported program of space 
biology and medicine directed towards valid determination of man’s basic 
needs, tolerance and performance capabilities in even the first generation 
of orbital vehicles with mission times not exceeding 2-7 days.360 
 
The author has thus identified the constraints imposed on any manned 
spaceflight program beyond the most basic missions by the state, at the time, of 
the US space launcher capability.  A subsequent, substantial, portion of the plan 
incorporates an ambitious (frankly over-ambitious) proposal to develop a military 
‘Lunar Expeditionary Force’; although there is no suggestion that any attempt was 
made to implement such a force, it is in itself a fine example of the connection in 
the US public eye between exploration and the peacetime role of the military –for 
now, it is sufficient to highlight that it might have faced legal challenge from the 
emerging consensus on permitted activity in space.361  
He then makes the point that the Soviet Union had begun to fly biological 
specimens on their second orbital flight and maintained the momentum on 																																																								
359 A complete copy of the plan, an associated intelligence threat brief, and a draft of a covering letter 
for the plan’s submission to the Secretary of Defense is in Schriever Archive, Recently Declassified 
Documents folder.  The covering letter would appear to have been written for signature by the 
Secretary of the Air Force, or possibly the Air Force Chief of Staff, and Schriever is the last copy 
recipient (often, but not infallibly, indicating the drafting office or appointment). 
360 “United States Air Force Proposed National Space Program”, Section 4/page12.  Schriever 
Archive, Recently Declassified Documents folder. 
361 The Lunar Expeditionary Force might well have fallen foul of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty 
of 1967 – “The establishment of military bases, fortifications and installations, the testing of any kind 
of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.” (Outer 
Space Treaty text, Article IV).  The lack of any attempt to implement the 1961 Policy made the point 
moot, and Schriever faced more serious challenges from the emerging legal regime relating to his 
ideas on space weaponization, but this is another example where he failed to note the emerging 
consensus.   
		 132	
successive missions, while the USA had yet to orbit a living organism (there had 
been numerous US sub-orbital flights carrying organisms ranging from fruit flies to 
monkeys and apes, dating back to V2 experiments in the 1940s, but none had yet 
achieved orbit).  He concludes the section by proposing a graduated series of 
orbital flights of increasing duration carrying primates, and including exploration of 
tolerance of radiation during the longer-duration flights.  This last objective is plainly 
a recycling of the BOSS proposal outlined above, and once again shows Schriever 
pursuing or directing the research necessary to develop a manned spaceflight 
capability. 
In the spring of 1961, Schriever had a chance to influence the shape of the 
US National Space Programme, and made what may have been his final public 
intervention on policy issues alongside Wernher von Braun.  The Soviet Union had 
launched Vostok 1 carrying Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin on his orbital flight on 12 April 
1961, about 3 weeks ahead of the planned manned launch of Lt Cdr Alan 
Shepherd on a sub-orbital ‘Mercury’ flight.362  Between these two events, a fit of 
national recrimination seized the United States, much of it directed at the White 
House.  As Craig Nelson summarizes: 
The shock of Gagarin’s achievement convinced any American who wasn’t 
already concerned about Sputnik, Luna and Strelka [earlier Soviet satellites] 
to now join the chorus of complaint against NASA and a drowsy Federal 
leadership.363 
 
Alongside a renewed interest in the USAF Space Plan, the Kennedy 
administration took particular steps to consider what the military might contribute to 
the emerging manned space gap opening up with the Soviets.  On 25 May 1961, 
President Kennedy would commit the USA to landing a man on the Moon within the 
decade.364  Before doing so publicly, however, he conducted and directed 
considerable study into what might be possible.  This began with a White House 
meeting chaired by President Kennedy on 14 April 1961 (two days after Gagarin’s 
flight), and was followed by at least two sessions of interviews with key players by 
Vice President Johnson.365  On 24 April 1961, both Schriever and von Braun spoke 
with the Vice President.  Nelson reports that: 
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363 Craig Nelson, Rocket Men: the epic story of the first men on the Moon (London: John Murray, 
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364 Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean  362 
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 “Schriever stated that ‘we need a major national space programme for 
prestige purposes’, and pointed out that such a direction would help the aerospace 
industry at a time when many in the USAF believed that the ICBM missile race 
would be levelling off…At his meeting with the vice-president, von Braun concurred 
that ‘we do not have a good chance of beating the Soviets to a manned ‘laboratory 
in space’…we have a sporting chance of sending a three-man crew around the 
moon ahead of the Soviets…we have an excellent chance of beating the Soviets to 
the first landing of a crew on the moon…”.366 
 
It is worth pausing briefly and trying to explain why von Braun was quite so 
prescient in his discussion with the vice-president.  Nelson himself offers no further 
analysis, but Neufeld’s biography of von Braun provides some explanation.  Firstly, 
the USSR’s breakthroughs in orbital flight and manned spaceflight had 
demonstrated that they had mastered the technology for launching relatively large 
(heavy) satellites.367  The step from Gagarin’s Vostok capsule to a larger, longer-
duration vehicle (von Braun’s ‘laboratory in space’) in Earth orbit would have posed 
challenges, but there was nothing in early Soviet missions to cast doubt on their 
ability to meet them, and as a ‘race’ voluntarily entered, it was not clear that the 
USA would win.  Conversely, lunar missions were a much more ambitious target, 
but the longer time that would be taken to achieve them gave the USA a better 
chance of catching up, hence von Braun’s enthusiasm.  As Neufeld notes: “..the 
technological leap was so large that it potentially cancelled out the Russian 
advantage in big boosters”.368  Lastly, the three-man circum-lunar mission 
(implicitly without a landing) had been an early overall goal of the Apollo program, 
albeit one that had been rejected by the Eisenhower administration.  This early 
meeting with Kennedy’s vice-president was an opportunity for von Braun to start 
lobbying for more ambitious Apollo goals.369 
As far as Schriever’s aspirations were concerned, a national space 
programme was plainly forthcoming, but it was a civilian programme, entrusted to 
NASA, in which von Braun would play a crucial part.  The extent to which Schriever 																																																								
366 Nelson, Rocket Men  156.  Nelson does not credit the specific source for this account of Schriever 
and von Braun’s interviews, though he lists multiple possible sources in his collected Bibliography, but 
the fact that ‘space meetings’ took place on the date cited is confirmed by Vice President Johnson’s 
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367 At launch in 1957, the Soviet Sputnik 1 had weighed just over 180lbs, and Sputnik 2, which 
followed about a month later carrying a dog as an experimental payload, had weighed over 1000lbs.  
In comparison, the first US artificial satellite Explorer 1, launched in early 1958 (after Sputnik 2), had 
only weighed about 30lbs.  By 1961, Gagarin’s spacecraft Vostok weighed about 5500lbs.   
368 Neufeld, Von Braun  356.   
369 Neufeld provides a more detailed summary of early Apollo options beginning with von Braun’s 
early (and frankly over-ambitious) plans for lunar missions drawn up during 1958-60.  Neufeld, Von 
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Management, Scientific and Technical Information Division, 1989) 3-11. 
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saw this as usurpation of a valid military task is unclear; the content of the USAF 
1961 Space Plan, and particularly the material relating to the Lunar Expeditionary 
Force, suggests that he saw at least some of this as valid work for the USAF, but 
there is nothing at the time in his diaries to indicate animosity with respect to 
NASA; on the contrary, the diary entries immediately following these meetings 
continue to reflect his concerns to keep ICBM development on track, to establish 
his authority over his new command at AFSC, to continue to grow Air Force Space 
capability at Vandenberg AFB in California (inextricably linked to the launch into 
polar orbit associated with reconnaissance missions, and by June 1961 to assisting 
NASA:  
“* Write letter to NASA offering our help 
* Establish SSD [Space Systems Division of AFSC] as focal point and 
direct that they set up office and work with NASA”370 
 
Schriever’s last foray into military manned spaceflight was his management 
of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) programme.  Rather than recap the 
lengthy technical history of that programme, this thesis will gauge Schriever’s 
understanding of its technical demands and progress through the testimony he 
gave to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on 8 February 1966.  
The context of the hearing was a Committee investigation into possible wasteful 
duplication between NASA and DoD space programmes, and Schriever’s 
testimony followed that of Dr Seamans, the NASA Assistant Administrator.371  The 
full text of Schriever’s prepared remarks survives, and viewed overall, they 
demonstrate that he had a firm grasp of the technical factors that he was managing 
at the time. 
Schriever explained to the Committee that a comparison had been made 
between adapting the NASA Saturn 1B launcher and developing a new variant of 
the Titan III launcher to launch the MOL, with the latter chosen for a variety of 
reasons.  He also explained the relationship between the modifications proposed to 
the NASA Gemini capsule heat shield and the forthcoming test-flight in that 
configuration.  He then discussed the demands posed by the proposed polar orbit 
to be adopted by the MOL for operational reasons, the reasons why that orbit then 
favoured launch from the West Coast rather than the East of the United States (to 																																																								
370 Schriever (part of) Diary Entry for 19 June 1961.  Schriever Archive, Recently Declassified 
Documents folder.  Bulleting and underlining in original. 
371 Berger, History of the MOL  210-11. 
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avoid overflying land during launch), and the payload constraints that would ensue 
from any attempt to launch from the East Coast.  He reviewed the technical 
challenges of designing a man-carrying craft for the extended mission duration 
intended for MOL (30 days), including environmental control, waste management, 
astronaut health and nutrition and the intended composition of the MOL 
atmosphere.  He briefed the committee on the tracking and monitoring activity that 
would be needed to support an MOL launch, communication arrangements during 
an MOL mission and finally the arrangements for emergency and planned recovery 
of the crew during the mission. 372  Although the brief had been prepared for him by 
the MOL Program Office, the ability to deliver and defend it before the Committee 
suggests that Schriever was a man with a sound understanding of the technical 
constraints and possibilities of the programme he was managing.373   
Military	Manned	Spaceflight	–	Schriever,	Policy	and	Strategy		
Some of the policy and strategy issues surrounding military manned 
spaceflight are actually implicit in the technical survey just completed.  The earlier 
efforts to develop a military manned spaceflight capability were simply aimed at 
getting an (air)man into space, principally for reasons of national prestige.  
Developing the capability and demonstrating it was, in itself, a worthwhile mission.  
Later efforts such as Dyna-Soar and (especially) the MOL, sought to explore more 
enduringly useful missions and in the case of the MOL, evolved into a proposed 
operational system.  But a persistent problem for all proponents of these schemes 
was identifying the mission to be undertaken; simply ‘being in space’ had 
significance as a national objective, but not to deliver positive military advantage.  
Thus, two strands of thought are detectable in the analysis of these missions.  
Firstly, some thought that once human exploration of space was underway, as 
surely as conflict had spread to the seas and skies with the invention of ships and 
aircraft, it would spread to space.  Adoption of this hypothesis appealed naturally to 
those subscribing to the notion of ‘aerospace’.  If a nation was unwilling to contest 
control of space, it would yield to any space-based threats that might be posed 																																																								
372 Summary taken from ‘Statement for the Record by General Bernard Schriever, Director Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory, Department of the Air Force, before the House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, February 8, 1966’.  Schriever Archive, Recently Declassified Documents folder. 
373 Berger notes the various difficulties imposed at this hearing by security constraints, including the 
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the MOL mission, and that consequently while Schriever could not mislead the committee, he could 
not discuss, for example, the reasons behind selection of a polar orbit.  Thus multiple versions of the 
brief were prepared, and some of the Committee members took partisan positions in questioning – 
most notably the contributions of Florida-based members, who were incensed that MOL operations 
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against it, and since the Air Force’s role was to protect against such threats from 
the air, it naturally extended to protection from and in space.  An alternative view 
was that a human presence would enhance or enable the operation of existing 
unmanned systems, most probably by improving reliability or efficiency.  
Schriever’s thinking was initially concerned with the first issue, but moved 
significantly towards the second with the passage of time. 
A prime example of Schriever supporting the ‘exploration’ school of thought 
can be found in his address at San Diego in 1957: 
Several decades from now the important battles may not be sea battles or 
air battles, but space battles, and we should be spending a certain fraction 
of our national resources to ensure that we do not lag in obtaining space 
supremacy. Besides the direct military importance of space, our prestige as 
world leaders might well dictate that we undertake lunar expeditions and 
even interplanetary flight when the appropriate technological advances 
have been made and the time is ripe.374 
 
At about the same time, Schriever’s ultimate Air Force superior, General 
Thomas White, was making a related point in testimony to the House 
Appropriations Sub-Committee.  He stated: “missiles are but one step in the 
evolution from manned high-performance aircraft to true manned spacecraft; and in 
the forces structure of the future…we will have all three systems.”375  What was not 
clear, however, from either White or Schriever, was an analysis of exactly how 
these new platforms would be integrated into this seamless aerospace force.  As 
Stephen Rothstein perceptively notes in his first thesis on the history of the 
aerospace concept: “There is little evidence to indicate, however, that the 
considerations and implications of Air Force operations in space from an 
intellectual perspective were studied much at all.”376 
Two years later, there was evidence that some thought had gone into this 
issue.  HQ ARDC drafted a proposed ‘Air Force Space Mission’ paper in 1959, 
which predicted that: 
Space weapons of the foreseeable future will be a family of satellite 																																																								
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vehicles with common characteristics and will tend to become larger, 
carrying combined payloads as our capabilities progress.  They will be 
manned or man maintained. Many of them will be general purpose type 
vehicles satisfying many requirements. These satellite forces will primarily 
satisfy strategic and air defense and support requirements. They must be 
integrated into a common system with the other strategic and air defense 
weapons. They must use a common communications and tracking 
system.377  
 
Although this showed that the problem had achieved some attention, it also 
implies considerable faith in rapid technical progress.  At least as far as the 
‘support’ missions were concerned, there was also clearly emerging evidence of 
the potential of unmanned systems.  By the end of 1959, Discoverer/CORONA was 
about half way through its series of development launches, the first ‘TRANSIT’ 
navigation satellite had been launched (albeit unsuccessfully) with a second 
nearing readiness for launch, and Project SCORE had demonstrated the potential 
of satellite communications in December 1958 – all by means of unmanned 
vehicles. 
The shift in Schriever’s thinking began to become apparent.  Speaking to 
the National Geographic Society in Washington DC in 1958, he stated:  “We can 
investigate by instruments alone a very large part of what there is to know about 
the other planets and about the conditions in space between planets.  But sooner 
or later we will need more data that cannot be practically supplied by instruments. 
At this point man, even with all the equipment he must take with him, will become 
the cheapest, lightest, and most practical 'instrument' for obtaining and assessing 
that added data.”378  The thrust of his remarks is still based on exploration and 
‘being there’, but the context is now man augmenting and supplanting an 
unmanned probe.   
During 1959-61, Schriever grappled with the rapidly crystallising 
‘aerospace’ concept.  In its simplest form, this concept proposed that the operating 
mediums of ‘air’ and ‘space’ were essentially indivisible, and hence that the military 
service charged with overall responsibility for ‘air’ should acquire a parallel 
responsibility for ‘space’ as technology made it accessible.  This emerging idea had 
powerful sponsors; although it had not originated with him, General White, the 
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then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was a very early champion of it.379  As Chief of 
Staff, he took the opportunity of promoting it as a vision for how the Air Force 
should configure itself, and via subordinate staff, he drove its use into doctrine.380  
Schriever, however, remained unconvinced as to its coherence and validity.  In his 
eyes, ‘air’ and ‘space’ remained separate domains, albeit ones in which the Air 
Force could still logically (in his eyes) claim primacy.  Stephen Rothstein dwells at 
some length on Schriever’s ambiguous relationship with the term, noting, for 
example, that in his testimony before Congress in 1959, he failed to defend the 
‘indivisibility’ argument, and in fact left scope for attack on the concept by the other 
Services.  In subsequent public-speaking engagements, Schriever’s commitment to 
the concept was again at best ambivalent.381  Without becoming engrossed in the 
propriety of Schriever publicly questioning his superior’s intent, one simple 
rationale for the discrepancy of thought may be that White was concerned to 
ensure that the statutory basis for an Air Force space programme was established 
via appeal to US Code Title 10, while Schriever, as a working engineer wished to 
highlight the technical challenges of operating in the extended (or new) medium; 
specifically, they would require different solutions to those addressing the 
difficulties of conventional air operations.382  
By 1961, Schriever was plainly thinking more deeply about the implications 
of linking exploration with military activity.  In an undated note/diary entry, he 
remarked in the context of the military space programme: “Lunar program could 
become political liability unless Nat[iona]l Security potential is identified”.383  That 
would never, in fact, happen, and the conceptual tide was running against such 
thoughts.  Ultimately, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 would explicitly prohibit a 																																																								
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military mission on the Moon.384		Prohibition of military activity was one of the last 
stipulations added to the succession of UN General Assembly Resolutions that 
preceded the Outer Space Treaty, but the general tenor of those resolutions gave 
less and less scope for extra-terrestrial military activity.   
The March 1961 report of the USAF Space Study Committee (established 
by Schriever in October 1960) shifted the balance even further.385  Its section on 
Manned Spaceflight opened with a reminder of the historical importance of the US 
Armed Services to exploration (the Lewis and Clark expedition to the Pacific Coast 
in 1804-05 is mentioned explicitly), but it moves rapidly to an analysis of manned 
spaceflight as an enhancer of unmanned or automatic activity: “…it is unlikely that 
information filtering in orbit can be performed more efficiently by machines than by 
man…The presence of a man to make and interpret tests, and to take corrective 
action, will make possible reliable continuous operation of much more complex 
systems…Flexibility of alternatives in perception and action can only be provided in 
automated devices at a great penalty in weight and reliability.  Man can better 
provide this flexibility for some time to come.”386  The problem with this belief is that 
unmanned system reliability was improving rapidly.  Accidents still occurred; 
nobody claimed ‘100% reliability’, and where it was expected, for example in 
manned spaceflight or in the launch of payloads with nuclear materials, it was hard 
to achieve, but the experience that Schriever had endured of repeated launch and 
on-orbit failures, for example early in the Discoverer/CORONA programme was 
thankfully in the past. 
Even if satellite systems were becoming steadily more reliable, there 
remained the question of whether they could be enhanced by the presence of a 
human operator, and a subsidiary question of whether there were any military tasks 
(not so far explored in the civilian space programme) that also required the 
presence of an astronaut.  The MOL was an effort to resolve these questions.  It 
arose out of an exchange between Vice-President Johnson and Secretary of 
Defense McNamara during 1963.  Preliminary details of the intended programme 
were worked out by Dr Harold Brown, then Defense Director of Research and 																																																								
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Archive, Box 140, Folder 6. 
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Engineering.  Carl Berger reports that: “According to his instructions, the basic 
purpose of the Manned Military Orbiting Laboratory (MMOL) was to 'assess the 
military utility of man in space’. Since man was not considered useful unless he 
performed a variety of tasks in space, MOL equipment was to be chosen both to 
support the astronaut and challenge his flexibility and judgment”.387  Headquarters 
USAF sent the full direction to Schriever and directed him to submit a development 
plan.388  Development work was slightly hindered, however, when the USAF settled 
on experiments relating to reconnaissance systems, and early suggestions that the 
MOL might meet operational requirements as well as performing experimental 
studies.  Those in higher headquarters who were aware of the existence of the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) feared that MOL activity might compromise 
the tight security that surrounded NRO activities.  Schriever nonetheless submitted 
an MOL development plan in January 1964, which included the proposal that he be 
appointed programme director.389  The following month, “Schriever's and 
Ferguson's planners agreed that ‘the objectives of the MOL should not be based on 
a single set of experiments aimed only at one mission, such as reconnaissance.’’390  
Despite opposing views, aimed at maintaining a reconnaissance emphasis, a 
balanced programme of experiments was agreed.  The 15 topics still included 
reconnaissance elements, such as direct observations over land and sea, and 
tracking ground targets but also included physiological and bio-medical tests of the 
astronauts, experiments in building and maintaining equipment, spacecraft 
navigation and gaining ‘spacewalk’ experience.391 
Unfortunately, alongside this effort to maintain a broad suite of experimental 
themes within the MOL programme, a parallel covert study into the possibility of 
deploying a very-high resolution reconnaissance system aboard the MOL was 
being conducted at the direction of Dr Brockway McMillan, who held the dual 
appointments of Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director of the NRO: ‘On 7 
June 1963 he instructed the Directorate of Special Projects (SAFSP), which 
developed and operated the unmanned reconnaissance systems, to undertake a 
study and simulations to determine man's ability to recognize "high priority targets" 
and to point "high resolution cameras so as to obtain coverage of these targets."’   
When its report was rendered, it suggested that man could indeed "make 																																																								
387 Berger, History of the MOL  52 
388 Berger, History of the MOL  54 
389 Berger, History of the MOL  56 
390 Berger, History of the MOL  61 
391 Berger, History of the MOL  69-70.  One primary experiment is unknown as it remains classified in 
the released version of Berger.  
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substantial contributions to a satellite reconnaissance mission."392  When this 
conclusion was applied to the MOL project-definition work then underway, the 
security implications (acknowledgement of the NRO’s existence and the activity of 
satellite reconnaissance) rendered the MOL programme classified in itself; 
additionally, from then on, MOL designs incorporated provisions for the large 
camera and telescope envisaged by the study.  Further studies explored whether 
such a camera could operate in an unmanned mode when the Laboratory was 
unoccupied, and ultimately whether there was a need for a man aboard at all.  
Schriever’s view on this quickly became apparent: “General Schriever was worried 
about the effect the unmanned system might have on MOL development planning, 
being strongly opposed to any possible decision to eliminate the manned version. 
On 29 December, during a conversation with General Evans, he proposed they 
undertake an operational analysis of "manned and unmanned capabilities for 
reconnaissance." He was particularly interested in the "quantitative differences” in 
the reconnaissance “take" of the two modes and also in a qualitative comparison of 
the resolutions on specific targets and the reliability of the two configuration on a 
30-day mission.“393  Notably absent from this discussion is any reference to 
‘experiments’.  The MOL has morphed into a reconnaissance system to meet 
operational requirements.   
Much of the pressure to re-focus the MOL on operational tasks had come 
from the Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), and much of the 
remainder of Schriever’s time in charge of MOL was occupied with an attempt to 
reconcile tensions between PSAC, the Department of Defense, the NRO and the 
USAF.  With the MOL rationale now only tenuously connected to the original 
experimentation plan, the DOD Budget Office were also evaluating the relative 
costs of the manned and unmanned missions – manned missions costing more.394  
During the summer of 1966, USAF justifications for retaining the man aboard 
centred on his ability to improve the quality of the reconnaissance results achieved, 
exploit ‘targets of opportunity’ and improve efficiency by eliminating photography 
marred by cloud cover.  There is also, however, some evidence in Berger that 
some PSAC staff supported the original experimental MOL ethos: ‘one of the 
PSAC members, Dr. Steininger, remarked during a visit with the NRO staff that the 																																																								
392 Berger, History of the MOL  59, 93 
393 Berger, History of the MOL  171-72 
394 The released version of Berger’s history does not reveal the physical resolution that the manned 
and unmanned camera systems were intended to achieve, thus the detail of his reporting of the cost 
comparisons are occasionally difficult to follow due to redaction.  The general point he makes, 
however, is clear.  Potentially unmanned missions could also have lasted longer (60-days proposed in 
lieu of 30-day manned missions), yielding more results for a given fixed cost. 
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DOD was "killing itself in attempts to justify the man." He said the man did not need 
to be justified to the panel, which accepted his presence. "MOL is an experiment in 
which man is the experimentor," he said. "We should keep it that way." Further, he 
stated 'that the panel insisted on automating all MOL functions so that the man 
"could stay loose and be an experimentor."’395   
In August 1966, General Schriever retired from the USAF.  As far as the 
MOL programme was concerned he made two ‘valedictory’ statements.  One was 
the testimony to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in February 
1966 described above.  The other was a memorandum delivered to the Secretary 
of the Air Force (Harold Brown) on the day he stood down.  In it, he restates his 
belief in the importance of military manned spaceflight, and laments the 
conservative pace at which it has been developed.  In the portion quoted by 
Berger, he makes specific comments on the MOL: “The inception of the Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory Program has given us the opportunity to bring into sharper 
focus a broader appreciation of the potentials of military space by now 
encompassing the uniqueness, flexibility, and responsiveness of man.”396  
Schriever’s faith in the utility of military manned spaceflight was now tied to 
militarily useful missions, but he had struggled throughout the MOL programme to 
protect its demonstration function.  Had he succeeded, it might have validated this 
belief without concentration on a single mission (reconnaissance), where in fact 
unmanned automatic systems were becoming more reliable, efficient and 
productive. 
Military	Manned	Spaceflight	–	Schriever	and	Administrative	Action		
Schriever’s main administrative activities (and difficulties) relating to military 
manned spaceflight involved managing the USAF’s relationships with other 
agencies, specifically ARPA and NASA.  In this section they are examined, 
particularly that relating to NASA, in order to demonstrate that Schriever 
maintained far better relations with them than with ARPA, while still recognising the 
differing motivations behind the actions of each agency and the USAF. 
																																																								
395 Berger, History of the MOL  186 
396 ‘Manned Mil Missions in Space’ (Schriever to Sec AF dated 31 August 1966), cited in Berger, 
History of the MOL  187.  Schriever makes no specific comment in these remarks about the 
reconnaissance versus experimentation controversy, perhaps because the memorandum was 
unclassified.  It is possible that Schriever intended that it be published, though the author can find no 
evidence that this happened.  Sadly, no copy of the full text appears to survive in the Schriever 
archive either. 
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The creation of ARPA was coincident with the formation of NASA during the 
second Eisenhower administration. Multiple factors converged to drive the creation 
of the two agencies, and it is not the intent of this thesis to explore them.397  Their 
result was that ARPA was created from scratch to manage a variety of advanced 
research programmes for the DoD on behalf of all the Services.  This included 
military space programmes.  Soon after, NASA – a reformation of the previous 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics – was given responsibility for 
management of the civilian space programme.  At this point, the military unmanned 
space programme was transferred back to the Services to deliver, but with ARPA 
retaining an oversight role, while the manned portion was subsumed into NASA 
activity. 
Schriever’s relationship with ARPA was frequently antagonistic.  By the end 
of 1958, ARPA was ‘reaching into’ the USAF to control the development of the 
Discoverer/SENTRY programme.398   In February 1959, the tenor of the 
relationship between them can be gauged by a memorandum transmitted within 
Schriever’s organisation.  Colonel Sheppard, Assistant Deputy Commander for 
Military Space Systems, wrote to Colonel Curtin (a close colleague of Schriever’s 
and at that time a staff officer within ARDC) stating: “…I have no hope that ARPA 
can be turned into a useful activity of any kind…Somehow we should be able to 
make use of the fact that industrial interest has governed many of their actions to 
an extent almost – if not quite – illegal…”.399  Sheppard goes on to propose 
sponsoring a history of ARPA activity compiled by external agencies and scholars.  
Matters appear to have culminated in August and September 1959, when 
Schriever twice wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force about ARPA’s 
performance.400 As was mentioned earlier in this chapter in our analysis of Dwayne 
Day’s account of SAMOS E-5 activity, Schriever even managed to enlist the 
support of General Curtis LeMay in his campaign to rescue the USAF space 
																																																								
397 There are numerous accounts in the literature of the various lobbyists claims and counterclaims 
surrounding ARPA and NASA.  For examples, see Walter A. McDougall, The heavens and the earth : 
a political history of the space age (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) 167-69,  
Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik challenge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 100-01 
398 Letter dated 5 December 1958, ARPA to Undersecretary of the Air Force ‘DISCOVERER-Thor 
project and SENTRY programs’.  Schriever Archive, Recently Declassified Documents folder.  
Schriever also received an internal ARPA memorandum dated 17 December 1958 detailing ARPA 
intent for the SENTRY programme.  Same Folder. 
399 Memo Col Sheppard to Col Curtin dated 5 February 1959.  A copy was furnished to Col Boatman, 
who was Schriever’s aide at the time, and Schriever retained it in his archive.  Schriever Archive, 
Recently Declassified Documents folder. 
400 Letters General Schriever to General White (untitled – one relating to SAMOS, one to MIDAS) 
dated 15 September 1959.  Schriever Archive, Recently Declassified Documents folder. 
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programme from ARPA attention. Eventually, Schriever prevailed, and the USAF 
regained adequate control of the military space programme.   
Schriever’s relationship with NASA was apparently more nuanced. The 
same internal memorandum referenced above relating to ARPA and its 
deficiencies adopted a more conciliatory, albeit still potentially mischievous, 
approach to NASA relations.  Col Sheppard suggested: 
My current feeling is that the politic thing to do is not to try to draft up and 
sell in any high pressure, overt way a category of things which NASA 
should do as contrasted to the things the military departments should do.  It 
seems to me that we can accomplish our objective with much less 
commotion by listing the countless requirements we have for scientific data 
relative to space and then laying these requirements firmly on NASA 
through all the channels we can find.  This will insure that they are kept so 
busy doing the right things that, in general, they will be unable to intrude 
into genuine military business.401 
 
There is again no record in the archive of Schriever’s reaction to this 
suggestion but it certainly illustrates a view held in his HQ at the time.  In 1961, a 
UPI news release (retained by Schriever in his papers) suggested that the DOD 
‘might seek to take over NASA’, but beneath the sensationalist headline UPI were 
actually reporting a 1960 memorandum from General White, the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force which had gone to Schriever among other recipients.  They noted that 
General White had written:  “It is obvious that NASA will play a large part in the 
national effort in this direction [spaceflight], and moreover, inevitably will be closely 
associated, if not eventually combined with the military…It is perfectly clear to men 
that particularly in these formative years for Air Force must [sic] for its own good as 
well as in the national interest, cooperate to a maximum extent with NASA to 
include the furnishing of key personnel even at the expense of some Air Force 
dilution of technical talent.”402  By 1961, Schriever appeared to have reached a 
working accommodation with NASA.  In his diary for 10 September 1961, he noted 
in ‘to do’ list-style:  “1.  More comms between BAS and TG [Schriever and Trevor 
Gardner] with J Webb [the inaugural NASA administrator].  2.  Need for existing 
resources now.  3.  Why NASA can’t build and do at the same time.  4.  Why USAF 
needs what it has – particularly life sciences.  5.  Why full partnership is needed – 
mgt resources etc.”  On the reverse of the same page, Schriever summarises an 																																																								
401 Memo Col Sheppard to Col Curtin dated 5 February 1959.  Schriever Archive, Recently 
Declassified Documents folder. 
402 UPI Press Release by David Burnham, dated 7 March (1961 can be inferred from reference to 
General White’s tenure as CSAF and a further reference to McNamara as Secretary of Defense).  
Schriever Archive, Box 136, Folder 1.  The author has not been able to locate an original copy of 
General White’s memorandum referred to.  
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action list for interaction with Mr Jerry Wiesner, President Kennedy’s Presidential 
Scientific Adviser: “2.  Jerry Wiesner *Get Together.  *Down Range.  *USAF/NASA 
– how do we work together – MLLP [Manned Lunar Landing Program?] (Wiesner 
had made a point of advocating for unmanned lunar and planetary exploration, 
notwithstanding President Kennedy’s recent public commitment to put a man on 
the Moon within the decade.)403  This shows Schriever simultaneously continuing to 
forge a constructive relationship with NASA, preserving USAF equity in life 
sciences research and influencing a notable critic of manned spaceflight, perhaps 
to NASA and the USAF’s mutual benefit. 
When the MOL was first proposed, the management context was an 
agreement of January 1963 between NASA Administrator Webb, and Secretary of 
Defense McNamara.  This agreement related initially to military interest in the 
NASA Gemini programme.  It committed the parties “…’to insure the most effective 
utilization of the Gemini program in the national interest.’ It created a Gemini 
Program Planning Board (GPPB), one of whose aims was ‘to avoid duplication of 
effort in the field of manned space flight and to insure maximum attainment of 
objectives of value to both the NASA and DOD.’”  Additionally, it stated that “neither 
agency could initiate a major new manned space flight program in the near-earth 
environment without the other's consent.”404  Schriever was taking a close interest 
in NASA activities at this time, delegating Major Generals Keeling and Ritland 
special responsibility; in his diary for 5 January 1963, he notes “NASA  
*Procurement and Contract, Keeling and Ritland – formal procedures for 
monitoring above – for the record.”405 
In March that year, NASA announced their intention to proceed with a study 
of a manned (civilian) laboratory, orbiting the Earth, with the intent of deciding for or 
against construction in time for the FY65 budget submission.  USAF officials 
reminded NASA of the terms of the January agreement, and Major General 
Ritland, presumably following his direction from January, advised Schriever that he 
thought NASA and the USAF should coordinate space station planning.406  
Discussions between DOD and NASA ensued during March and April, culminating 																																																								
403 Diary page in Schriever Archive, Recently Declassified Documents folder.  For comment on 
Wiesner’s attitudes to manned exploration, see Arnold S Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era 
(NASA SP-4102) (Washington DC: NASA Scientific and Technical Information Branch, 1982) Chapter 
2.  President Kennedy made his public commitment to manned lunar exploration before a joint 
session of Congress on 25 May 1961. 
404 Text of the ‘Gemini Agreement’, quoted in Berger, History of the MOL  19, 22. 
405 Schriever Archive, Box 6, Folder 14. Underlining and bulleting in original. ‘Keeling’ is almost 
certainly Major General Gerald Keeling, at that time Schriever’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Procurement 
and Production at Air Force Systems Command.  
406 Berger, History of the MOL  22-23. 
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in a meeting between Secretary McNamara and James Webb on 27 April, in which 
they: “reached a compromise of sorts. That is, the space agency head agreed that 
funded space station studies "should be jointly sponsored by the Department of 
Defense and NASA." Webb also accepted the argument that DOD and NASA 
would proceed, with hardware development "only by mutual consent."’407  The 
USAF moved to capitalize on DOD interest in the subject area, by offering their 
own plan for an orbiting space station. 
The USAF proposal struck a responsive chord in OSD. On 25 May 
Secretary McNamara advised Zuckert that he considered "the Orbital 
Space Station Program as one requiring a new national mission to be 
assigned by the President on behalf of all national interests." He agreed 
that since the lunar landing assignment previously had been given to 
NASA, "the near-earth interests of the DOD might be considered a logical 
reason for assigning to the DOD this undertaking … He expressed 
confidence that, if such an assignment were made to the DOD, "the. Air 
Force could carry out its management responsibilities cooperatively with the 
NASA."408 
 
This direction plainly flowed down to Schriever.  His diary suggests that as 
Commander Air Force Systems Command during May 1963, he was principally 
concerned with the travails of the RS-70 proposed reconnaissance aircraft, and 
with establishing the personnel who would conduct the Systems Command ‘Project 
FORECAST’ technology futures study, but it also shows that he kept a ‘watching 
brief’ on space station progress.  Although its future probably did not appear bright, 
his diary also suggests enduring interest in the Dyna-Soar programme and its 
objectives.409  By the end of the year, as recounted above, the Air Force had a 
proposed MOL programme with Schriever as its Director.   
The last individual mention of relationships between NASA and the USAF in 
the context of MOL arise in 1965, near the end of Schriever’s involvement with the 
programme.  Without specific context, Berger reports that: “By 1965-1966 Air Force 
and NASA manned space programs had evolved to the point where the 
competition between the two agencies had manifestly declined… This period saw 
																																																								
407 Letter Secretary McNamara to Mr Zuckert (Secretary of the Air Force) cited in Berger, History of 
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409 A good example is Schriever’s diary entry for 28 October 1963, which indicates his interest both in 
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November 1963, there is a further entry listing both ‘X-20’ (the alternate designation for Dyna-Soar) 
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increasing coordination of the efforts of both agencies.“410  He then recounts, 
however, an instance where although Schriever worked to promote good relations 
with NASA, his methods were questioned from above.  In September 1965, NASA 
and DOD senior leadership proposed “to establish an informal six-man DOD/NASA 
committee to review and solve manned space flight problems "not solvable by any 
other level." The committee, they agreed, would also serve to assure Congress that 
they were working closely together in the Gemini, Apollo Applications, and MOL 
areas”.  Schriever was unconvinced of the need for the committee: “General 
Schriever, however, had been attempting to establish a close personal working 
relationship with Dr. Mueller and felt that the proposed committee would undercut 
his current effort.” 411   In the end, Schriever was overruled and the committee 
established, but by the time this happened, Schriever’s involvement with MOL was 
coming to an end.  
Throughout this account of Schriever’s interaction with NASA, he was 
working to build a constructive relationship with them.  He recognised the 
conceptual difference between military and civil/scientific spaceflight but also the 
technical similarities.  He also understood the significance of their early efforts for 
national prestige and worked pragmatically to forge a productive relationship with 
them.  After his retirement, he summarised it thus:  
I was never opposed to NASA as such. What I was concerned about was 
the constant reference to space for peaceful purposes and forgetting or 
implying that we weren't going to do anything in space for military or 
national security needs…My own feeling is that had we not had NASA that 
we would have proceeded much more rapidly in our military space 
programs… So it was not NASA per se that I objected to. It was the space 
for peaceful purposes baloney that kept cropping up all the time. If the 
President had just said, "We're also going to do those things necessary for 
national security," I would have been perfectly happy… All the time that I 
was running the Systems Command, I made available some of my best 
people to NASA …and, as far as I'm concerned, supported NASA with all 
the resources that we had available at all times in the most cooperative 
way.412 
 
Despite the pressures he was working under, and the wider remit of 
programmes he had to manage as Commander of Air Force Systems Command 
compared to his previous appointments, it seems clear that he recognised and 																																																								
410 Berger, History of the MOL  222. 
411Both quotations from Berger, History of the MOL  238.  There are, unfortunately, no diary entries 
from Schriever to corroborate or add context to Berger’s assertion.  This specific interaction is the last 
mention of Schriever in Berger’s MOL History, which goes on to recount the rest of the programme 
until its cancellation in 1969. 
412 Schriever, 'USAF Oral History Interview',  42-43.. 
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prioritised relations with external agencies appropriately in pursuit of the military 
manned spaceflight mission. 
Military	Manned	Spaceflight	–	Summary		
Schriever’s faith in the utility of military manned spaceflight was sincere and 
enduring, but it must be evaluated against the steps he took to achieve it and the 
criterion of technical risk reduction, conceptual maturity and administrative span of 
control and competence.  The analysis is complicated by the limited practical 
extent of the USAF’s manned spaceflight programme; however, it can nonetheless 
be evaluated as to the likely outcomes by comparison with the NASA manned 
spaceflight programme, at least as far as technical aspects are concerned. 
Schriever’s first attempted forays into manned spaceflight – his advocacy 
for the MISS programme, and perhaps his preparation for a manned SAMOS 
capsule, closely mirrored the NASA Mercury programme.  Schriever also had a 
proven understanding of many of the technical challenges of manned spaceflight, 
partly from studies he had promoted, and partly because the NASA Mercury and 
Gemini programmes relied on launchers based on USAF ICBMs.413  It thus seems 
reasonable to surmise that MISS and manned-SAMOS would not have posed any 
insuperable technical challenges if they had proceeded to the hardware stage.  
Schriever took a close interest in the Dyna-Soar programme through most of its 
life, despite not having had significant involvement in it initially.  He was also aware 
of its dependence on a Titan-variant launcher.  The degree of technical risk 
associated with Dyna-Soar would have been substantially higher than with the 
earlier ballistic capsules, due to the challenging goal of ensuring its controllability 
for glide-landings to fixed landing sites, but there were some technical analogues 
such as the X-15 research aircraft then in use which might have suggested that 
Dyna-Soar was at least technically plausible.   
When Dyna-Soar was eventually cancelled in favour of the MOL 
programme, Schriever became much more closely involved with its day-to-day 
management.  From the technical standpoint, the MOL was an ambitious 
undertaking, but it reused elements of proven technology such as the Gemini 
capsule for crew transport and a developed Titan launcher.  A convincing technical 
analogue for MOL was the subsequent Skylab mission flown by NASA in 1973-74.  
It utilised surplus Saturn and Apollo components after the last lunar mission, in a 																																																								
413 The initial sub-orbital Mercury launches used a booster based on the US Army’s ‘Redstone’ 
missile, but all orbital Mercury launches, and the entire Gemini programme relied on Atlas and Titan 
variants respectively. 
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technically similar configuration to MOLs use of Gemini and Titan parts.  Although 
not without its problems (part of the laboratory was damaged on launch, 
necessitating improvised repairs by its crew), it yielded useful data and is generally 
regarded as successful.  It could be argued that its impromptu repair by its crew 
was exactly the kind of capability intended for demonstration by MOL.414 Thus 
Schriever’s faith in the technical plausibility of MOL appears well founded.  The 
technical plausibility of the manned reconnaissance mission remains unknown; all 
Schriever had to base his optimism on were some preliminary experiments and 
trials conducted on Earth, including use of a Lockheed simulation facility, but these 
were in themselves promising, and thus his endorsement of the proposal appears 
sound.  Problems would, however, arise over the policy and conceptual 
implications of combining an experimental programme with an operational mission. 
As was outlined above, Schriever’s view about the conceptual relevance of 
manned spaceflight shifted from an initial focus on exploration to one of exploitation 
during the latter stages of his career.  Unfortunately for him, he never, however, 
managed to synchronise this vision with a task that the Air Force could legitimately 
address; in the earliest days of manned spaceflight, he understood the technical 
challenges posed by exploration, and believed the Air Force was well placed to 
solve them, but was unable to gain support in the higher levels of government for 
this mission to be assigned to them.  As manned spaceflight matured, he 
advocated for a comprehensive programme of experimentation to validate his 
ideas about possible missions, but was then unable to keep the MOL oriented 
towards them, as it was instead redirected into meeting operational requirements, 
isolating its original experimental ethos.  These, in turn, delayed its development, 
and by the time Schriever retired, it was already caught in the vicious spiral of 
delay, increased costs and diminished budgets that would lead to its cancellation.  
Meanwhile, the manned reconnaissance imperatives disappeared as improved 
unmanned systems became available. 
Finally, as regards administrative span of control and related matters, 
Schriever moved convincingly to forge effective relationships with NASA, 
particularly where their cooperation had mutual benefits.  He was perhaps fortunate 
that the services regained operational control of their advanced research and 
development programmes from ARPA at a critical stage in their evolution.  He was 																																																								
414 A brief comparison of MOL and Skylab can be found in the extensive Skylab history by David Hitt, 
Owen K. Garriott, and Joe Kerwin, Homesteading space : the Skylab story (Outward Odyssey Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008).  Hitt et al’s analysis of MOL (at pp12-13) is hampered by 
the MOL Reconnaissance Mission still being classified in 2008, but the general principles they outline 
hold. 
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unable, however, to recreate the budgetary authority he had enjoyed with respect 
to ICBM development in order to enable manned spaceflight programmes.  The 
overt reason was a sea-change in the appetite within the Department of Defense 
for this level of autonomy, as exemplified by Secretary McNamara’s centralising 
tendencies.  Underlying this, there was also the fact that concurrency and devolved 
budgetary authority relied on their objective being assessed as being of critical 
national importance (described as ‘crash’ priority in Chapter 3 above).  It is very 
hard to see a programme of laboratory experiments to evaluate what military tasks 
could be performed in space being accorded such a status. 
Taken overall, the military manned spaceflight programmes as pursued by 
Schriever had the characteristics of a ‘pet project’; manageable technical risk with a 
plausible route to its reduction, an at least adequate administrative span of control, 
perhaps threatened by budgetary difficulty, but a grave deficiency in a plausible 
conceptual framework.  In the earliest days of manned spaceflight, the conceptual 
task was simple, but the USAF was excluded from its direct execution by policy.  
When that stipulation was relaxed, they struggled to define what the evolving 
manned space mission should be.  When they proposed an experimental 
programme to resolve what it could be, they were unable to protect it from being 
diverted to meet (transient) operational needs, and by the time those had passed, 
the programme was too costly and Schriever had passed into retirement.  His 
enduring enthusiasm for the mission was palpable, but he was reduced to lobbying 
for it from outside the Service.
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CHAPTER 6 – DAYDREAMING: THE USAF AND 
SPACE WEAPONIZATION 	
The last area of space capability explored by Schriever was the thorny 
issue of space weaponization.  Even today, there is no universally agreed definition 
of what would constitute a ‘space weapon’, or what act involving one (construction? 
deployment? threatened use? actual use?) would constitute ‘space weaponization’.  
In this Chapter, this thesis looks at the systems that at various times have plausibly 
been considered ‘space weapons’, and the extent to which the USAF explored their 
operation or brought them into service.  It starts by considering the competing 
definitions of a space weapon, then looks in turn at the various systems employed, 
or considered seriously, by Schriever and the USAF.  Using the same model as 
previously, it considers specifically Schriever’s understanding of the technical and 
conceptual problems they posed, and the actions he took to enable their 
employment. 
Space	Weapons	–	Definitions	and	Scope.		
In deciding what might be thought to be a space weapon, an analyst must 
consider what is their unique or identifying feature.  Existing analysis varies, with 
some commentators analysing putative space weapons by the destructive 
mechanism envisaged: directed energy (typically laser or microwave derived), 
various conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) warheads for use in space or against 
surface targets and use of nuclear warheads, again either against space-borne or 
terrestrial targets.415  An alternative view, based simply on the area of operation, 
provides a simple definition of a space weapon as: “…any system that directly 
works to defeat space assets from terrestrial- or space-based locations or 
terrestrial-based targets from space.”416  Generally excluded as ‘space weapons’ 
are Ballistic Missiles, on the grounds that though they travel through space, they do 
not achieve orbital velocity.  Views on whether anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) are 
space weapons or not is less consistent.  Without naming specific sources, Paul 
Stares suggests that they were commonly regarded as a ‘space weapon’ during 
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416 David W Zeigler, 'Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary', in Bruce M. De Blois 
(ed.), Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought (Maxwell, AL: Air 
University Press, 1997), 191. 
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the Eisenhower era.417  However, contemporary US national policy made a relevant 
distinction: “… the relation between outer space technology and ballistic missile 
technology is recognised, US policy on ballistic missiles is not covered in this 
policy.  Anti-missile defense systems also are not covered except to the extent that 
space vehicles may be used in connection with such systems.”418  While 
recognising this divergence of opinion, this thesis will, take the contemporary view 
and include them. 
Space	Weapons	–	USAF	Experience		
Initially, the USAF was excluded from operation of an ABM by military 
policy; surface-to-air missiles (SAMs - aimed at aircraft) were operated by the US 
Army, and since the first operational ABM system was a development of the ‘Nike’ 
SAM, known as ‘Nike-Zeus’, the Army retained ownership and responsibility for 
them.  In 1955, the USAF revived a previously abandoned proposal known as 
‘Wizard’ in an attempt to seize the role back from the Army.  After a bitter and 
prolonged dispute over several years, which expanded to incorporate a parallel 
debate about the competing nature of the USAF ‘Thor’ and the US Army ‘Jupiter’ 
ballistic missiles, the USAF abandoned Wizard for the second time and temporarily 
withdrew from ABM operations.419   
At the same time as it failed to secure an ABM role, the USAF was 
exploring anti-satellite technologies.  One justification for this need was the 
realization that the USA would be as vulnerable to satellite reconnaissance 
overflight as they hoped the USSR would prove to be.  They envisaged thus 
needing to be able to destroy hostile overflying satellites.  Early statements of 
intent towards this capability are easy to find, for example as stated by General 
Gavin: 
It is inconceivable to me that we would indefinitely tolerate Soviet 
reconnaissance of the United States without protest, for clearly such 
reconnaissance has an association with an ICBM program.  It is necessary, 
therefore, and I believe urgently necessary, that we acquire at least a 																																																								
417 Paul B. Stares, The militarization of space : U.S. policy, 1945-1984 (Cornell studies in security 
affairs Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985) 47-48 
418 From ‘General Considerations: Scope of Policy’ in ‘US Policy on Outer Space’, agreed between 
the National Air and Space Council and the National Security Council on 12 January 1960 and 
published later that month.  Reproduced in John M Logsdon et al. (eds.), Organizing for Exploration 
(NASA SP-4407 - Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the US Civil Space 
Program, 1; Washington DC: NASA, 1995) 362 
419 For a more detailed analysis of this dispute, see Barry Leonard, History of Strategic and Ballistic 
Missile Defense: Volume II: 1956-1972 (Colingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2011), and specifically 
Chapter 4.  It is also worth noting that the ‘Wizard’ proposal of 1955, although touted in some circles 
as a revival of interest in work begun at Johns Hopkins University in 1947, in fact had almost nothing 
in common with its predecessor. 
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capability of denying Soviet overflight – that we develop a satellite 
interceptor.420 
 
Although General Gavin was a US Army officer, similar arguments can 
found from USAF, and in fact also from USN sources.421  (It is taken as read, 
throughout the US discussion at the time, that Soviet over-flight of the USA would 
be inherently much more destabilising than the reverse case).  The USAF, 
however, struggled to turn this apparent necessity into action. The Eisenhower 
administration was willing to tolerate experiments and trials to evaluate the 
practicality of the various destructive mechanisms but was not wiling to see those 
developed into operational systems, since such a move would be a clear 
contradiction to the ‘space for peace’ theme permeating their policy at the time.  
Paul Stares again provides a comprehensive summary of the status of the various 
systems considered at the time – some as paper studies, but others that 
progressed to hardware trials.422   
A second, and slightly later, driver for interest in developing an ASAT 
capability came from fear that the USSR was developing a nuclear orbital 
bombardment system.423  Public statements such as that made by Premier 
Khrushchev in August 1961 highlighted these fears: “…we have bombs more 
powerful than 100 megatons.  We placed Gagarin and Titov in space, and we can 
replace them with other loads that can be directed to any place on Earth”.424  
Countering such possible threats was thus a direct analogue to shooting down an 
incoming sub-orbital ICBM, but since the activity would be directed against an 
orbiting system, it would more logically be addressed by the USAF.425    
In 1958, the USA began to explore the effects of nuclear explosions in the 
upper atmosphere and outer space.  These experiments were not directed or 
conducted specifically by the USAF, though Schriever must have been aware of 																																																								
420 James M. Gavin, War and peace in the space age (London: Hutchinson, 1959) 215-6 
421 Stares, The militarization of space  49 
422 Stares, The militarization of space  Chapter 6, pp106 et seq 
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(Poole: Blandford, 1983) 64-76 
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ASATs.  Of these, the UN Navy project was considerably the more ambitious.  Under the project 
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advantage of using a conventional, rather than nuclear, warhead, but was eventually cancelled due to 
concerns about costs and about command and control issues.  See Hand, AU-18 (1993) Space 
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them.426  Relatively small warheads were used and results were measured both by 
satellite and by ground installations.  Although these earliest tests had specific 
scientific goals relating to the interaction between the warheads and the Earth’s 
radiation belts, they yielded results later used by ARPA for anti-satellite studies.427   
At least partly inspired by the 1958 findings, the USAF conducted their first 
successful demonstration of a potential ASAT missile the following year.  Project 
BOLD ORION had begun as an attempt to develop an air-launched ballistic missile 
(ALBM), but one test firing was adapted to demonstrate ASAT potential.  The 
unarmed test-shot, launched from a B-47 bomber, was estimated to have passed 
within a few miles of the nominated ‘target’, ‘Explorer IV’.428  BOLD ORION did not 
mature into an operational system, being superseded by the Skybolt ALBM, and its 
anti-satellite potential ceased with it. 
A more ambitious USAF attempt at developing an ASAT system followed, 
embedded within Project ‘SAINT’.  Its origins lay in a requirement issued in 1958 as 
‘General Operational Requirement 170’ to be able to inspect a satellite and 
determine its identity. SAINT was a complicated and ambitious programme, which 
would initially have provided an on-orbit inspection capability (hence the acronym 
‘SAINT’, from ‘SAtellite INspecTor’), but with the potential to grow this into an 
attack system.  The extent to which these roles were emphasised varied during its 
troubled development period, and there were also policy constraints applied to how 
much could be said in public.429  SAINT was eventually cancelled in December 
1962 by Secretary of Defense McNamara without any hardware having been 
deployed.430   SAINT is described in greater detail in the following section (pp 158-
59 below). 
The final anti-satellite system touted by the USAF during Schriever’s 
service was also the only one actually delivered.  Program 437 began as an 
alternative to the US Army’s Nike-Zeus system, which had been briefly operational 
during 1963-64.  Nike-Zeus had been built as an ABM system, with limited potential 																																																								
426 The 1958 Project Argus test shots were directed by the Presidential Scientific Advisory Committee 
and conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. 
427 Fact Sheet contained in Defense Nuclear Agency Report DNA 6039F - Operation Argus 1958,   
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428 Rip Bulkeley and Graham Spinardi, Space Weapons: Deterrence or Delusion (Cambridge: Polity 
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for an ASAT application.  Program 437 was overall a more capable system, with 
the added advantage that it built on existing proven components (the Nike-Zeus 
was a radical extrapolation of the Nike-Hercules SAM).  Program 437…”melded the 
Thor booster, existing warheads and launch pads, and ADC's worldwide detection, 
tracking, communications, and command and control infrastructure into an 
operational ASAT system.“431    It also drew on the 1962 series of high-altitude 
nuclear tests (Operation FISHBOWL), which had used much larger warheads than 
the 1958 ‘Argus’ series.  The impact that these explosions had on the then orbiting 
population of satellites demonstrated (in a rather indiscriminate way) the potential 
delivery of a working ASAT; work on Project 437 was authorised on 11 January 
1963, and the system became operational in June 1964.  It remained in existence, 
albeit latterly with much reduced reliability and effectiveness, until April 1975.432 
Finally, there are the most controversial of space weapons – those 
designed to threaten targets on the Earth’s surface from space.  These are 
collectively referred to as ‘orbital bombardment systems’.  Available information on 
these systems is sketchy at best, but two identifiable attempts to procure and 
operate them can be found.  The first originated in the earliest days of the US 
military space programme, and the second became a component of the manned 
space programme. 
The German rocket scientists who came to the USA after the end of World 
War 2 brought with them ideas about the potential of orbital bombardment systems.  
Wernher von Braun was undoubtedly one of their proponents; Michael Neufeld’s 
biography of him cites interviews he gave to Associated Press in 1957-58.433  In it, 
Neufeld asserts that without mentioning it explicitly, von Braun was plainly 
envisaging an orbital bombardment system.  Von Braun then removed any doubt in 
an article he wrote for the mass media, eventually published in June 1958.  In this, 
he pointed out that a manned space-station would make a good launching base for 
nuclear warheads to threaten terrestrial targets.434   Von Braun’s views can thus be 
referenced with confidence.  However, further analysis of these early systems 
becomes difficult, due to a paucity of impartial reporting.   
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It seems likely that Walter Dornberger shared von Braun’s views, for 
example, but it is hard to detail his understanding or opinions.  Dornberger had 
worked with von Braun in Germany during World War 2, and like him, had come to 
the USA after the war.  In 1947, while von Braun was embedding himself in the 
emerging US Army space programme, Dornberger wrote a report for the USAF on 
the potential of bombardment systems.  No copy of this report can be located but 
its content is described in several publications.  Writing in 2001, Karl Grossman 
states that the USAF began early work on implementing such a system under the 
acronym NABS (‘Nuclear Armed Bombardment System’).  Unfortunately, 
Grossman relies on earlier reporting by another author, Jack Manno, and does not 
cite any primary sources for his work.435  Yet another journalist who reported at the 
time on bombardment systems was Philip Klass, who was then on the staff of 
Aviation Week magazine; Klass’s reporting appears consistent with Manno and 
Grossman.  Klass’s work is also cited by others, most notably by Michael 
Golovine.436  From these brief references, all that can be stated with confidence is 
that the USAF probably did study a NABS system during the late 1940s or early 
1950s, drawing on the opinions and ideas of the German scientists and engineers 
then working for them, but only took those studies to the conceptual stage.  By 
1960, a slightly less ambitious scheme had also reached the concept stage.  The 
‘Positive Control Bombardment System’ (PCBS) was the outcome of an Aerospace 
Corporation study conducted for AFBMD.  Rather than proposing a long-endurance 
orbiting system holding an enemy target at risk continuously, it addressed the 
problem of determining the need for a retaliatory strike in the presence of 
ambiguous warnings.  It proposed a short-life orbiting system which could be 
launched immediately ‘on warning’ to enter a low-earth orbit for a brief period.  It 
would then be commanded to attack if a warning was confirmed, or alternatively, it 
was envisaged to re-enter quickly in a safe area, with its warhead disarmed.  An 
alternative profile would be for it to launch into a barely sub-orbital flight path ‘the 
long way round’ to its target, again in anticipation of commands either to attack or 																																																								
435 Karl Grossman, Weapons in Space (New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2001) 65.  Grossman is 
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to achieve ‘safe’ disposal.437   The context of the brief reporting available on the 
PCBS tells its own story: the covering letter is a response from HQ USAF to the 
legislative liaison office of the Secretary of the Air Force.  The House Science and 
Astronautics Committee had apparently discovered that AFBMD had held a briefing 
session with industry on the proposed USAF space programme, and has asked for 
a copy of the brief.  A copy was duly supplied, with explanatory notes indicating 
which of the concepts or projects briefed were already in service or development.  
The PCBS is noted in the covering letter as being limited to a “study to determine 
feasibility”; in the main brief, it is noted that “BMD has requested industry to look 
further into this type of system under Study Requirement 199A”.438  Study 
Requirement (SR) 199 (without the ‘A’) is noted in a contemporary guide to space 
programmes as being a “third generation ICBM to be operational by 1970.  To 
counteract antimissile missiles”.439  With that rather cryptic description, PCBS 
disappears from public record. 
Walter Dornberger had one more opportunity for involvement in a space 
weapons system, via his work for the Bell Aircraft Company, whose staff he joined 
after his early work for the USAF.  Dornberger played an active role in developing 
the X-15 experimental aircraft and then served as a consultant on the X-20 Dyna-
Soar project described above.  Among the various roles envisaged for the X-20 
was bombardment.  This arose from one of the three programmes – ‘Brass Bell’, 
‘Hywards’ and ‘BOMI’ which were merged to become the X-20 programme.  BOMI 
was an acronym for ‘Bomber Missile’ – a proposal that merged experimental and 
operational aspects of ICBM and manned spaceflight technology in a two-stage 
boost-glide vehicle intended to deliver a nuclear payload against a distant target.  
Although the X-20 always remained a research programme, it was envisaged as 
leading to operational applications.  At the time of Dyna-Soar’s cancellation in 
1963, it had failed to demonstrate sufficient range or payload potential to enable 
the bombardment mission, and as policy had turned against such uses.  It is hard, 
however, to escape the view that its proponents still saw weapons delivery as one 
of its eventual roles.  
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Space	Weaponization	–	Schriever	and	Technical	Progress		
Given that so few of the USAF’s space weapons programmes came to 
fruition, it is sometimes difficult to establish the extent to which Schriever 
understood the detail of their potential and their problems.  Nevertheless, some 
insight can be found in his remarks and activities, which must serve to establish the 
extent and nature of his involvement in them. 
It was stated above that Schriever must have been aware of the early US 
trials of nuclear detonations in space that informed early ABM and ASAT work.  
This is because the rocket used to launch the warheads detonated in the trial were 
originally produced to test the re-entry characteristics of the Atlas ICBM warhead; 
the Lockheed X-17 was a solid-fuelled rocket designed to lift the various shapes 
proposed for the Atlas warhead to the edge of space and accelerate them to 
representative speeds for re-entry trials.  The X-17 was produced specifically to 
support the Atlas programme – Schriever is quoted by John Chapman as noting 
“[the X-17] proved to be a quick and accurate way to gain reliable data without 
flying a full-scale missile”.440  At the end of the X-17 programme, which comprised 
26 flights, the ARGUS programme constructed a further 7 X-17s from spare parts, 
which were then used to loft the ARGUS payloads.441  Although there is no 
detectable mention of Argus in Schriever’s diaries for the period of the Argus trials, 
given the importance that Schriever attached to shepherding assets and resources 
related to the Atlas programme, seen most notably in his concerns to prevent Thor 
and WS-117L activity from impacting on Atlas delivery schedules, it seems 
inconceivable that he would not have been aware of the fate and disposition of X-
17 hardware. 
Schriever had also almost certainly begun thinking about ASAT systems 
more generally, perhaps as early as 1956.  This was when Air Research and 
Development Command (ARDC) – the parent organization of the Western 
Development Division – first began a formal study of ASAT technologies. In 1959, 
Schriever himself commissioned a technical and operational concept from the 
Space Technology Laboratories for the SAINT system.  Project SAINT grew to 
incorporate a number of proposed developmental stages, leading eventually to an 
armed vehicle capable of destroying a target satellite.  A snapshot of the proposed 
programme in 1959 outlined the various stages:  																																																								
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The proposed Saint program divided into four parts: (a) Green Saint - early 
demonstration of ground launched rendezvous and inspection technique 
against a cooperative satellite, consisting of four vehicles beginning in 
1961…(b) White Saint - an outgrowth of Green Saint to demonstrate an 
operational unmanned interception and inspection system consisting of five 
launches beginning in January 1963…(c) Silver Saint - demonstration of an 
air-launched interception and inspection technique…(d) Blue Saint – a 
manned operational and interception and Inspection system with the first 
R&D launching in July 1965, and with the first operational launch possibly in 
1967.442 
 
By 1961, when development was underway in earnest, Schriever had risen 
to the rank of General and was commanding Air Force Systems Command.  SAINT 
development was then supervised by Major General Ozzie Ritland, the 
Commander of AFBMD.  It is thus difficult to gauge how much routine 
understanding Schriever had of the progress being made.  Ritland selected proven 
components from the USAF inventory to make up the SAINT booster – he planned 
to utilize an Atlas first stage, coupled with an Agena second stage to lift the SAINT 
payload alongside its target; both would have been familiar systems for Schriever, 
the Atlas because of its ICBM pedigree, and Agena because of its multiple uses 
within the CORONA reconnaissance programme.  Schriever also maintained 
overall responsibility for the proposed test programme.  He is cited as having 
approved 4 test flights initially, though increasing concerns about development 
progress led technicians to propose increasing this to 8.443  Eventually, however, 
the complexity of the programme, its limited capacity (SAINT relied heavily on 
‘SPADATS’ the space tracking systems which at the time lacked the sophistication 
to support it properly) and its vulnerability to overload or swamping by multiple 
targets led to its cancellation.   
Schriever noted the end of the programme; McNamara cancelled SAINT on 
3 December 1962, and in his diary for 18 December 1962 Schriever notes: 
Earliest capability (Defense) – Air Launched Satellite Interceptor.   
• RAND brief ESD (SPADATS Accuracy).   
• Determine whether all resources are being brought to bear on this 
subject.   
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• Conceptual Paper on need for defense against satellites.444   
Plainly he recognised that although SAINT had been cancelled, the need 
for the capability remained, and he understood that the limitations of the Space 
Tracking System had been fundamental to the failure and that an air-launched 
ASAT might show more potential.  Whether at that time he had in mind a system 
such as BOLD ORION, which had been cancelled in the previous year, or whether 
he envisaged a system based on a smaller missile (such as would eventually 
become the ASM-135 system carried by F-15 air defence aircraft in the 1980s) is 
unclear.  Furthermore, It is not clear from the diary entry whether Schriever 
envisaged commissioning a new conceptual paper on the need for ASAT systems, 
or was referring back to earlier policy papers on this topic.  What was clear was 
that Schriever remained wedded to the principle of space weaponization.  Earlier in 
1962, he had contributed a ‘headline-summary’ of USAF aspirations for military 
space systems to a trade-journal review article.  In it, he noted that:  
…the United States must give every encouragement to the rapid advance 
of space technology and its adaption into operational space systems, both 
manned and unmanned… 
The conduct of future military operations in space depends on 
developments in a number of specific technological areas.  These include 
launch vehicles; propulsion in space…sensors…weapons and command 
and control.445 [emphasis added] 
As events transpired, Schriever’s last foray into ASAT systems would not 
be air-launched.  Instead, he would be instrumental in delivering Program 437, 
based on the “Thor” IRBM.  The shift to ground-based systems had been endorsed 
by the Department of Defense; Dr Harold Brown, the Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering had cited both technical and financial reasons in a prominent 
address while Program 437 was under consideration.446   Thor had always been 
intended to be a ‘stop-gap’ missile until Atlas and later systems had entered 
service, and by late 1962 was in the process of being withdrawn from use, so 
finding a new use for the hardware certainly addressed cost issues, as well as 
driving significant risk out of the programme.   Schriever began by issuing ‘Advance 
Development Objective 40’.  This outlined the requirement for an ASAT, and was 
issued on behalf of Aerospace Defense Command (ADC).447  The technical 																																																								
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challenges envisaged then lay largely outside Schriever’s control.448  Thor was in 
service, and its warhead would be suitable for the ASAT role.  A Thor launch facility 
existed at Johnston Island in the Pacific, one of the intended operational locations 
(it had been installed there to support the 1962 high-altitude nuclear explosion 
‘Fishbowl’ tests), although it would require augmentation for this new role.  ADC 
had already outlined their own ideas for developing an ASAT system, and this work 
would also be subsumed into the Thor ASAT project, which became ‘Program 
437’.449  As was noted above, development work was broadly successful, and the 
system was declared operational on 10 June 1964.  Although it suffered from 
declining effectiveness due to the creeping obsolescence of Thor, and 
environmental factors including hurricane damage incurred in 1972 on Johnston 
Island, it remained at least notionally operational until 1975, long after Schriever 
had retired from the USAF. 
The final category of systems where Schriever’s showed technical insight is 
bombardment systems.  He was an active proponent for such systems, and had 
comprehensive strategic reasons for believing them to be useful and desirable.  
However, beyond the studies outlined above, and to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, no serious attempt was ever made to construct or introduce to US 
service such a system; there is no evidence that ‘NABS’ or ‘PCBS’ ever progressed 
beyond the conceptual stage, and although an armed role was envisaged on paper 
for Dyna-Soar, that programme was cancelled long before the engineering 
challenges would have become apparent.  Thus, there is no programme with which 
to gauge Schriever’s technical understanding on practical grounds.  Schriever did, 
however, consider some of the technical issues posed by bombardment systems in 
the first text he co-authored with Sam Cohen; the bulk of the technical analysis is 
found in the first part of Chapter 10.450  He described the components of a 
bombardment satellite as he envisaged it, including a warhead within a re-entry 
vehicle containing a guidance system, a launch mechanism to eject the warhead 
when required, and an associated control, communication and power generation 
system.451  He recognised that there were several technical challenges that would 
be faced in its design and highlighted three related problems he felt especially 
important: guidance challenges inherent in releasing the warhead from orbit, 																																																								
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associated orientation requirements for the carrying satellite, and the precision 
required from the ejection mechanism.452   
He saw the guidance issue as being a logical, but more complex 
extrapolation of the problems faced by a manned bomber aircraft, where the launch 
platform crew could see the target, and the ICBM where guidance was automatic, 
but began from a fixed location (the launch pad or silo) against a pre-determined 
target.  He implicitly believed the problem to be soluble (without spelling out how it 
might be done) and conflated it with the constraints that would arise from targets 
only being reachable from a given satellite during part of its orbit.  In fact, this issue 
would probably have been soluble relatively easily with the passage of time; ICBM 
accuracy improved as guidance systems matured, and so long as the warhead 
knew its position at launch, guiding to a given target would probably not have 
posed major problems.  However, it seems that Schriever did not envisage that 
possibility.  The ballistics of a warhead would have been known, however, and from 
that, calculation of practical launch positions could have been derived.    
Satellite orientation seemed a lesser problem to Schriever, and here he 
identified a practical solution.  He suggested that since the satellite would have a 
clear view of the heavens from outside the Earth’s atmosphere, precise attitude 
information could be derived by celestial means.  This was both practical, and 
achievable at the time: CORONA reconnaissance satellites used similar systems 
for observation camera pointing and referencing. 
Finally, Schriever was concerned with a high degree of precision and 
repeatability in the release mechanism for the warhead.  Here, he may again have 
been thinking of CORONA parallels; the CORONA satellite ejected exposed film in 
capsules for return to Earth.  These were ejected from the ‘parent’ satellite, but 
then decelerated by a built-in rocket to achieve re-entry.453  This occurred about a 
quarter of an orbit before the capsule reached the Earth’s surface, and the 
projected impact area was measured in hundreds of miles.454  It is unclear whether 
Schriever really thought through the implications of the issue here – he was 
seeking to achieve accuracy comparable to contemporary ICBMs, which were 
constrained in accuracy required by the yield of their warheads.  Several orders of 																																																								
452 Schriever and Cohen, ICBM  Chapter 10 Page 14. 
453 The similarities between CORONA and a bombardment system had occurred to another key 
player, albeit in this instance in the opposite sense, beginning with a bombardment system and 
extrapolating it to a re-entry system of some sort. 
454 Albert D Wheelon, 'CORONA - a triumph of American technology', in Dwayne A Day, John M 
Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky: the Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites 
(Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 36. 
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magnitude improvement in accuracy were plainly needed to adapt this technology 
to warhead delivery, but precision in the release mechanism (as opposed to 
accuracy and consistency in the re-entry rocket motor) would have been but one of 
the issues.  Implicitly, Schriever did not envisage guiding the re-entry vehicle during 
its flight, since that would surely have ironed out any small fluctuation in the release 
mechanism. 
Another technical speculation that undercut Schriever’s analysis of the 
practicality of orbital bombardment was that he recognised the demands of 
launching multiple satellites.  He recognised that the costs of orbiting a significant 
number of satellites would be large; much greater, for example, than the cost of 
maintaining missiles ready for launch on the ground.  He believed, however, that 
he had a solution for this issue:  
Since we would plan on placing these payloads in orbit during times of 
peace, we can contemplate using a delivery vehicle whose major cost 
components are recoverable so that we do not expend a highly expensive 
rocket for each payload in orbit.  The concept of using recoverable boosters 
is now under investigation and the feasibility of such a scheme seems well 
established.455 	
Schriever thus confirms the existence of studies into recoverable launch 
systems even at this early date, but it is a matter of record that although various re-
usable systems were posited over the years, most notably the Space 
Transportation System (STS – the Space Shuttle) as achieving cheap and reliable 
access to orbit, none has yet fulfilled its promise or demonstrated anything 
approaching the capability envisaged by Schriever. 
There were other technical issues that appear not to have been considered 
by Schriever.  They include launch reliability, on-orbit ‘shelf life’, and the relative 
costs of such systems compared to the practical alternatives.  We will summarise 
each quickly to outline problems that could and should have been apparent to 
Schriever even as he proposed such systems. 
Firstly, any system designed to ensure the safe placement of nuclear 
warheads in orbit would need to demonstrate extreme reliability.  But launch 
reliability, or rather launch un-reliability, had plagued early space-flight efforts.  
Statistical reliability for Atlas, Thor and Titan orbital launches during the 1950s and 
1960s was never better than 90%, and on occasions dipped below 50%.456  Any 																																																								
455 Schriever and Cohen, ICBM Chapter 10, Page 13. 
456 Statistics taken from www.spacelaunchreport.com, which maintains a database by nationality and 
launcher type from 1957 onwards, suggest that the Thor failure rate in orbital attempts was 7/13 
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attempt to orbit a bombardment system exposed the warhead(s) to this risk.457  The 
implications of loss of nuclear warheads were understood at the time.  Evidence 
can be found from the various nuclear accidents that had affected the deterrent 
force from its earliest days, but if anyone was in any doubt whether accidents of 
this kind could apply to missiles, the evidence was also in plain sight.  On 25 July 
1962, one of the intended high-altitude nuclear tests at Johnston Island, using a 
Thor missile, failed at launch.  The Range Safety Officer destroyed the warhead by 
remote control and the Thor missile exploded.  A large amount of contamination 
occurred, and the subsequent clean-up operation took several weeks.  
Contemporary reports assert that no personnel received significant radiation 
dosage at the time, but the contamination is still detectable at the site today.458  All 
this should surely have given pause for thought to anyone proposing the planned 
launch in peacetime (as opposed to responsive missile launch under attack) of 
large numbers of nuclear warheads. 
Assuming that the risks of launch were deemed acceptable, any proponent 
of nuclear bombardment systems would then have had to cope with the 
implications of maintaining a significant number of complex satellites and the 
associated weapons payloads on orbit.  Again, evidence of contemporary failures 
was legion – Schriever would have had to account for (for example) the twelve 
consecutive failures of the early ‘Discoverer’ satellites before one functioned as 
intended on-orbit, the re-entry failures that continued to affect the programme 
(planned re-entry of a capsule for recovery in a designated area was not dissimilar 
to the intended re-entry of a warhead onto a target), and finally with the need to 
dispose safely of the bombardment satellites if they reached the end of their 
intended life without being used (in the case of a bombardment satellite, the safe 
life of the warhead without maintenance might well have been less than that of the 
carrying vehicle).  The risks either of not being able to de-orbit a failed satellite, or 
																																																								
(54%) in the 1950s and 33/271 (12%) in the 1960s, Atlas recorded 50% and 19% respectively in the 
same periods and Titan had a 10% failure rate in the 1960s.  Reliability did improve over these 
periods, and where launchers were man-rated to support manned spaceflight launches, reliability was 
100% (until the Space Shuttle failure in 1986), but this was only achieved at significant cost. 
457 Later debates about orbital bombardment systems have included consideration of non-nuclear 
payloads, often including kinetic-energy penetrators but even these pose significant problems.  For an 
analysis of some of these issues, see Major William L Spacy, CADRE Paper Number 4 - Does the 
United States need Space-based Weapons? (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1999) 26-29 
458 See Defense Nuclear Agency, Report DNA 6040F - Operation DOMINIC 1 1962 (Washington DC: 
Defense Nuclear Agency, 1983) 232 for details of the incident.  Although the report cited was written 
in 1983, it plainly relied on contemporary accounts for details.  The assertion that nobody received 
significant radiological exposure during the incident is contested and various veterans of nuclear 
testing in this era have received compensation for injuries and illness consequent upon the tests. 
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alternatively proposing where and how to send the bombardment satellite and its 
payload at the end of its life would have been substantial. 
Finally, with his background in managing costly programmes, Schriever 
would have had to have given thought to the costs of what he was proposing.  
Notwithstanding his faith in the savings achievable from re-useable launchers, 
each nuclear warhead launched on a bombardment satellite was essentially 
expended at launch, and over time the costs of such activity would have mounted 
alarmingly.  Each warhead would carry a quantity of fissile material, which would 
probably not be recovered if unused.  The reliability of launchers was improving in 
Schriever’s time, but the costs of ‘man-rating’ the missiles to serve as boosters had 
proved substantial, and essentially a bombardment system would have needed 
similar reliability (at similar cost). 
There is no evidence that Schriever considered these issues in any depth, if 
at all.  We will look shortly at his motivation for proposing orbital bombardment, but 
none of it addressed issues like these. 
Space	Weaponization	–	Schriever,	Policy	and	Strategy		
Whatever the practicalities of Schriever’s involvement in space 
weaponization, there can be little doubt that he not only regarded it as inevitable, 
but also as desirable.  In one of his earliest public speeches after Sputnik had 
orbited the Earth, he noted: 
In the long haul, our safety as a nation may depend upon achieving “space 
superiority”.  Several decades from now the important battles may not be 
sea battles or air battles, but space battles, and we should be spending a 
certain fraction of our national resources to ensure that we do not lag in 
obtaining space superiority.459 
 
By 1959, views among Schriever’s staff on the desirability of implementing 
this aspiration had become clearer.  In a draft paper entitled ‘Air Force Space 
Mission’, a clear intent was stated:  “At the present time we have requirements and 
are planning satellites for early warning, inspection and interception, attack alarm, 
retaliatory attack and logistic support”.460  The larger paper is firmly rooted in 
‘aerospace’ terminology, laying claim to operations in the aerospace continuum as 
the natural function of the Air Force, though at the time, Schriever was plainly 																																																								
459 Address by Schriever to the Astronautics Symposium at San Diego, CA, 19 February 1957.  
Extract retained in Schriever Archive, Box 164, Folder 3. 
460 Schriever Archive, Box 6, Folder 3 (‘1959 undated’).  This is the same paper as was referred to in 
the preceding Chapter.  Its context is unclear – it might have formed the basis for a speech or 
testimony, but its classification (‘Secret’ at the time) would appear to rule out public use. 
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grappling with the technical problems of operations in ‘space’ as opposed to 
‘airspace’; as was noted in Chapter 5, this exposed difference of opinion between 
Schriever and General White, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.  Nonetheless, for 
the applications of satellite identification and interdiction, both the need, and the Air 
Force claim to primacy in this area are almost assumed. 
The sphere of operations where even Schriever recognised that he was 
moving into contentious strategic ground was orbital bombardment – the ‘retaliatory 
attack’ satellite alluded to immediately above, but here at least, his motivation and 
rationale can be assessed with some confidence.  Firstly, he made clear in later 
life, that he was influenced by the thinking of a colleague, Major General ‘Harry’ 
Evans.  Evans had, like Schriever, served in the Pacific during World War 2, and 
after the war had pursued a career as a reconnaissance pilot, gaining early 
experience in the RB-36 reconnaissance version of the B-36 manned bomber. He 
attended the University of Michigan for two years during 1950-52, and then worked 
in nuclear weapons development prior to attending the Air War College at Maxwell 
AFB during 1956-57.461  While there he wrote a thesis on ‘The Weapon System to 
Follow the ICBM’, in which he apparently advocated for a nuclear bombardment 
systems, which he entitled ‘Floater One’.462  On graduation from AWC, Evans was 
assigned to work for Schriever at AFBMD.  He recounted the details of this at some 
length to Neil Sheehan in an interview in support of Sheehan’s biography of 
Schriever described earlier.  Since it contains Evans own account of his paper, the 
relevant portion is quoted in full: 
M.G. Evans: 'And then I went to Air War College for one year at Maxwell, 
and then, after graduation from Maxwell, I was assigned to the Air Force 
Ballistic Missile Division under Benny Schriever. 
Mr. Sheehan: Oh, in 57.  
M.G. Evans: Yes. It was BMD. I might add, again this is the influence of a 
friend, I have no idea how I got out there, how come I ended up out there 
since I hadn't been in the atomic weapons business. But, one of the things I 
did for a thesis was to write at the War College. I wrote a thesis on the 
weapon system to follow the ICBM, and the weapon system was called 
Floater One, and it was a bomb in orbit. 
Mr. Sheehan: And it would be launched from a satellite, you mean? 
M.G. Evans: No, it was launched from the ground and put into a satellite 
orbit, and you would call it back down and retro it back down whenever you 
wanted to use it. 																																																								
461 Major General Harry L Evans, USAF Official Biography. 
462 Evans’ thesis is in the custody of the Air University Library at Maxwell AFB to this day, but also 
remains classified.  It has resisted all attempts to gain access to its content through content review for 
declassification and FOIA requests, even as it approaches the 60th anniversary of its submission.  All 
inferences about its content arise from mention in unclassified interviews. 
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Mr. Sheehan: Oh, I see, you'd bring it out of orbit. 
M.G. Evans: Yes, out of orbit -- you started in orbit. 
Mr. Sheehan: And you had rockets on it and you would fire the rockets to 
bring it down. 
M.G. Evans: That's right, fire the rockets to bring it down.  I've often 
wondered if writing that thesis had anything to do with my ending up at the 
ballistic missile division. 
 Mr. Sheehan: You mean, somebody saw it perhaps. 
M.G. Evans:  Somebody might have seen it, I don't know. It wasn't a very 
well written document, but it was kind of interesting to explore what it took 
to put a bomb in orbit and stabilize it and keep it there, and to retro rocket it 
down. And, it turned out, when I think about it in retrospect, there was an 
awful lot of stuff I learned about writing the thesis at the War College that I 
learned later that I had to put to practice in the Discoverer program. 
Mr. Sheehan: I see, because what you were doing at the War College was 
like dual of learn, and the fact that you were theorizing it out. 
M.G. Evans: Substitute a camera for the warhead, and deorbit the camera 
with the film, and it was very much the same mission that I had written the 
thesis on.463 
 
Schriever’s own views on the need for and advantages of space weapons 
are found principally in the first Schriever-Cohen manuscript, Chapter 10.  About 
the time this was being written, nuclear strategists were pondering what impact 
ICBMs would have on deterrence theory; specifically, they were analysing how 
strategy would be impacted by the hardening of the launch installations for second 
and third generation ICBMs.  First generation ICBMs like Atlas-D operated from so-
called ‘soft sites’; geographically fixed bases where the missiles stood on exposed 
launch-pads.  Later Atlas-D and Atlas-E models allowed the storage of on-alert 
missiles in concrete ‘coffins’, which provided rudimentary protection, but it was only 
with the introduction of Atlas-F, and associated silos for on-alert missiles, that 
protection from a pre-emptive nuclear strike became possible.464  Titan missiles 
were envisaged to be silo-based from introduction to service (albeit brought to the 
surface for launch in the case of Titan I), and Minuteman missiles would be silo-
based from the outset with the added possibility of mobile basing in purpose-
designed rail cars.465  The implications of all this for Schriever was that as the 																																																								
463 Sheehan Archive, Box 15.  The author has seen a transcript of a Schriever oral history interview 
where Schriever acknowledges the influence, but was unable to copy it due to library restrictions at 
the time. 
464 Walker and Powell, Atlas  153-54.  The protection offered by silo-basing for Atlas was 
compromised by the need to bring it to the surface for fuelling immediately prior to launch. 
465 Stumpf, Titan II : a history of a Cold War missile program  29, 33.  Roy Neal, Ace in the Hole: The 
Story of the Minuteman Missile (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Inc, 1962) 139-42, 68.  The mobile 
Minuteman concept was cancelled by the Kennedy Administration in 1962, for a variety of technical 
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(hardened) silos were being placed across the countryside, from the Soviet 
standpoint, they were moving from being counterforce targets, that could be 
attacked by the Soviets at (relatively) less risk to the US civilian population, to 
becoming countervalue targets which if attacked would expose civilians to 
substantially enhanced levels of risk.  His own concerns about this were clear: 
Should the Soviets attempt to destroy our present SAC-forces (both bomber 
and missile bases) in this country, in an effort to wipe out or retaliatory 
power, the civilian casualties would run quite high: From two to five million 
people might be killed outright by the blast effects and some twenty to forty 
million might die due to radioactive fallout effects… 
 
…Several years from now, with the establishment of the Minuteman missile 
system, we will pose the Soviets with a United States-based strategic force, 
whose vulnerability to surprise attack is but a small fraction of our present 
SAC vulnerability…Missiles will either be hardened (in underground silos) 
or made mobile by mounting them in railroad cars… 
 
…What must be taken into account, when we look at our programmed 
deterrent posture of some years hence, is that the vulnerability of our home-
based forces and the vulnerability of the Nation itself will go hand-in-hand.  
If we consider the size of force that must be launched against this future 
strategic complex, the grim fact that emerges is that even if the attack is 
unsuccessful the Nation will suffer a terrible degree of physical devastation 
and radiological contamination… 
 
…What we will have done is to so thoroughly implicate the total populace 
with an attack upon the purely military elements that the issue of peace or 
war will truly become one of life or death.466 
 
Schriever then posited orbital bombardment systems as a response to this 
guilt-provoking realization: 
With the foregoing discussion in mind, let us now turn upward 
toward space and investigate the possibilities of ultimately removing our 
strategic forces from the confines of our country and placing them at some 
distance from the Earth.  More specifically, we shall consider the application 
of a bombardment satellite in an attempt to mitigate the political and social 
problems which may arise from a prolonged continuation of basing strategic 
forces in the United States. 
 
Suppose that we decided to place a large number, many hundreds 
or even thousands of unmanned bomb-carrying satellites in orbits at 
altitudes in the range 300-500 miles…467 																																																								
and economic reasons.  For a discussion of the ultimate limitations of mobile Minuteman, see Chapter 
4 of Steven A Pomeroy, An untaken road: strategy, technology, and the hidden history of America's 
Mobile ICBMs (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016) (pp 67-90) 
466 Schriever and Cohen, ICBM Chapter 10, from pp 9-11.  There is no clue in the mss where 
Schriever and Cohen derived their casualty forecasts from; it is the author’s opinion that if the 
estimates were based on intelligence assessments, Schriever and Cohen would have faced difficulty 
getting this passage cleared for publication.  The point that they are making is, however, independent 
of the detail. 
		 169	
 
Schriever next embarks on the lengthy exposition of the technical features 
and advantages of a bombardment system that we touched on earlier in this 
chapter, including his previously mentioned hope that a reusable booster would 
reduce the launch costs to the point where the system itself would be affordable.  
He uses the features of his proposed bombardment system to argue that it would 
be exceptionally difficult to attack, citing the possibility of adding multiple decoys to 
the satellite constellation, and his belief that hardening the bombardment satellites 
to resist the harmful radiation effects from nuclear explosions aimed against them 
would result in a well-nigh impregnable system.  This latter assumption, although 
strategically desirable, is another instance of Schriever’s technical optimism; given 
his correct identification of a long duration and reliable power supply as an 
essential feature of the bombardment satellite, either it would have required solar 
panels, which would be vulnerable to attack, or the satellite would have had to 
carry an internal nuclear power source in addition to its nuclear warhead payload.  
Even then, Schriever’s trust in the ability to harden a bombardment satellite to this 
extent is perhaps optimistic.  But he saw the strategic advantages as 
overwhelmingly worth the effort: 
If we could remove our strategic arsenal from the face of the Earth and 
place it in orbit, a unique and invaluable degree of flexibility could be 
achieved…we may have found a way to cope with a terrifying problem to 
the extent that non-military forces…will have a more extended period to 
effect solutions of international disputes.  …an aggressor might still threaten 
to bomb our country, but he would have to divest himself of every thread of 
logic to do so.   
 
As long as we have our deterrent force stationed within the country, 
we cannot dismiss his threats as insane. (They may be immoral, but by no 
means necessarily insane).  But if we have removed the deterrent into 
space, we can dismiss this threat as sheer bluff, since the attack of the 
country itself, assuming that we possess an invulnerable deterrent force, 
would only ensure his own destruction.468 
 
Schriever’s wish to ‘de-militarize’ the homeland by moving away from fixed-
silo installations for ICBMs was logical in itself.  However, moving the deterrent 
force into orbit was not the only way of achieving this, and it is clear that Schriever 
was aware of this. The first major strand of his efforts arose from the development 
of the Minuteman solid-fuel ICBM.  Minuteman had been promoted vigorously by 
one of Schriever’s subordinates, Col Edward Hall.  Hall had worked within WDD 																																																								
467 Schriever and Cohen, ICBM Chapter 10, page 12. 
468 Schriever and Cohen, ICBM Chapter 10, pp24-25. 
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since its formation, specialising in propulsion development.  The initial adoption of 
liquid-fuelled rockets had been a technical necessity, as well as a logical 
progression from exploitation of the V2 after World War 2; although their simplicity 
was attractive, nobody in the world knew how to make large enough solid-rocket 
motors to achieve intercontinental range during the early days of the ICBM 
programme.  Thus Atlas and Titan (and the Thor IRBM, and in fact their Soviet 
analogues too) were predicated on liquid fuel.  But Hall was convinced that such a 
solid-fuel motor would be possible, and led early development work to achieve it 
under Schriever’s supervision.469  Two further spurs to the work emerged at the 
same time.   
The first was awareness that the US Navy were working to develop a solid-
fuelled IRBM suitable for submarine launch.  The Navy had developed a very early 
maritime nuclear strike capability via the ‘Regulus’ cruise missile.  ‘Regulus I’ had 
entered service as a component of the US deterrent, capable of launch from both 
surface vessels and submarines, but it was a subsonic (i.e. vulnerable) missile of 
limited range and questionable accuracy.  Regulus II would have addressed many 
of these concerns – it was a supersonic missile of medium range with a much 
improved guidance system.  But these improvements would have come at 
significant cost, and the Navy turned to ballistic missiles.  They discontinued 
development of Regulus II, and having briefly involved themselves in a joint project 
with the US Army to develop an IRBM that could be launched from land or sea, 
they then set to work designing the Polaris.470  In an early historical work about the 
Polaris programme, Harvey Sapolsky summarises some of the challenges the 
programme faced, both from within the Navy (resistance to innovations such as 
dual-crewing of ballistic missile submarines to increase utilization, loss of the 
coveted ‘general-purpose’ or ‘multi-role’ tag applied to other naval combatants) and 
from without.  Nonetheless, there was sufficient enthusiasm from senior Naval 
officers to ensure progress.  Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, 
had concluded that: “only the service which first developed a satisfactory launching 
																																																								
469 George A Reed, 'U.S. defense policy, U.S. Air Force doctrine and strategic nuclear weapon 
systems, 1958-1964: The case of the Minuteman ICBM', (Duke University, 1986 PhD), 51-52.  Hall 
was known for his abrasive personality, and the relationship between Schriever and Hall was 
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470 For an account of Regulus I and II, see Kenneth P Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile 
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1985) 113-19.  The Joint Army/Navy missile was the ‘Jupiter’; 
eventually developed to success by the Army, although it was then, due to its range, allocated to the 
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to adapt to submarine launch.  See Wernher Von Braun, 'The Redstone, Jupiter and Juno', 
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system would be able to count on having a long-range missile capability”.471  The 
external threats emerged largely from the Air Force, and centred on their concerns 
about the immaturity of solid-rocket propulsion, the problems of communicating 
with submerged submarines, potential navigation inaccuracy, and the constraints of 
the smaller warheads that Polaris was restricted to carrying.472 
The second spur to Air Force interest in solid-fuel missiles came from one 
of several studies instigated by Schriever around this time.  The ‘Bacher’ panel 
(named after Professor Robert Bacher, its Chairman) reviewed the state of the Air 
Force missile programme and its possible future developments, and in August 
1957 reported that there was an: 
…immediate need to construct a missile force capable of surviving a 
surprise attack, and noted that survivability might depend on a small, simple 
and reliable missile, possibly one compatible with mobile or semi-mobile 
bases. Such a missile would most likely be fuelled by solid propellants, 
rather than the liquid fuels used by the missiles then being developed.473 
The Bacher panel report appears to have had a significant effect on 
Schriever’s views on solid-fuel rockets.  Previously sceptical, over the course of the 
summer and autumn of 1957, he became if not utterly convinced, at least 
persuaded that they potentially had a role to play.474  
From all these factors, came the origins and goals of the Minuteman ICBM.  
A succinct summary of these is found in a volume actually devoted to the history of 
guidance systems within the overall missile programme.  Donald Mackenzie notes: 
The use of solid fuel alone would not have been sufficient to justify yet 
another ICBM program.  The risks of liquid fuel were not as pressing an 
issue for the Air Force as for the Navy…But Hall integrated his preferred 
fuel into a distinctive picture of a new ICBM.  More radical…than the 
proposal to use solid fuel was the central criterion Hall applied to his 
missile: it should be cheap. 																																																								
471 Internal memorandum by Admiral Burke, following a National Security Council meeting in 1955.  
Cited in Richard G Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy 1946-1962 (Chicago, Il: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1974) 308 
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Hall envisaged…a single site where as many as 1000 to 1500 missiles 
would be assembled, deployed in dispersed silos in constant readiness for 
firing, and their parts recycled if computers…indicated failure.  The chosen 
name of Minuteman conveyed instant launch as well as revolutionary 
pedigree.475 
Mackenzie also notes that Hall ‘was not a sophisticated strategic thinker’.476  
But whether by accident or design, he had proposed an affordable first-strike 
capability for the USA.  Minuteman I was not an inherently accurate weapon 
(although accuracy of subsequent models improved notably).  But against ‘city-
sized’ countervalue targets, it posed a significant threat.  Colonel Hall left the 
Minuteman programme in 1959, and some of his more ambitious design objectives 
(such as the ‘super-site’ facility) did not survive his departure.  But a large, 
affordable arsenal of countervalue missiles would be embraced by the 
Kennedy/McNamara Department of Defense in the early 1960s and silo-based 
Minuteman’s future would be assured. 
During October 1957, Schriever, Hall and Colonel Charles Terhune ‘took 
their show on the road’ in a series of briefings to Senior Commanders, culminating 
in briefs that persuaded Generals Curtis Le May and Tommy Power (Vice-chief of 
Staff of the Air Force and Commander of Strategic Air Command respectively) of 
the proposal’s merits.  By April 1958, Minuteman (as a silo-based system, 
integrated with the existing ICBM work being directed by Schriever to deliver Atlas 
and complete development of Titan) had been approved.477  But during the 
explanatory briefings, General Power had also been intrigued by the options 
offered by mobility.  Hall had not envisaged mobility as a key feature of Minuteman, 
believing it compromised his faith in a low-cost system, but Power favoured the 
possibilities offered by deception implicit in mobility, and in September 1958 
directed AFBMD (under Schriever) to study mobility across the ICBM programme.  
Schriever complied, though it was very quickly discounted as an element of the 
Atlas and Titan programmes.  Road and river/barge options for Minuteman were 
considered, but rail quickly emerged as the preferred solution; along with the 
limitations of road (expense and physical constraints) and water (too limited in 
extent and too close to population centres), Pomeroy notes that Schriever was 
sensitive to the pressures being felt within the rail industry by the advance of the 
automobile and was confident that they would be amenable to the proposal to base 
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477 Neal, Ace in the hole  88-97. 
		 173	
missiles on the system.478  It also seems reasonable, however, that Schriever was 
forming his ideas about the desirability of getting the deterrent force off the 
homeland altogether. 
Mobile Minuteman would ultimately fail to meet its early promise, but 
meanwhile another avenue explored was the development of an air-launched 
ICBM or ‘ALBM’.479  Such a system would, its protagonists believed, combine 
desirable features of the ICBM and the manned bomber; the most notable of these 
programmes was the Douglas GAM-87 Skybolt.  The bases where the launch 
aircraft originated would, of course, remain obvious military targets for an 
opponent, but this was already the case for the nuclear bomber force.  An ALBM 
force would be dispersed to airborne alert in time of crisis without attracting 
incoming fire to large swathes of rural America.  Schriever was certainly aware of 
the programme’s existence – there are periodic references to it in his diary, 
although in most cases, the context is unclear.480  But Skybolt encountered 
technical problems and cost overruns that eventually led to its cancellation by 
Secretary McNamara in 1962.481    
Both mobile Minuteman and Skybolt would have remained USAF-operated 
systems, but the most significant attempt to address the vulnerability of silo-based 
ICBMs came from another domain.  While all this development was underway, the 
US Navy was developing the Polaris intermediate-range ballistic missile and its 
associated submarine launch platform.   
In his history of the Polaris programme, Harvey Sapolsky makes clear 
Schriever’s early awareness of the Polaris programme and the Air Force attitude to 
it; regarding some early adverse publicity being leaked to the media by Air Force 
sources, he notes that Schriever was asked by Admiral Raborn, then Director of 
the Naval Special Projects Office, to intervene and prevent the spread of 
																																																								
478 Pomeroy, Untaken road  67-70. 
479 The overall technical concept for the rail-carried Minuteman appeared sound, culminating in trials 
of a representative rail-car, but drawbacks included wear and tear on the missiles (the vibration 
environment of rail haulage damaged the delicate guidance system), some tactical doubt about the 
implications of needing to be at a surveyed launch location to use the missile with acceptable 
accuracy, and the manpower bill attendant on crewing multiple missile trains. 
480 For example see Schriever Archive, Box 6 Folders 9 & 10.  Typically, the occurrences simply list 
‘GAM-87’ as a topic for discussion within a conversation, meeting or telephone call without further 
detail, although there is one slightly more substantive reference to the suitability of various launch 
aircraft options. 
481 Pomeroy lists the various technical shortcomings of Skybolt in his brief mention of the cancellation.  
An alternative view is that following the UK Government decision to purchase Skybolt to deliver the 
independent UK deterrent, factions within the USA saw in its cancellation a means of curtailing that 
independence.  Pomeroy, Untaken road  117, Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: 
the Irony of Interdependence (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) 166-67 
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misinformation.482  Coverage of the subsequent sparring between the single 
services is patchy, but an interesting insight to the positions being taken is provided 
by an internal US Navy memorandum of April 1958.  In it, the Chief of Naval 
Operations is providing an overview of the latest round of budgetary negotiations to 
his brother Naval officers. In this document, he describes both the Navy’s attitude 
to the budget bids of the other two services, and their reciprocal comments on the 
Navy requests.  Relating to the missile programmes of each, it records: 
In commenting to SECDEF on the Navy's submissions, the Army and the 
Air Force seized the opportunity to expound upon their pet peeves against 
the Navy…. 
 
a. On POLARIS the Army stated that the feasibility of the system is 
still unproved, the missile is too inaccurate for effective use against 
priority targets, and therefore the system will be effective only 
against urban and industrial targets rather than specific targets such 
as submarine pens, air fields, and missile sites. This places 
POLARIS in the category of an over-all deterrent system and raises 
the question of how much and what proportions of ICBM's, IRBM's 
and atomic-capable aircraft are required. 
 
The Air Force stated that POLARIS is open to question on: 
 
(1) The ability of the system to maintain an alert on station and thus 
its ability to fulfill specific target commitments. 
(2) Its accuracy except when located at or very near, previously 
surveyed geographical or oceanographic points. 
(3) Its ability to transmit and receive communications while 
submerged, and thus its ability to respond to centralized control 
 
And later, it noted: 
 
…the Air Force requested $259 million for development of an ICBM 
MINUTEMAN Weapon system.  The Air Force has a long ways to go before 
they will even have the ATLAS, and its successor, the TITAN.  
 
The MINUTEMAN, which is to be a solid propellant missile, would 
conceivably be a close successor of the first two, but according to the Air 
Force would have shore-based mobility. It appears that by means of the 
MINUTEMAN project the Air Force hopes to kill our POLARIS program. 
They have made drastic claims about the minimum costs and time scale of 
completion of MINUTEMAN in comparison with POLARIS. 	
 
…We bought only a small part of what the Air Force tried to sell 
SECDEF…We allowed funds primarily for R&D… and to increase the 
number of SNARK squadrons and SNARK missiles which the Air Force 
doesn't want much for some reason we don’t understand, since it is a good 
																																																								
482 The date of the incident(s) is not clear, but Sapolsky cites subsequent discussion at a Navy 
meeting in February 1957.  Sapolsky, Polaris System Development  40.  There is no obvious 
corroboration around that date in Schriever’s diary, nor record of any specific action taken. 
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missile.483 
 
This last comment would surely have caused some comment had it been 
released to the USAF, since SNARK was most definitely not a ‘good missile’.484 
Schriever would also probably have taken exception to the line about the 
USAF using MINUTEMAN to ‘kill’ the Polaris programme.  Although there was 
clearly competition between the services for funding for their programme, there 
was also an awareness of the need to cooperate, which had been formalised in the 
previous year.  The driving force on the USAF side towards cooperation was 
General Donald Putt – Schriever’s predecessor as commander of ARDC (and 
immediate superior while he was commanding WDD).  The backdrop to the tension 
was the original design intent for Minuteman – small, solid-fuelled for ease of 
storage, safety and reliability, (relatively) cheap, , but with true inter-continental 
range.  Polaris, meanwhile, had emerged as a more promising means of expanding 
naval nuclear launch-options than trying to deliver the Regulus II cruise missile, or 
use of a liquid-fuelled missile afloat.  Substantially smaller than Minuteman 
(constrained by practical dimensions for a submarine) and much shorter range, 
Polaris was a two-stage as opposed to three-stage missile.  But the fact that they 
(Polaris and Minuteman) were both ‘second-generation’ solid-fuel missiles gave the 
impression that they were similar.  Steven Pomeroy relates the implications of this: 
…the Air Force and Navy warily eyed cooperation.  A March 1956 letter 
from Richard E. Horner, the DoD's Acting Assistant Secretary, Research 
and Development, to Clifford C. Furnas, the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Development, oversimplified the joint-service work on 
solid propellants by asserting that "there are no significant differences 
between solid rocket engine requirements for land or sea-based use.  That 
was reasonable for individual components but overlooked the contextual 
differences driving each service’s missile design needs. Regardless, Air 
Force General Donald Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, and 
Navy Admiral William F. Raborn, head of the Polaris program, agreed not to 
block each other's programs, probably because they were complementary 
weapons – the Navy pursued an intermediate-range missile for use in 
submarines, while the Air Force sought an ICBM. Horner directed the 
services "to keep the two programs complementary, the air force will avoid 
duplicating the navy effort to bring forth a solid propellant IRBM 
[intermediate-range ballistic missile] engine using presently available 																																																								
483 Chief of Naval Operations 'Dope' - CNO Personal No 36 to Flag and General Officers,   
(Washington DC, 1 April 1958) 12-13 
484 The Northrop SNARK was an air-breathing, supersonic cruise missile, not dissimilar to the US 
Navy ‘Regulus II’ programme.  Based on a concept dating back to 1946, it suffered numerous delays 
due to budget constraints, re-prioritizations (not least to accommodate early ICBM development) but 
most notably technical issues.  It was eventually declared operational in USAF service, at one base 
only, for 11 months during 1960-61, but even then was regarded as barely credible, due to its 
demonstrated unreliability and inaccuracy.  For a short history of the programme and its travails, see 
Werrell, Cruise Missile  82-97. 
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technology. On the other hand, the navy must avoid duplicating the air force 
program." 485 
 
Schriever appears to have received and understood this guidance, and 
there is certainly little in his papers to indicate dissatisfaction with Navy activity 
while Minuteman and Polaris were developed in parallel.  There is just one 
apparent instance of him pondering whether the two systems were complementary 
or not. In the ‘1961 undated’ collection of diary entries are two pages entitled ‘Geo-
Strategic Positions’.486  Their contents bear stating in full: 
1. Polaris v M2   
• Need for a force that has a credible first-strike capability. 
• Without such a capability, our negotiating position will continue to 
deteriorate. 
• Intelligence will improve. 
• Only M2 has the reaction time and falls into practical cost range to 
permit adequate numbers. 
a) Credible first strike –  
 > Do not telegraph our punch, i.e. provocation level to pull trigger 
Requirement – intelligence, command and control, numbers. 
Soviets only respect power. 
2. Limited War Response –  
 a)  We do not have a credible first-strike capability today – it may be 
hard to achieve. 
 b)  Our strat forces are only adequate to deter total war.  Suicidal to 
launch in response to a Laos, Cuba etc. 
 c)  Selective response cap inadequate and inflexible – relative to 
today’s technology. 487 
The inference from this is that Schriever is looking to Minuteman to provide 
a first-strike capability for the US, though he plainly appreciates the size of that 
task, and that he feels that the Polaris programme would struggle to deliver it both 
for technical and financial reasons.  In his second paragraph, he appears to be 
referring to the need for a ‘limited war’ first strike, which he sees as separate from a 																																																								
485 Pomeroy, Untaken road  53.  There appears to be a small typographic error in the source; Richard 
E Horner was the Air Force Assistant Secretary for R&D at the same time as Clifford Furnas held the 
equivalent DoD appointment. 
486 The pages referred to are completely undated, and it is unclear what criteria the curator applied to 
dating them.  See footnote following for discussion of possible alternative dates. 
487 Schriever Archive, Box 6, Folder 11.  Bulleting and formatting copied from original as far as 
possible.  The second page continues with more notes about weapon systems, but may have been a 
later addition, unrelated to this (though it does include a mention of a lightweight fighter aircraft and of 
the ‘Neutron Bomb’ – emphasising that it is/will be a small weapon).  Although included in a ‘1961’ 
folder in the archive, the pages are undated, and the sense of the content would support both earlier 
(reference to ‘Polaris v M2’) and later (reference to Cuba, if that implied the Missile Crisis of 1962) 
dates. 
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‘total war’ first strike capability.  What is less clear is what he saw as possible 
solutions to this.  Contemplating limited or flexible nuclear responses in 1961 would 
not have sat easily with the doctrine of massive retaliation via the (US) Single 
Integrated Operations Plan.  Assuming the archive dating of 1961 is accurate, 
Mobile Minuteman had either just been cancelled or was about to be, so probably 
was not seen as part of the solution to this.  Possibly, Enhanced Radiation 
Weapons (the ‘Neutron Bomb’ reference footnoted above) were seen as an 
alternative.488   But looking back to his exposition of the advantages of an orbital 
bombardment system described above, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
Schriever saw such a system as providing an immediate first-strike capability, and 
potentially a second-strike advantage for the USA, perhaps across multiple 
theatres of conflict, if the technical challenges could be overcome. 
Ultimately, despite Schriever’s enthusiasm, the United States did not 
pursue an orbital weapon system along the lines he envisaged.  Schriever’s 
technical optimism was in the main, untested.  The reasons why this was so were 
not, however, technical.  Instead, the US voluntarily constrained itself not to 
develop them, via a series of multi-lateral agreements culminating in the ‘Outer 
Space Treaty’ of 1967.   
The chronology of these agreements can be quickly summarised.  The 
Eisenhower administration had considered limitations on activities in space from 
the earliest days of the space age, but discussion began from an overall 
consideration of nuclear disarmament and associated limitations on nuclear tests, 
with constraints and accommodations of space activity as a means of verifying this.  
Serious consideration of constraints on orbital bombardment systems came slightly 
later, in the very last days of the Eisenhower administration.  In September 1960, 
the President proposed a ban on orbiting weapons analogous to the agreement 
recently concluded prohibiting weapons in the Antarctic, but subject to agreement 
on an inspection and verification regime.  This proposal foundered in the face of 
Soviet indifference.489   Beginning in 1961, President Kennedy worked in the first 
instance towards the establishment and signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
which among other things, outlawed nuclear testing in space; this would thus have 
had immediate impact on any proposed improvements to ASAT or Ballistic Missile 
Defence applications that relied on exo-atmospheric nuclear explosions for their 																																																								
488 Options for tactical nuclear campaigns are examined in more detail in the ‘second Schriever-
Cohen manuscript’ tentatively identified earlier.  See Chaper 3 pp 83-84 
489 Raymond L Garthoff, 'Banning the Bomb in Outer Space', International Security, Vol 5 No 3  
(Winter 1980-81  
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effect.  It would not, in and of itself, have prevented the launching of an orbital 
bombardment system.  However, Kennedy had been equally enthusiastic about 
restraining nuclear weapons deployment in space; addressing the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1961, he had spoken in favour of: 
…keeping nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer 
space… reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of 
mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies…490 
 
In 1962, the United States proposed a draft treaty on ‘General and 
Complete Disarmament’ which included the provision: “The Parties to the Treaty 
would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass 
destruction’.491  Although this treaty proposal did not in the end mature (indeed it 
was described as ‘pie in the sky’ by Garthoff),492 it formed the basis of further treaty 
proposals and reflected the Administration’s position until binding agreements 
could be entered into.493  These were approached by other non-binding 
declarations, most notably that which immediately preceded the unanimous 
adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 1884 in October 1963.  The 
resolution: 
1.  Welcomes the expressions by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and the United States of America of their intention not to station in outer 
space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of 
mass destruction; 
 
2.  Solemnly calls upon all States: 
 
• To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying 
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction…494 
 																																																								
490 ‘Address by President Kennedy to the [United Nations] General Assembly, September 25, 1961’,  
reproduced in Robert W Lambert (ed.), Documents on Disarmament 1961 (Washington DC: United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962) 470 
491 ‘United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Outline of 
Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, April 18, 
1962’, reproduced in Robert W Lambert (ed.), Documents on Disarmament 1962 - Volume 1, 
January-June (Washington DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963).  
Quoted phrase on page 360. 
492 Garthoff, 'Banning the Bomb in Outer Space',  (International Security) 
493 For further details of the Kennedy Administration’s development of Space Weapons Policy, see 
Document 226 ‘Editorial Note’ in David W Mabon and David S Patterson (eds.), Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1961-1963 - Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington DC: US 
Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1995).  Raymond Gartoff’s 
article cited above also provides much detail of the policy implementation process (Gartoff was a 
senior State Department official at the time of treaty negotiations and served as Executive Secretary 
of the ‘NSAM 156’ Committee). 
494 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly1884 (XVIII). “Question of general and complete 
disarmament”.  1244th Plenary Meeting, 17 October 1963. 
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Although this resolution was non-binding, the declarations that preceded it, 
and the clear signal that it sent about US intentions ended any interest in 
developing an orbital bombardment system. 
In the face of this coordinated policy development, the role of the US Armed 
Forces was limited.  After the rejection of the ‘General and Complete Disarmament’ 
proposal early in 1962, the President issued ‘National Security Action 
Memorandum 156 (NSAM 156) which established a Committee to consider the 
ongoing negotiations (relating both to disarmament and to satellite 
reconnaissance), and to:  
…carefully review these negotiations with a view to formulating a position 
which avoids the dangers of restricting ourselves, compromising highly classified 
programs, or providing assistance of significant military value to the Soviet Union 
and which at the same time permits us to continue to work for disarmament and 
international cooperation in space495 
 
The Department of Defense was represented on this committee by the Hon 
Paul Nitze, at that time Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs.  It was 
charged with reporting quickly (it was established on 26 May to report by 1 July).  
Its report was rendered in time, and made 19 separate recommendations.  Of 
these, the first 18 concentrated on reconnaissance satellite operations, with a very 
brief mention of anti-satellite systems (the report recommended not drawing 
attention to them).  The final recommendation revealed a split in the committee: 
It is recommended that a decision be made now as to whether to propose a 
separate arms control agreement banning weapons of mass destruction 
from being carried in satellites, with appropriate verification controls. The 
US has proposed discussion of such an agreement along the general lines 
of the provisions contained in the April 18 Treaty Outline. The members of 
this Committee are not agreed on the net advisability of making such a 
proposal, which of course depends on political considerations apart from its 
effect on the reconnaissance satellite program. (See Tab C for a summary 
of the considerations pro and con.) They are agreed that no such proposal 
should be tabled until the question has been reviewed with you.496 
 
The NSC concurred in all the reconnaissance recommendations and 
referred the weapons question for further study.  Further discussions ensued, and 
the President’s final word on the subject was promulgated on 2 October 1962, by 																																																								
495 NSAM 156 text reproduced in Paul Claussen, Evan M Duncan, and Jeffrey A Soukup (eds.), 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-63 (FRUS 61-63) , Volume XXV Organization of Foreign 
Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters. (Washington DC: United States 
Government Printing Office, US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
2001).  Document 420. 
496 NSAM 156 Committee Report, reproduced in Claussen, Duncan, and Soukup (eds.), FRUS 61-63 
Vol XXV.  Document 421.  Regrettably, the summary of the pro v con arguments described as ‘Tab C’ 
above are reported to have been lost and are not included in this official record of the discussion. 
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issue of NSAM 192.  This noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been consulted 
within the discussions, and that all the recommendations on the original report 
were endorsed, except that the President wanted advance notice before any 
comprehensive disarmament proposals (including deployment of orbital missiles) 
were tabled at the UN or elsewhere.497  The clearest outline of the Joint Chief’s 
thinking is in a record of discussion at the “Committee of Principals” in October 
1963; plainly this is a year after some of the detail had been agreed, but it appears 
to be the best publically available minuted meeting where the Joint Chiefs were 
represented in addition to DoD senior leadership.498  The bulk of the meeting 
content (conducted by representatives from the State Department, the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the White House and the Department 
of Defense) concerned the form and timing of declarations leading up to the 
proposed General Assembly resolution, the possibility of the resolution being 
presented formally by proxy states and the dangers of the resolution being 
amended while under discussion.  Of the three Joint Chiefs representatives 
present, only one – General Hamlett – spoke.499  He made it clear that the Joint 
Chiefs were happy to forego orbiting bombardment systems, and that their possible 
reservation hinged solely on the term ‘nuclear weapons’ in orbit.  “The Joint Chiefs 
had wished to reserve the right to place small nuclear weapons in orbit.”500  They 
had hoped by substituting ‘weapon of mass destruction’ in any agreement to 
preserve this freedom, thus allowing possible small warheads as ASAT systems; 
General Hamlett also wished to protect prospective nuclear rocket propulsion 
systems from prohibition. 
In all this, Schriever’s voice is absent.  He had written down, but not 
published, his views on such systems in his first manuscript with Cohen and he 
plainly saw them as both useful and achievable.  But he failed completely in any 
effort to gain support for this view.  In 1962, he considered a further appeal directly 
to the public on the topic.  In the Schriever Archive at the Library of Congress is a 
short (9 pages) essay on the advantages of orbital bombardment systems.  It is 
essentially an advocacy piece, positing Soviet development of an orbital 																																																								
497 NSAM 192 text available online at the JFK Presidential Library website. http://www.jfklibrary.org   
accessed 19 December 2015. 
498 Meeting of Committee of Principals to Discuss ‘Bombs in Orbit’ at ACDA on 8 October 1963, 
Record of Conversation reproduced in Evans Gerakas et al. (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1961–1963 Volumes VII/VIII/IX, Microfiche Supplement (Washington DC: Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1997).  Document 222.  
499 General Hamlett was at the time Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.  He was accompanied at the 
meeting by Major General Power USAF – then Commander of Strategic Air Command – and a 
Colonel Sykes (affiliation and appointment unknown). 
500 General Hamlett remarks at the meeting, ibid. 
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bombardment system (without confirming whether this was known, assumed or 
merely hypothetical).  The original is marked ‘DRAFT 23 May 62 (Col Cella)’; 
whether this indicates Col Cella as the originator, or whether it was a Schriever 
draft that Col Cella had collaborated on or commented on is immaterial.  What is of 
interest is that the front page is annotated in Schriever’s handwriting with what 
appears to be a range of intended readers or recipients.  One column of surnames 
include a few that can be attributed with confidence: ‘Vinson’ is presumably The 
Hon Carl Vinson – at the time Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 
‘Goldwater’ is likewise presumably Senator Barry Goldwater, an Air Corps and Air 
Forces veteran and longstanding member and sometime chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee; ‘Stennis’ is probably Senator John C Stennis, another 
senator with defence interests.  In a separate column are three more: ‘Chas 
Murphy’ may have been Mr Charles S Murphy – adviser to Presidents Truman, 
Kennedy and Johnston on an eclectic range of topics.  ‘De Seversky’ was surely 
Alexander P de Seversky, the Russian émigré aviator, inventor and strategic air 
power advocate, while ‘Drake – Readers’ Digest’ probably refers to Francis Vivian 
Drake, the Defense Editor at that magazine at the time.501  The implications are 
that by 1962, Schriever had been isolated from the higher levels of strategy and 
policy formulation and was considering resorting to ‘open letters’ and advocacy 
pieces in popular journals to achieve his policy goals.  He recognised the 
problem(s) he faced and in fact analysed them succinctly. 
Additionally, in the classified section of the Schriever archive is a short ‘note 
to self’ in Schriever’s own handwriting.  It is incomplete (it stops in mid-sentence) 
and undated, but pagination suggests nothing is missing and filing and sense 
suggest it is roughly contemporaneous with the weaponization debate.  The 
handwriting is clear and legible; it states: 	DoD deficiencies 
 
1  US Mil strategy – Natl Policy and Technology are interdependent to the 
highest degree – this of course also applies to mil tactics. 
 
2.  Major decisions must be made at the highest level of Gov’t 
(Departmental (inter) 
 
3.  Mil operational and logistics factors are fed in thru a direct channel – 
joint and specified commands to the SecDef (JCS).  Major decisions are not 																																																								
501 Schriever Archive – Recently Declassified Documents folder, originally in ‘Military Papers – 
Satellites and other space issues – papers of interest to Schriever 1958-1963’ (classified folder).  
Francis Drake co-authored some of his Reader’s Digest articles with Catherine Drake (relationship 
unknown) and it is possible that Schriever is referring to her rather than him.  
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or at least need not be service party line influenced – nor compromised by 
layers of review and approval and compartmented org elements 
 
4.  Aside from current operating forces, the most important DoD decisions 
involve the nature of the next generation of forces structure. 
 
5.  Decisions in this area should be based on Natl Policy – Mil Strategy – 
operational and logistic factors  = enemy cap – tech feasibility – cost 
effectiveness etc 
 
6.  The Service R&D org having the greatest cap for systematic analysis of 
those factors and in control of the vital technological factors: 
 
1. do not have direct access to the top 
2. are inhibited – influenced - coerced by Mil and Sec layers above 
3. Service body English is applied for party line reasons on all 
proposals reaching DoD level. 
4. Proposals are suspect. 
5. Large adjudicating staffs are justified – generally mediocre and 
bureaucratic 
6. Decision makers finally get a thoroughly screened massaged and 
slanted version from people far removed from the doing – and with 
no direct responsibility.  The responsible individual seldom if ever is 
given a hearing 
 
7  This applies also to PSAC [the Presidential Science Advisory Committee] 
which has become extremely influential but which also has no 
responsibility. 
 
8  The services of course have made R&D their battleground since copping 
development prizes establishes the further positions of the service and also 
502 
Schriever has here identified why he had failed to gain traction for his ideas; 
major decisions had to be made at the highest level (paragraph 2), national policy 
has a dominant role in this decision-making (paragraph 5), and the service R&D 
organisations are isolated from the debate, largely through interposition of multiple 
layers of bureaucracy (paragraph 6, and especially 6.6).  Schriever had no counter 
to this procedural isolation, and it was his failure to come up with one, as much as 
the technical problems he would have faced, which prevented him advocating 
successfully for space weaponization. 
In conclusion, there are two other aspects of this memo that have lasting 
resonance.  Firstly, the implicit criticism of excessive layers of supervision and 																																																								
502 Schriever Archive, Recently Declassified Documents folder, originally in ‘Military Papers – 
Satellites and other space issues – papers of interest to Schriever 1958-1963’ (classified folder).  
Paragraphing and underlining in original, abrupt ending also preserved.  As is typical, there is no clue 
as to the context of this memo – it might have been the foundation of an article or essay, notes for an 
impromptu address or the basis of a more carefully planned one, or even just Schriever clarifying his 
thoughts in isolation.  But it is plainly Schriever’s own work, drafted personally and capturing his 
thoughts at the time. 
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review can be read as a critique of the fractious relationship between Schriever and 
Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense.  A good summary of its implications 
in this area is captured by Steven Johnson: 
…but a more serious problem was a tendency toward “creeping 
centralization” at the secretary of defense level. … officers perceived a 
“trend toward imposition of super-management organization at the top of 
current review and approval channels.” The problem was subtle, “the more 
intangible consequence resulting from more detailed time-consuming 
control by the higher echelons outside of the Air Force.” External controls 
removed “program control flexibilities” from “responsible operating levels in 
the field.” Schriever’s management reforms, encapsulated in the 375-series 
regulations, sought to decentralize decision-making processes to the 
project manager to reduce weapon system lead times.  He lamented the 
increasing delays and the volume of work generated by McNamara’s 
requests for information, which subverted AFSC’s procedures.503 	
The second is the prioritization of ‘next generation of forces structure’ in 
paragraph 4, which can be seen as presaging Project FORECAST, the wide-
ranging re-run of the ‘Towards New Horizons’ survey from the 1950s that Schriever 
would instigate and lead during 1963-64.  Schriever came to a grudging 
acceptance of the primacy of policy considerations, as witnessed in a post-
retirement address he gave at the Air University in 1969 where in the main he 
outlined how Project FORECAST had been conducted and the areas of technology 
it had explored, but which he opened with a review of the relationship between 
technology and strategy in the recent past: 
During the past several years, we have had a policy which has inhibited 
technology.  For the past eight years, we have had a very  active policy 
leading toward a political détente with the Soviet Union. I am sure no one 
quarrels with the basic idea of a detente between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  What is debatable is whether a detente is actually possible 
and how we should go about achieving it. 
 
There were people who expressed the belief as far back as the early 1960s 
that the Soviet Union desired an accommodation with the United States. 
They felt that if we could only reduce cold war tensions by avoiding 
provocations with the Soviet Union we could in fact achieve a detente. 
Among the things which these people considered provocative was our 
strategic superiority, which they thought would induce or initiate action 
leading to new weapon systems. The theory was that these new systems 
would tend to escalate the arms race, especially nuclear weapon systems.  
I will not argue whether these beliefs and the actions taken in recent years 
on the basis of these beliefs were right or wrong. I will leave it to your 
judgment to determine whether we have made any real progress toward a 
meaningful political detente. But the fact remains that in recent years we 
have slowed down our progress in military technology as a result of the 																																																								
503 Stephen B. Johnson, The United States Air Force and the culture of innovation, 1945-1965 
(Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002) 207-08 
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detente theory.504  
 
Schriever thus acknowledges the priority, but plainly rues its effect on the 
delivery of advanced technology for operational use. 
Space	Weaponization	–	Schriever	and	Administrative	Action		
Given the very limited extent of the USAF development of space weapons, 
there was correspondingly little that Schriever could do to smooth their introduction 
administratively.  Two aspects only seem worthy of note.  The first relates to his 
involvement in ASAT development, where he quickly identified the need to 
collaborate with Aerospace Defense Command in order to exploit their expertise in 
the rudimentary space-tracking system then in place.  In doing this, he was not only 
making best use of the available resources for the programme, he was also re-
emphasising Air Force Systems Command (an R&D focussed organisation) 
primacy in weapons systems development over front-line operational organisations 
such as ADC.   
The second administrative detail of note relating to weaponization was 
recounted above – the Secretary of Defense’s antipathy (shared by other DoD 
seniors) to Schriever’s employment of concurrency.  This, coupled with increasing 
budgetary pressures on defence as the US’s involvement in SE Asia deepened 
(recall also the analysis in Chapter 3 above; concurrency was rarely claimed by 
anyone (apart from Schriever) to save money) fuelled the pressure on any system 
that could not be shown to be economical.  Walter J Boyne captures the dilemma 
succinctly: 
The very complexity of AFSC, the urgency of its mission and the success 
Schriever had experienced with the technique in creating the ICBM fleet 
made him push for concurrent rather than sequential development of the 
various projects.  Strong views against this were voiced at the top, including 
those of the Director of the Directorate of Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR&E), Harold Brown, then the third most powerful man in 
DoD.  Schriever prevailed, and for the most part, concurrency worked… 
…The war in Vietnam put a budget ceiling on AFSC’s activities for more 
than a decade and placed a more critical focus on immediate operational 
problems that had emerged in conflict… 
With peacetime budget restrictions, risk in weapons development was 
feared more than delay.  The concurrency concept fell into disfavour so that 
																																																								
504 Bernard Schriever, 'Technology and Aerospace Power in the 1970s', Air University Quarterly, Vol 
20 No 6  (September-October 1969).  The journal article is an adaptation of the 1969 ‘Thomas D 
White’ Lecture delivered by Schriever on 19 February 1969. 
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development and production were severed and a return made to traditional 
“buy-before-fly” methods.505 	
 
It is possible that Boyne is conflating a systemic loss of confidence in 
concurrency with McNamara’s innate centralising tendencies, but in either case, 
the outcomes were not favourable for Schriever. 
Space	Weaponization	–	Summary		
How then, should we evaluate Schriever’s activity relating to space 
weaponization against our technical, conceptual and administrative yardsticks? 
Partly because of its fitful and fractured nature, his involvement in space 
weaponization is harder to trace coherently than in more successful programmes.  
In its limited success, most notably in the introduction to service of a rudimentary 
ASAT system, Schriever identified the strategic need, and moved to redeploy and 
recycle systems (specifically converted Thor IRBMs) that he had previously helped 
develop into a new role.  Recycling an existing system ‘bought out’ a significant 
portion of the technical risk.  The strategic need was matched by a credible 
concept that could be developed and deployed quickly, and Schriever’s 
administrative acumen was equal to the task.  In particular, he recognised the need 
to collaborate with Air Defense Command for operational and technical reasons, 
and took the requisite administrative steps to do so.  Thus once again, we see the 
pattern repeated from the ICBM and reconnaissance satellites – technical risk 
reduction, conceptual maturity and appropriate administrative authority combining 
to deliver a successful programme. 
If Schriever had been held to account for his wider campaign for space 
weaponization, and particularly his interest in and enthusiasm for orbital 
bombardment systems, he would probably have had to admit that it had all the 
characteristics of a ‘daydream’.  He certainly believed that he had a rational 
explanation of such a system that was technically sound.  All that he needed was a 
live development programme that would allow him to drive the technical risk out of 
it and the administrative authority to manage it; insofar as he was simultaneously 
working to develop an orbital reconnaissance system that overflew the Soviet 
Union and then returned a capsule to a desired surface location, he probably felt 
that he had a reason to be optimistic about the some aspects of the problem.  But 
in truth, his ideas about space weaponization were far less mature than he 																																																								
505 Walter J Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the US Air Force 1947-2007 (Second Edition) 
(New York: Thomas Dunne Books - St Martin's Press, 2007) 210-11 
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believed.  It is the author’s contention that he would have faced excessive costs 
and insuperable technical problems in delivering an operational system.  The (un) 
reliability rate from contemporary satellite launches in Schriever’s time would have 
been a terrifying prospect when each launch carried multiple thermonuclear 
payloads, there is no sign that he seriously addressed the ‘end of life’ issues 
relating to such a system, and it is only today, in 2016, that we are seeing first 
signs of the development of reusable launchers that might have made Schriever’s 
plan affordable and technically plausible.506 
With all these technical challenges outstanding, orbital bombardment 
systems meet the definition of a ‘daydream’ in this thesis’ analytic method; 
something that its proponents held to be conceptually desirable, despite lack of 
technical plausibility.  The only qualification to this is that Schriever’s views on 
weaponization also faced serious conceptual challenges.  A key part of conceptual 
maturity is a higher command authority that believes in the system being proposed 
and is willing to shape doctrine for its use.  In the context of innovation, this may 
require the protagonist to lobby for such acceptance.  But although Schriever railed 
against the ‘space for peaceful purposes’ mantra then current, he did so in an 
ineffective manner, and thus he never succeeded in developing a credible space 
weaponization concept.  On the contrary, the political tide at the time was flowing in 
the opposite direction, and subsequent events would have undercut his proposals 
fatally.   
Finally the deepening involvement of the USA in the conflict in South-East 
Asia at the time of these proposals and the consequent pressures on the defense 
budget would almost certainly have eradicated any chance of funding, even if the 
technical and conceptual challenges had been successfully addressed.  All that 
can be said in summary is that, thankfully, circumstances conspired to render both 
the technical and the policy debates surrounding such systems hypothetical.
																																																								
506 Echoes of the concern about safety relating to nuclear payloads at launch continue to this day, for 
example surrounding proposals for launch of deep-space missions powered by radio-thermal 
generators, typically using plutonium fuel.  For an accessible summary of the safety concerns, 
including some historical examples stretching back to Schriever’s time, see Andrea Gini, 'Safety of 
Nuclear Powered Missions', Space Safety Magazine, Vol 1 No 1  (Fall 2011 ) 
		 187	
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction		
In the preceding three chapters, this thesis has dissected Schriever’s 
successes and failures in exploiting and developing military spaceflight capability 
during the 1950s and 1960s, using the analytic categories – technical risk 
reduction, system risk reduction and administrative control – outlined in Chapter 1.  
In this concluding chapter, it will revisit and address the research question originally 
posed, compare the results received across Schriever’s activities and consider the 
extent to which they validate the analytic method.  In closing it will then appraise 
Schriever’s character and comment on the various insights gleaned during its 
preparation.  
An	Analytic	Method	for	Technically	Advanced	Systems		
This thesis asserted that in order to introduce technically advanced systems 
into military service, it is necessary to make progress along three separate 
avenues.  Firstly, technical risk must be reduced by innovation, leading to 
development of the equipment concerned.  This kind of progress is measured 
today via ‘Technology Risk Levels’ (TRLs), though these had not been formalised 
in Schriever’s time.  Next, conceptual risk must be reduced, by attention to the non-
equipment aspects of the innovation, such as personnel and training issues and 
assurance that it conforms to doctrinal prescripts.  Issues of legality and policy-
compliance are best considered as ‘non-equipment factors’ too.  Measurement of 
progress against non-equipment factors is of necessity less formal than the TRL 
equivalent, but a ‘traffic light’ assessment scheme is proposed to indicate good, 
marginal or inadequate progress.   Finally, it is suggested that having (or gaining) 
an appropriate span of control and authority to achieve progress against these two 
demands is a further necessary step towards ultimate success.   
It is asserted that Schriever validated this schema in both positive and 
negative cases during the course of his work.  It must immediately be admitted that 
this can only ever be a demonstration, albeit a strong one, rather than a rigorous 
proof.  The component parts might be necessary but not sufficient conditions, or 
might even be coincidences, though correlation in both positive and negative 
directions makes the latter less likely.  It is also not claimed that Schriever himself 
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advanced this thesis.  Where he complied with it, at best it can be stated that he 
did so unconsciously.  There is direct evidence, particularly relating to ICBMs, but 
to a lesser extent in other areas, of where he explicitly acknowledged the 
importance of non-material factors alongside material ones; the importance of 
technical issues can be taken as read given the nature of Schriever’s appointments 
and the acknowledgement of his technical competence, dating all the way back to 
his first appointments following World War 2.  Lastly, Schriever’s actions in 
achieving adequate span of control to drive programmes to success can also be 
clearly demonstrated in several instances. 
Next, it must also be stated that although this thesis established the 
existence of mature numerical scoring systems for technical readiness, and posited 
an analogous, though less rigorously defined, assessment method for conceptual 
and ‘systems’ factors, no attempt has been made to apply these retrospectively to 
Schriever’s work:507  In the case of technology readiness levels, assigning their 
achievement to his various programmes across time would require unachievable 
access to records in order to establish the various dates where different stages of 
technical progress were first demonstrated.  Suffice it to say that for systems that 
entered productive service, achievement of a high TRL has been demonstrated.   
For conceptual and systems factors, the purpose of outlining a scoring 
schema was simply to demonstrate that there was some sort of graduation in the 
state of development reached and that progression along the axis could thus be 
demonstrated.  Defining the values reached at given points would again require 
comprehensive access to records and would additionally involve a greater degree 
of subjectivity.  Nonetheless, success in a programme suggests that these 
problems had been overcome, and where failure can be attributed to them, it again 
validates them as meaningful indicators. 
Validation	of	the	Analytic	Method		
The initial research question posed by this thesis was “What did Bernard 
Schriever believe to be the utility of military spaceflight (manned and unmanned), 
how did he act to realize those beliefs, and to what extent were his views justified?”  
In order to evaluate Schriever’s progress   It is the author’s contention that these 
questions have been answered as follows.   
																																																								
507 Note specifically, as stated above and in Chapter 1, that Technology Readiness Levels were not 
formally codified until the 1980s. 
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Firstly, he believed that development of ballistic missiles had equipped the 
USAF to exploit the emerging space age in all its dimensions.  Next, he had 
already identified the importance of gleaning strategic reconnaissance, principally 
about the intentions and activities of the Soviet Union, and had clear ideas about 
how satellites could contribute the task.508   Additionally, he held the view that 
translation of the strategic deterrent mounted on ICBMs to orbital platforms was 
both possible and desirable, principally driven by concerns that silo-deployed 
missiles would turn large parts of the continental USA into valid military counter-
force targets.  His views on the utility of military manned spaceflight were less 
mature and well developed; he had a sincere belief that after the initial bout of 
experimental and exploratory missions into and beyond Earth orbit, valid military 
missions requiring a manned vehicle would emerge, though he was less clear 
about what those missions would be.  One idea he clung to, probably based on 
early experiences with reconnaissance satellites, was that the problems of 
automation of payload functions on a satellite and general reliability concerns about 
payloads would make crew control and intervention necessary.  The possibility of 
direct combat in space could not be ruled out either, in his opinion, though in the 
time-frames he was directly interested in, he initially proposed experiments to 
establish what a crew member could or could not do, rather than rapid 
advancement of operational systems. 
Regarding how Schriever acted to achieve these aspirations, his direction 
of the ICBM programme provides the clearest and best documented example of his 
management techniques.  He acted as a manager and system integrator, rather 
than a working development engineer, harnessing effective partnerships with 
contractors and placing a premium on comprehensive information flows between 
parties.  He adopted a holistic approach to simultaneous (‘concurrent’) 
development of the operational system, involving both hardware and non-hardware 
factors such as personnel management and training.  He lobbied effectively at the 
highest levels of government to ensure approvals for his plans were forthcoming 
and he acted to secure effective oversight and budgetary authorities to deliver an 
operational system within challenging time-constraints.  The analytic method 
proposed in this thesis assigns these multiple activities to one of three categories 																																																								
508 Although he initially championed the use of satellites for strategic reconnaissance, Schriever was 
undoubtedly aware of other satellite applications in support of terrestrial forces, most obviously 
satellite communications, since that was an (Army-sponsored) application that made use of an Atlas 
launcher as early as December 1958, predating practical reconnaissance efforts.  However he plainly 
saw reconnaissance, and allied surveillance activities such as missile launch warning, as having the 
greatest priority, at least for the USAF. 
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and considers how Schriever used them both in the ICBM and in his other 
initiatives.  This analysis will be reviewed in turn for each of them. 
Finally, regarding the extent to which Schriever’s hopes were justified for 
each of his goals, the analytic method proposed has been used to examine the 
degree of success or reason for failure for each of his major initiatives.  The ICBM 
programme is already widely acknowledged as successful; an early operational 
capability was developed, and the limitations of the earliest platforms were quickly 
addressed by follow-on systems.  Satellite reconnaissance similarly delivered rapid 
early results which further improved over time, and the ICBM fleets provided the 
basis for families of launchers which although much developed and modified, 
served as workhorses for military and civil space programmes for many years. 
Schriever’s faith in space weaponization was far more problematic and 
accomplished much less.  Apart from delivery of a limited anti-satellite and anti-
missile capability, which yielded limited operational capability for about 10 years, 
most of Schriever’s other ideas were broadly misplaced.  Deeper analysis follows 
below, but orbital bombardment systems as envisaged by Schriever proved both 
contrary to emerging national and international strictures, and would arguably have 
faced severe practical difficulties.  Schriever also never succeeded in delivering a 
military manned spaceflight programme, though for more subtle reasons.  Initial 
proposals foundered essentially over policy – specifically because of an American 
wish to establish an identifiably civilian space exploration programme.  Later efforts 
failed (among other reasons) because Schriever was unable to preserve the 
experimental ethos of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory against operational 
imperatives.  Subsequent delays, concomitant cost increases and the budgetary 
strictures of American involvement in conflict in South East Asia led to ultimate 
cancellation after Schriever’s retirement, but it is hard to see how he would have 
addressed these problems had he remained in the service. 
Schriever’s	successes		
As was stated above, Schriever’s management of the ICBM programme is 
arguably the best example of him achieving progress along the three axes of our 
model; it is certainly the best documented.  Within it, he simultaneously maintained 
technical leadership and management of progress, which drove technical risk out 
of the programme while managing systems progress.  He also lobbied and 
manoeuvred consistently to establish and maintain the overall programme 
administrative control and oversight he needed.  The steady path of technical risk 
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reduction can be traced relatively easily; short-range ballistic missiles were 
demonstrated in Europe at the end of World War 2, and studied and improved 
upon during the late 1940s in the USA.  Inspired by his mentor ‘Hap’ Arnold’s faith 
in advanced technologies, and almost certainly informed by exposure to RAND 
Corporation studies as part of his Scientific Liaison duties, Schriever gained a quick 
appreciation of their potential.  He was also, however, acutely aware of the 
problems of accuracy (or otherwise) when compared to the yield of early nuclear 
warheads and range when compared to their weight.  It was 1953 before this 
conundrum was solved by the demonstration of the possibility of a lightweight 
thermonuclear warhead, which was simultaneously light enough to be carried the 
required distance while having sufficient yield to be effective within the accuracy 
achievable at the time.  That Schriever understood all this is demonstrated by the 
presentations he was giving at the time, most obviously demonstrated by the 
‘Rome’ presentation described in Chapter 4.  Between the establishment of WDD 
under Schriever’s command in 1954 and the delivery of the operational Atlas 
system in 1959, he showed a comprehensive understanding of the technical 
challenges he faced.  These included refinement of the Atlas booster design, 
selection and development of the guidance system and proving the design of the 
re-entry vehicle, as well as integrating these sub-systems together to form the 
complete missile.  Again, there is ample evidence in Schriever’s diaries and the 
briefings that he gave, particularly during 1956 and 1957, which he remained fully 
aware of the challenges he faced.   
Regarding system risk and its reduction, it is equally clear, particularly from 
the direction transmitted to ARDC and then to WDD from Headquarters Air Force in 
1955 that the Atlas programme had to address all aspects of delivering an 
operational system, and that Schriever rose to the challenge.  The clearest 
demonstration of this is probably in the monitoring of a personnel and training 
scheme within the WDD performance management system alongside the tracking 
of technical progress, and significant effort to develop suitable infrastructure at the 
development base (Vandenberg Air Force Base) to deliver an early operational 
capability.  Schriever’s own remarks from the time confirm the importance he 
attached to filling in gaps where they had occurred.  Doctrinally, ICBMs fitted 
logically into Air Force capabilities, and there were clearly agreed national policy 
goals to be addressed by the delivery of a credible deterrent system at the earliest 
opportunities, so here, less work was required.  Nonetheless, we also see from 
Schriever’s briefing and advocacy activity that he identified the importance of 
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reassuring the country’s senior leadership that his programme was capable of 
fulfilling these goals.509 
Finally, in the ICBM programme we have Schriever’s clearest adoption of 
concurrency as a management tool.  Even though, as was shown, he was not 
entirely consistent in his application of the term, the ICBM programme met its 
fundamental requirement to be managed in this way; a critically important effort 
afforded ‘crash’ priority. Additionally, Schriever recognised the sclerotic nature of 
the budgetary processes he inherited, and in advocating for and shaping the 
Gillette regulations to supplant them, took effective steps to circumvent the 
problem.  Lastly, note the multiple technical strands (booster, warhead integration, 
re-entry vehicle and guidance system) that Schriever developed simultaneously, 
and close cooperation between the Programme Office and the contractors 
engaged in production.  
All this allowed Schriever to pursue progress towards technical and 
systems risk reduction, enabled by effective management and appropriate 
authorities in the case of the ICBM programme, and that the programme then 
delivered a useful capability on time. 
Turning now to satellite reconnaissance, the Schriever Archive yields clear 
evidence of his grasp of the technical challenges inherent in developing 
reconnaissance satellites; on one hand, as he explained to General Power in 1955, 
he recognised the small increase in velocity required to turn a ballistic payload into 
an orbiting one, but he also recognised that while that would indeed put the 
payload into an orbit it could sustain without thrust, the challenges of the mission 
were only beginning at that point, and constraints such as the need to stabilise and 
orient the satellite correctly and to command it to perform its mission would pose 
significant challenges.   
It was unclear at the start of development efforts what the best method of 
retrieving information from the satellite would be; ejecting undeveloped film from 
the satellite back to Earth solved some technical challenges by circumventing 
them, but also imposed an inevitable delay and additional risks (lost capsules, 
malfunctions during re-entry) to recovering useful information.  The principal 
alternative of developing the film aboard the satellite and encoding and 																																																								
509 It is worth highlighting that despite its deficiencies as a reference document, Vince Ford’s 
description of the personal dynamics of Schriever’s lobbying, and the corroborative detail such as the 
Capitol Building meeting between Schriever and Vice-President Nixon provide a unique resource for 
historians of this period.  
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broadcasting the information contained on the developed film to a ground receiver 
gained much in timeliness but at the cost of complexity, and of other tactical and 
operational disadvantages, for example in the limited time a satellite would be in 
sight of a ground station, and consequent inability to return information fast 
enough.  Schriever’s early preference for ‘develop and broadcast’ methods was 
ahead of the technology of the day, and it was only when he switched his attention 
to film-return that success became possible. 
Schriever’s greatest contribution to the development of satellite 
reconnaissance may have been in the area of system risk reduction.  His very early 
recognition of the strategic imperatives relating to cold-war reconnaissance 
requirements, as evidenced by his conversation and interaction with Dick Leghorn 
in 1946 and 1947 shows a doctrinal and conceptual foresight that was truly 
remarkable.  It is deeply regrettable that Schriever’s Development Planning 
Objective for Intelligence and Reconnaissance appears to be lost.  The inferences 
that can be drawn from its reported content provide substantiation of Schriever’s 
vision, and barring recovery of a copy from an unforeseen source is probably all 
that scholars will be left with.510  Schriever’s enduring faith in the importance of 
strategic reconnaissance throughout the late 1940s and through the 1950s until he 
gained control of the WS-117L programme outlined in Chapter 4 above was plainly 
influential.  His efforts to harness insights arising out of the work of the RAND 
Corporation was also plainly important in terms of conceptual development and 
informing national policy formulation.   
Finally, Schriever faced significant challenges in securing appropriate 
administrative control to manage the reconnaissance satellite programme 
successfully. Chapter 4 described the need both to manage the relationship 
between the USAF and ARPA and to maintain the programme during a time of 
financial stringency.  The fact that it is harder to identify the key breakthroughs that 
Schriever made reflect the problem outlined in Chapter 1; strict metrics for 
administrative action and freedom of manoeuvre are probably not definable.  All 
that can be noted is that Schriever was aware of the problems he faced.  He 
benefited from the Soviet decision to launch Sputnik at a critical moment, which 
plainly demonstrated the feasibility of orbital systems and managed to negotiate 																																																								
510 As was noted in Chapter 4, Schriever commented directly on the fact that the ‘I&R DPO’ was both 
highly classified and circulated on a very limited basis.  It is possible that a copy exists within the 
National Reconnaissance Office archives, and that it might become available through their ongoing 
declassification work.  It is also possible that a copy exists within an archive of personal papers, such 
as that of Colonel Dick Leghorn, currently under conservation at Boston University.  Only the passage 
of time and further archival exploitation will tell in either case. 
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the pitfalls of shared responsibility with ARPA, the establishment of the NRO and 
the concerns of the CIA to his ultimate advantage.511 
This again shows that appropriate attention was paid to the technical, 
system and administrative aspects of the reconnaissance satellite programme, and 
that Schriever was instrumental in each instance.  Does this validate the model?  In 
the strictest sense, ‘no’; in most cases we cannot impute motives to Schriever 
retrospectively.  It can be shown that his decisions were objectively sensible and 
contributed to programme success in several cases, but we can only presume that 
he took them for the reasons implied.  Nonetheless, using it to analyse the 
instances where Schriever failed to achieve his goals can further validate the 
model.  
Failure	cases		
It is impossible to determine when Schriever first thought in detail about the 
potential of military manned spaceflight.  On one hand, he must have been aware 
of the RAND Corporation work on spaceflight, which from its earliest days included 
studies on the practicalities and utility of a manned spacecraft.512  It would also 
seem reasonable to infer that, given his intimate involvement with management of 
Research and Development at Headquarters Air Force, he would at least be aware 
of the bio-medical research interest being shown by the Air Force medical 
community from its outset.  On the other, there is no obvious documentary record 
of him speaking about manned spaceflight until his famous speech in 1957, and 
the topic does not feature significantly in his diary until 1958, when references to 
the MISS programme begin to appear.  Yet his 1957 remarks at San Diego, and 
those that followed them, showed considerable foresight and preparation, 
suggesting previous consideration of the issues.  For now, all that seems 
reasonable to surmise is that he had given manned spaceflight issues some 
attention before 1957, but that the demands of managing the ICBM programme, 
and then the early reconnaissance effort, had occupied his time to a substantial 
extent.  Once military manned spaceflight seemed like an achievable goal, his 
engagement increased substantially. 
																																																								
511 The author acknowledges that the complex relationship between the USAF, the CIA and the 
National Reconnaissance Office is not explored in any depth in this thesis – it would form a valid 
subject for a thesis in its own right – but many of the ramifications played out after Schriever had 
retired from the USAF and as such they would not inform the initial research question. 
512 The challenges of manned spaceflight were explicitly explored, to a greater extent than unmanned 
military applications, within the initial RAND report of 1946, although subsequent RAND studies 
quickly began to explore unmanned applications too. 
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The earliest MISS proposals were a sincere effort to ensure that the USA, 
having lost the race to launch an artificial Earth satellite stood a chance of being 
first to undertake manned spaceflight, but they would also have secured a leading 
role for the USAF within that effort.  However, it would have been contrary to the 
‘space for peace’ policy of the Eisenhower administration, and the proposals died 
with the formation of NASA.  Schriever’s response may have been to nurture the 
development of the manned SAMOS E-5 capsule, ostensibly as a back-up should 
the NASA Mercury capsule encounter difficulties or delay; a slightly conjectural 
account from Day tells the story plausibly, but not irrefutably for our purposes.513  
What does appears unarguable is that Schriever advocated strongly to preserve 
the E-5 capsule, and to promote its use for biomedical research at the end of its 
life; meanwhile, the original reconnaissance payload specialists were puzzled by 
the modifications being made to the capsule.  The point became moot when 
SAMOS E-5 was cancelled for the second time, but once again Schriever’s 
involvement in the BOSS proposal to fly a primate in the SAMOS capsule 
substantiates his interest in the medical aspects of spaceflight and his wish to keep 
the USAF engaged in its exploitation. 
Schriever’s major attempt to secure a manned role in space for the USAF 
was his direction of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory programme.  Here he had a 
funded military spaceflight proposal to direct, but which carried from its early days 
an internal conflict; was it, as its name suggested, a laboratory to determine what 
roles a military astronaut could usefully perform, or was it an operational system to 
deliver reconnaissance and surveillance of potentially hostile territory?  The two 
requirements were not in themselves totally irreconcilable, but nor were they 
completely compatible.514  A measure of the shift in balance between them can be 
gauged from the decision to move the launch site for MOL operations from Cape 
Canaveral in Florida to Vandenberg AFB in California.  The move was undertaken 
in order to enable a polar orbit for the MOL by allowing a southwards launch over 
the Pacific Ocean; such a launch would not be possible either northwards or 
southwards from Cape Canaveral.  The implications for reconnaissance is that the 
MOL would in a polar orbit overfly the entire Earth’s surface in the course of a 																																																								
513 The 1965 Memorandum by Mr Wheelon mentioned in Chapter 5 substantiates the existence of a 
manned SAMOS E-5 proposal, but offers no insight on Schriever’s part in the programme. 
514 This thesis relies heavily on Carl Berger’s account of the MOL programme, as this was the most 
comprehensive account of the programme released in the initial tranche of declassified MOL 
documentation.  It is possible that a more balanced view of the programme, and perhaps resolution of 
questions relating to the true MOL objective – laboratory or operational reconnaissance asset? – will 
become possible as scholars work through the voluminous collection of primary material 
accompanying the declassification decision.  The author is also aware of extant oral history interviews 
not yet released, which might shed further light on this interesting question. 
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mission, but at the (not inconsiderable) cost of developing launch facilities at 
Vandenberg AFB; the laboratory mission would have been entirely possible from 
Cape Canaveral.   
Schriever appears to have had a sound technical grasp of the nature and 
challenges of the MOL mission, and in retrospect those challenges appear soluble.  
The MOL employed several already mature systems – a modified Gemini capsule 
for crew transport and a developed Titan booster (derived from the Titan ICBM that 
Schriever had introduced to service) for launch.  The one test flight of the entire 
programme was a successful sub-orbital trial of the developed booster leading to a 
successful test of the modified Gemini capsule at re-entry.  Only the core MOL 
vehicle was new; regarding its technical plausibility, all we can note is that within 10 
years a larger, but conceptually similar, vehicle served as the NASA Skylab 
laboratory.  That programme in turn conducted three successful missions 
comparable or longer in duration than the intended MOL flights and in fact 
demonstrating capabilities such as crew repairs that the MOL had been intended to 
explore. 
On the conceptual side, Schriever again oversaw some of the necessary 
lines of development; most notably in recruitment of an astronaut cadre for the 
MOL.  However, in the author’s opinion, the fatal conceptual flaw in the MOL 
programme was Schriever’s inability to retain the experimental or laboratory nature 
of its mission.  Once the MOL became inextricably linked to reconnaissance 
requirements, the intelligence community and their operational imperatives, its fate 
was taken out of Schriever’s hands and became hostage to delays, cost increases 
and budgetary vicissitudes beyond his control.  In fact, Schriever had retired from 
the USAF before the programme was cancelled, but this in itself emphasises the 
delays the programme had endured. 
Schriever’s other conceptual and policy initiatives relating to manned 
military spaceflight, such as his promotion of the 1961 Air Force space policy and 
the ‘Lunar Expeditionary Force’, also suffered from critical conceptual flaws, most 
notably the impact of the emerging consensus about peaceful uses of space that 
would be enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.  They were never tested at 
the programme level, and it seems fair to assess them as technically impractical 
too, certainly as over-ambitious; consider, for example, the size and scope of the 
Apollo programme, which over 5 years of flight operations managed to land a total 
of 12 astronauts on the lunar surface for no more than 3 days at a time, with the 
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USAF’s 1961 aspiration to have a permanently manned base on the Moon with a 
population of about 20 astronauts, and with occupation commencing early in 1968. 
In summary, then, the USAF’s Manned Spaceflight aspirations had the 
characteristics of a ‘pet project’ according to our analytic scheme.  Much (though 
not all) of it was technically plausible, and in most cases Schriever seems to have 
had a clear idea about where the remaining challenges lay and how they might be 
addressed.  Conceptually, however, he struggled to describe the missions that 
military astronauts might perform, and to translate that vision into practical action.  
Additionally, his plans fell foul of emerging legal norms and diverged from emerging 
US government policy.  By tying the development of the MOL to an operational 
requirement, he also exposed the programme to budgetary pressures that 
ultimately led to its cancellation. 
Finally, in the field of space weaponization, Schriever pursued ideas that 
seem radical and forward leaning even today.  In a very limited case – that of 
delivering an operational anti-satellite system – he led the introduction into service 
of a credible system.  The development of System 437 followed the model for 
successful programs outlined – technical success, in this case largely driven by the 
adaptation of systems already in service and careful development of infrastructure, 
coupled with collaboration to develop the radar required for an effective system and 
advocacy leading to a policy-compliant system that satisfied legal norms.  In the 
case of orbital bombardment systems, however, Schriever again failed to make 
adequate progress both in the technical and conceptual arenas.515  The hardest 
part of the analysis is to work out which was the less practical: the technical 
feasibility or otherwise of his ideas or the conceptual and policy difficulties he would 
have faced in implementing them.516  Taking the latter first, Schriever had clear 
ideas why orbital bombardment systems were desirable, coherently stated in the 
first Schriever-Cohen manuscript.  But he failed to persuade others of their merits 
and in fact was fighting an emerging consensus to the contrary across the US 																																																								
515 It would be instructive to gain access to the source(s) of Schriever’s conceptual underpinnings for 
his ideas here.  A useful start would be to gain sight of Harry Evans’ Air War College paper of 1956-
57, which almost certainly had some influence on Schriever’s thinking.  However, despite ongoing 
FOIA requests by the author, it remains classified and un-releasable in 2016, the 60th anniversary of 
its writing.   
516 In this respect, uncovering a copy of Dornberger’s original report to the USAF from 1947, and any 
contemporary accounts of the ‘NABS’ programme that followed it, might shed light on how and why so 
many people at the time had faith in bombardment systems and how their technical challenges were 
viewed at the time.  Further amplification of the PCBS proposal of 1960 would also be useful; all that 
can be found at present is the correspondence between the USAF and Congress which 
acknowledges the discussions on such a programme had taken place with industry.  However, no 
clues have been uncovered at all about where such records might exist, and in the case of 
NABS/PCBS documentation it is likely that they would still be classified.  
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administration.  There is no clue anywhere in the Schriever Archive as to why his 
summary of this rationale in the Schriever-Cohen manuscript was not published, 
but it is clear that what advocacy he did attempt was unsuccessful.  
Simultaneously, he demonstrated some understanding of the technical challenges 
he would have faced, and in some cases he had plausible means of overcoming 
them, but he severely underestimated their magnitude.  As such, Schriever’s 
enthusiasm for orbital bombardment systems provides evidence of failure to make 
progress on either technical or policy development.  Policy might conceivably have 
changed with the passage of time or the arrival of a new administration, but it 
appears to the author that the technical challenges could not have been overcome 
with the technology of the day (or even with any plausible extrapolation of it).  As 
such, orbital bombardment systems fell, marginally, into the category of a 
‘daydream’ – a conceptually desirable outcome (in Schriever’s eyes) that exceeded 
the technical competence of the time. 
The	analytic	model	–	summary		
This thesis has thus shown the plausibility of the analytic model in both 
positive and negative senses.  Where its prescriptions were followed, programmes 
were broadly successful, and where failure occurred, there were clear problems on 
at least one of its lines of activity.   It should be noted however that Schriever, who 
was keen in his earlier days to outline his management methods, most notably in 
the case of concurrency, does not appear to have analysed his own work in these 
terms at any point.  Additionally, the rationale behind decisions must often remain 
speculative; in the absence of clear evidence, a sound decision leading to a 
successful outcome might still have been made for erroneous, speculative or even 
lucky reasons.  Nonetheless, the model utilised would form the basis for a plausible 
analytic tool for any introduction of a technically advanced system into defence or 
military service, as demonstrated here by its use against multiple test cases from 
Schriever’s career. 
So how could the model be adapted or further validated?  Any future test 
case should be chosen with an eye to the quality of data likely to be available; on 
one hand this favours further historical studies rather than any attempt to analyse 
ongoing projects, if only to avoid issues of classification.  On the other, it probably 
constrains suitable cases to the recent past, if only to ensure sufficient data and 
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perhaps access to participants and their recollections.517  A possible improvement 
would be to develop a more systematic and discriminating schema for analysing 
‘concept space’; this might, however, be purely of use to retrospective analysis.  
TRLs as a metric are currently used by project practitioners and managers as 
working tools to measure progress, enforce contracts, judge research proposals 
and award funding, to name but some uses.  Whether there would be the same 
appetite for a conceptual framework is less clear, but its merits as an analytic tool 
seems established. 
Closing	thoughts	on	Schriever		
Along the course of this analysis, several new insights about Schriever 
have emerged, which may be of use to other scholars working on his life.  One of 
the original spurs to the author when embarking on research for this thesis was a 
casual remark made about Schriever by a retired historian who has worked on this 
period extensively.  He noted in personal correspondence with the author: “After 
his retirement, Schriever got carried away pushing weapons in space with which to 
attack the earth and shoot down missiles. Sad ending.” The prospect of exploring 
views on space weaponization was intriguing, although in the end, this thesis says 
almost nothing about Schriever’s post-retirement interests.518   
What emerged, however, was a portrait of Schriever’s achievements and 
failures that went beyond the reasonably well studied aspects of ICBM 
development, and showed considerable conceptual subtlety in Schriever’s 
analysis.  In most cases where his aspirations were either impractical, or with 
hindsight undesirable, he nonetheless had deeply held views which he had thought 
about carefully to justify them.  To point out the flaws in his thinking, or to explain 
why those outcomes are now held to be undesirable does nothing to diminish the 
sincerity with which he held them.  Previously unknown Schriever writings emerged 
during exploration of the Schriever Archive at the Library of Congress.   
Within that archive, on one hand, Schriever’s diaries proved less 
illuminating than the author initially hoped; much of the content is mundane, some 
is obscure due to abbreviation, and questions must persist about its completeness.  																																																								
517 One possible topic might be an appraisal of the Manhattan Project during World War 2; it meets 
the criteria of technical complexity, novelty at the time and coincident technical, managerial and 
conceptual challenges.  Others might be to look at the introduction of nuclear propulsion to maritime 
strategy, or the more recent move to precision-guided munitions in terrestrial combat. 
518 The originator is almost certainly referring to Schriever’s post-USAF employment as a consultant 
to President-elect Reagan during 1980-81 as a member of the Transition Team preparing him for his 
assumption of office, and prior to the announcement and development of the ‘Strategic Defense 
Initiative’ (SDI) from 1983 onwards. 
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On the other, the discovery of two co-authored but unpublished book manuscripts, 
one certainly and one probably the joint work of Schriever and Samuel Cohen was 
an unexpected surprise; the earlier of the two provides Schriever’s otherwise 
unknown rationale for orbital bombardment.  Some gaps in the Archive record, 
probably attributable to enduring classification, were addressed by NRO 
declassification activity, shedding additional light on Schriever’s contribution to 
space-based reconnaissance, and particularly the MOL programme.   
Finally, the Ford manuscript provided context for some of the personal 
interactions around the core of the ICBM programme, but to the extent that they 
illustrate Schriever’s enduring care and regard for his old colleague in attempting to 
bring the manuscript to market, even after his own retirement, does him credit.  In 
the end, like some of his other space aspirations, this attempt failed, though 
sections of Ford’s thinking survive in Neil Sheehan’s biography of Schriever.   
In summary, the high regard in which the USAF held Schriever (evidenced 
by the tribute of renaming Schriever AFB in his honour) shone through, and the 
reasoning behind this esteem became clearer.  It is the author’s hope that other 
scholars will return to Schriever as a topic for research; there are still gaps in the 
accounts of his life that could be covered, and this conclusion has outlined sources, 
and potential lines of enquiry that might profitably be explored to fill them.    
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